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ABSTRACT 
 
  DEREK SMITH KEYSER: Horror in Euripides‘ Hecuba and Heracles 
   (Under the direction of Peter Smith) 
 
 
This dissertation investigates horrific material in Euripides‘ Hecuba and Heracles. It 
applies analytic models found in modern horror criticism to discuss graphic violence and the 
contradiction of normative cultural conventions within these plays. It argues that in both 
plays Euripides uses horrific material to demonstrate the inadequacy of such conventions as 
protections against ruthless brutality. It concludes that by eliciting horror from his audiences 
and denying them the possibility of resolution following disaster Euripides invites them to 
question the stability of their cultural framework.    
In my first chapter I discuss how we should define and identify horror in ancient 
tragedy. I begin my investigation with an analysis of fear in Aristotle‘s Poetics, but I turn to 
modern horror theory to find a more suitable approach for identifying tragic horror. I adopt 
the approach of Noel Carroll, who argues that horror is generated by severe and violent 
contradictions of normative cultural categories.  
 In my second chapter, I focus on horrific disruptions found in the Hecuba. I focus on 
three areas of the horrific in this play: the presence of ghosts, incidents of aberrant violence 
against φίλοι, and the manipulation of cultural categories in Hecuba‘s revenge. In my third 
chapter I analyze the way the horrific massacre in the Heracles subverts traditional 
assumptions concerning religion, family, and home.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been long recognized that Greek tragedy elicited the most profound emotions 
from its audience. Plato complains of its ability to bring even the most self-possessed to weep 
in sorrow and shudder in fear (Rep. 387a-387e and 605a – 607a, Phdr. 268c-d); Herodotus 
mentions that Phrynichus‘ Sack of Miletus brought the entire audience to tears, and the 
Athenians prohibited the material from appearing in future productions (6.21); in the Life of 
Aeschylus we read that the monstrous chorus of the Eumenides was so shocking that it caused 
children to faint and pregnant women to miscarry (Life Of Aeschylus 1.35-1.38). While the 
last story is likely apocryphal,
1
 its essential point, that the opening of the Eumenides horrified 
its audience, does not seem controversial. Aristophanes makes a similar claim about 
Aeschylus‘ fondness for shocking material in Frogs 962, and modern critics have frequently 
described the play‘s opening as horrific.2 Although Aeschylus is the tragedian most 
frequently associated with horror,
3
 gruesome and shocking material can be found also in the 
works of Sophocles and Euripides: the oozing sores of Philoctetes and Medea‘s chariot 
bearing her own children‘s corpses are no less disturbing than the monstrous Furies. 
Despite the pervasive presence of horrific material in tragedy there has not been an 
adequate treatment of horror and its function in the plays. Many scholars apply the terms 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Lefkowitz (1981) vii-xi on the general unreliability of the Lives. Regarding this specific passage, however, 
she notes: ―Detail makes the story sound plausible‖ (71). 
 
2
 E.g. Kitto (1961) 87-88, Taplin (1977) 371, Stanford (1983) 161-162, Belfiore (1992) 21-25. I offer a 
provisional discussion of the passage in my first chapter pages 12-13. 
 
3
 In discussing the monstrous spectacles condemned in Aristotle‘s Poetics,  Lucas (1968) ad 1453b9 notes: ―It is 
not known to what [Aristotle] is referring unless it be Aeschylus.‖ Cf. also De Romilly (1958) and Konstan 
(2006) 144-148. 
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horror and horrific to tragic passages without defining them or explaining how these scenes 
achieve this effect. Rosenmeyer, for example, sees ―sheer horror‖ and tragedy as mutually 
exclusive categories but does not offer a clear explanation of this distinction.
4
 Kitto describes 
the report of Creon‘s and Glauce‘s deaths in the Medea as ―sheer Grand Guignol,‖ an 
example of horror not ―enveloped in the greater emotion of pity.‖ He also claims that the 
audience experiences a ―catharsis of horror‖ after realizing that these characters ―are the 
victim of an almost external force.‖5 Kitto‘s reading, based on ideas found in Aristotle‘s 
Poetics, is more developed than Rosenmeyer‘s account, but it does not explain fully how 
Euripides achieves this horror nor why violence from an ―external force‖ relieves the 
audience of the feeling.
6
 This kind of analysis is common in modern scholarship: critics 
assume that descriptions of graphic violence and monstrous spectacles can safely be dubbed 
horrific without further qualification. 
I contend that we should be more cautious in our assessments of tragic horror. Casual 
references to the horrific are not very useful to readers who wish to understand the emotional 
effect of ancient tragedy; often these references merely tell the reader what he or she already 
knew (i.e. that a scene is graphically violent) but fail to explain how the horrific fits into the 
play as a whole. Since tragedy appealed to its audience largely by eliciting particular 
emotional reactions from them,
7
 we should examine specifically what prompted these 
emotions and how the generation of these emotions affected the audience‘s assessment of the 
                                                          
4
 Rosenmeyer (1987). 
 
5
 Kitto (1961) 192-197. 
 
6
 He initially cites Aristotle‘s contention that a kinsman knowingly slaying another kinsman is the worst sort of 
violence, but his focus on the horrific death of Glauce, who shares no relation with her killer, does not fit with 
this premise.  
 
7
 This is Aristotle‘s contention (Poet. 1449b24-1449b28); cf. Heath (1987) 37-89. 
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scene and of the entire play. In this dissertation I investigate both of these issues through 
discussions of ancient and modern theories concerning emotional responses to fiction and 
through analyses of horrific content in two dramas. I focus on two Euripidean plays, the 
Hecuba and Heracles, for several reasons. First, they contain an abundance of material that 
can be described as horrific, according to definitions I shall provide. Second, they are 
notoriously difficult plays and I believe my analysis can contribute to critical discussions of 
their meaning. Finally, there has not been a comprehensive examination of horror in the 
works of Euripides, and I believe the analysis of these two plays can help us to understand 
other Euripidean tragedies.  
   In my first chapter I discuss how we should define and identify horror in ancient 
tragedy. I begin my investigation with an analysis of fear in Aristotle‘s Poetics, which is 
commonly considered an authoritative text on the emotional effects of Greek tragedy. While 
Aristotle provides valuable insights, especially in his cognitive theory of emotions, his 
account of tragic fear is limited by his focus on form rather than content. I examine in detail 
one passage in the Poetics that seems promising for understanding tragic horror, namely 
Aristotle‘s condemnation of ὄψις and its tendency to produce τὸ τερατ῵δες rather than τὸ 
φοβερόν (1453b8-1453b10). I show through an investigation of τέρας-words in the Aristotelian 
corpus that the philosopher is not, as many scholars claim, condemning monstrous spectacle 
(e.g. the Erinyes in Eumenides) but rather spectacles that deviate from an established plot 
arrangement.  
Because the Poetics fails to define clearly what constitutes fearsome or horrific 
content in tragedy, I turn to modern horror theory to find a suitable approach for identifying 
tragic horror. I adopt the approach of Noel Carroll, who argues that audiences experience 
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horror when confronted with a monster that is not only frightening but also repulsive. He 
appeals to the anthropological research of Mary Douglas in defining this repulsion as a 
reaction to an impurity based on a contradiction of cultural categories. He concludes that 
when audience members witness a fictional character confronted by such a repellent threat, 
they share with these fictional victims an assessment of the threat as something repulsive and 
frightening, and consequently they relate to the victim through a sympathetic emotional 
reaction of horror. I then propose an application of Carroll‘s model to the horrific in tragedy, 
which I define as the severe and violent contradiction of normative cultural categories. I 
conclude with a discussion of the benefits of this approach for understanding the difficult and 
contradictory material found in the plays of Euripides. I argue that his tragedies, like the 
bleakest of modern horror fictions, presented the audience with anomalous disruptions of 
social order that can never be fully eliminated or resolved.   
 In my second chapter, I focus on horrific disruptions found in the Hecuba. Many 
critics have assessed the play on an ethical basis, particularly through their praise or 
condemnation of the eponymous protagonist and her gruesome revenge. I argue that such 
readings are inadequate since Euripides persistently inserts confusing and contradictory 
elements that resist simple moral evaluation. I focus on three areas of the horrific in this play: 
the presence of ghosts, incidents of aberrant violence against φίλοι, and the manipulation of 
cultural categories in Hecuba‘s revenge. In the first section of the chapter I analyze how 
Euripides contrasts the ghosts of Polydorus and Achilles to create a severe disjunction 
between appearance and reality: Polydorus‘ unkempt and disfigured image suggests 
threatening behavior, but he does not express violent desires, while Achilles‘ resplendent 
armor and distinguished tomb contrast with his dissatisfaction with his burial and consequent 
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bloodlust. This contradiction establishes a chaotic atmosphere in which violence can come 
from unlikely sources. In the second section I discuss how two killers in the play, Odysseus 
and Polymestor, appropriate the language of friendship (φιλία) to defend horrific acts of 
violence against innocents. The similarities between the two reveal how easily bonds of φιλία 
can be distorted so as to incorporate the sort of repulsive violence against which φιλία 
relationships are supposed to protect people. Then I examine Hecuba‘s subversion of familiar 
political and gender-based distinctions in avenging her son. She allows others to presume that 
she as a female slave is harmless, but her horrific revenge is associated with masculine 
aggression and regal authority. I conclude by examining the Final Girl motif in modern 
horror fiction and its relevance for our understanding of Hecuba‘s character. I argue that 
Euripides, like modern producers of horror, offers this horrific depiction of her revenge not 
for the sake of moral condemnation but in order to challenge his audience‘s preconceptions 
about their world. The tragedian reveals the instability of cultural distinctions and categories, 
and he shows how this instability results in human vulnerability.  
 In my third chapter I analyze the way the horrific massacre in the Heracles subverts 
traditional assumptions concerning religion, family, and home. Scholars have noted some of 
the play‘s disturbing contradictions (e.g. Iris and Lyssa, Heracles‘ dual parentage), but their 
readings are limited by their contention that Euripides resolves these contradictions through 
the appearance of Theseus and the departure to Athens in the finale. I argue that the drama 
resists such resolution; the disruptive elements found in the massacre are present throughout 
the play and the horror it generates is never purged. In the first section of the chapter I 
examine how Euripides distorts fundamental structures of Greek religion. The shocking 
appearance of Iris and Lyssa confirms the unreliability of human belief found in the first half 
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of the play. The goddesses introduce unsettling contradictions by challenging the Greek 
belief in divine reciprocity, disrupting the play‘s narrative movement, violating traditional 
dramatic conventions, and defying expectations based on visual appearance. I argue that 
these contradictions are never fully resolved: the rational approach of Theseus does not 
sufficiently account for the many complications following the massacre, such as the pollution 
of Heracles and his weapons. In the second section I explore the horrific disruption of the 
family. Before the massacre the tragedian depicts two competing models of fatherhood for 
Heracles: Amphitryon as vulnerable but attentive and Zeus as powerful but remote. The 
messenger‘s description of the massacre illustrates a horrific contradiction of these two 
models. While his family repeatedly appeals to their kinship with Heracles, he acts like a 
foreign intruder in his own home and slaughters his family as though they were enemies. The 
family is never restored, as Theseus‘ offer to bring Heracles to Athens permanently removes 
him from his home and from his father. In my final section I discuss the violent corruption of 
the home. Euripides establishes the house as a secure place of refuge during the first half of 
the play, but the massacre undercuts this assumption. The intrusion of Lyssa and Heracles‘ 
rampage demonstrate the building‘s permeability. The messenger‘s explicit descriptions of 
familiar architectural details corrupted by unsettling violence call further attention to the 
home as a locus of horror. I compare this corruption of a familiar safe space with a similar 
trope found in modern horror fiction. I conclude that the Heracles, like the Hecuba, ends 
with the irreparable disintegration of cultural distinctions and categories.  
 Ultimately this dissertation demonstrates that scenes of horror are important for our 
understanding of tragedy and its audience. Though Euripides‘ interest in defying tradition 
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and shocking his audience is well known,
8
 my investigation of the contradictory elements in 
his depictions of gruesome violence reveals a sustained interest in exposing the instability of 
cultural categories and distinctions. The tragedian used horrific spectacles and descriptions to 
probe the fundamental assumptions that Athenians took for granted. He invited them to 
consider how the familiar institutions and values that failed to protect tragic characters 
onstage might also fail to protect the audience from the horrors of the everyday world. 
Though Euripides did not present Athenians with instruction on the proper way to address 
such disruptions, I contend that his use of the horrific nonetheless served a valuable function. 
By upsetting his audience‘s assumptions he encouraged them to think critically about the 
fragility of the social and cultural structures that defined their lives.    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Cf. Michelini (1987) 70-93. 
  
 
 
I. DEFINING HORROR IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 
 
An action represented in tragedy may be too bloody and atrocious. It may 
excite such movements of horror as will not soften into pleasure; and the 
greatest energy of expression, bestowed on descriptions of that nature, serves 
only to augment our uneasiness. Such is that action represented in ―The 
Ambitious Stepmother,‖ here a venerable old man, raised to the height of fury 
and despair, rushes against a pillar, and striking his head upon it besmears it 
all over with mingled brains and gore. The English theatre abounds too much 
with such shocking images.  
 
- Hume Of Tragedy  
This critique of horror in 18
th
 century English drama could easily be applied to tragic 
productions from Athens more than two millennia earlier.
1
 We find in these plays graphic 
descriptions of blood and gore (Medea, Agamemnon), on-stage representations of corpses 
brutally murdered (Bacchae, Heracles), actors suffering gruesome torture and punishment 
(Prometheus Bound, Trachiniae), and many other unpleasant features that Hume would 
likely deem ―shocking images.‖ The abundant supply of such material in ancient drama 
raises two significant questions: how did ancient audiences react to these explicit depictions 
of violence? And if they, like Hume, found these depictions shocking and horrifying, why 
did ancient tragedians include such material? 
In this chapter I will discuss some preliminary considerations that will help answer 
these questions in later chapters. My primary aims in this chapter are to establish the 
presence of horrific material in Greek tragedy, to provide a satisfactory approach for 
identifying the horrific in tragedy, and to explain how an examination of the horrific might 
help modern readers to understand ancient dramas, particularly those of Euripides, more 
                                                          
1
 Dadlez (2005) notes this similarity by comparing Hume‘s approach to tragic spectacle to that of Aristotle.  
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fully. I have divided the chapter into four sections: in the first part I discuss briefly several 
scenes from ancient drama that are relevant to a discussion of tragic horrors; in the second I 
analyze ancient literary criticism, particularly Aristotle‘s Poetics, in seeking an explanation 
for tragic horror from a source familiar with ancient performances and audiences; after 
establishing the inadequacy of ancient treatments, I investigate modern approaches to horror 
in the third section; in the final section I explain how an application of modern approaches to 
horror can help modern readers understand the complex plays of Euripides. Like producers of 
modern horror, the tragedian presents his audience with chaotic environments in which 
disturbing, aberrant violence cannot be predicted or prevented. We should not condemn the 
ambiguous and contradictory nature of these scenes as evidence of poor artistry or mere 
rebelliousness.
2
 We should instead appreciate Euripides‘ ability to use horrific descriptions 
and spectacles to challenge his audience and encourage them to ponder the fragility of 
familiar conventions and distinctions that they took for granted.   
A) What Horror? Preliminary Examples in Ancient Tragedy   
Before discussing the horror to be found in the tragedies of Euripides, we first must 
identify horror and consider whether it is relevant to ancient drama. Contemporary scholars 
define horror as an emotional reaction comprised of fear and repulsion.
3
 It is the feeling 
humans experience when confronted with a stimulus that conveys danger and generates 
disgust, such as a rotting corpse or a room full of roaches. The reaction is commonly 
associated with the horror genre, which is largely defined by its intended emotional effect.
4
 
Modern horror films generate this emotion by depicting violent actions or entities that are not 
                                                          
2
 Both criticisms have been applied to Euripides frequently .Cf. my discussion on pages 51-55 below. 
 
3
 E.g. Colavito (2008) 13, Cavallaro (2002) 2-5, Carroll (1987) 52-53, Stanford (1983) 34. 
 
4
 This is the view of Noel Carroll, whose work I shall discuss thoroughly in section C below. 
10 
 
only frightening but also gruesome and repulsive. The removal of either element from such a 
film would change its classification. Action films, such as Die Hard (1988) or Batman 
(1989), are full of tense and frightening situations, but the heroes and villains are not 
revolting, nor is the violence presented as something repellent. Similarly, audiences are not 
horrified by the graphic dismemberment found in Monty Python and the Holy Grail (1975) 
because the comedy lacks the frightening component of horror. While horrific moments can 
be found outside of the horror genre,
5
  this genre‘s focus on gruesome acts and characters 
within frightening contexts helps clarify the  emotional effect it frequently generates. 
  But does this modern explanation of genre and emotion resonate with ancient Greek 
thought? There was no ancient literary genre comparable to modern horror and no single 
Greek word for ―horror.‖ While several terms designate fear (e.g. φόβος, δέος, τάρβος)6 and 
disgust or repulsion (e.g. στύγος, μῖσος),7 no single term combines both elements. The term 
φρίκη and related words are the closest in meaning to the Latin word horror, which denotes a 
physical response involving shuddering or trembling often associated with fear. The use of 
φρίκη-terms also frequently denotes intense fear in Greek literature: Aristotle argues that 
Greek tragedy causes even those who read the play without witnessing its performance to 
shudder with fear (φρίττειν, 1453b5). It should be noted, however, that the fear associated 
with φρίκη-terms does not necessarily include repulsion: Creon in Antigone shudders (φρίσσω, 
997) upon hearing Teiresias‘ vague pronouncement of danger. Similarly, other promising 
                                                          
5
 There can be horrific moments within other genres. In the action film Mad Max (1979) for example, the 
protagonist punishes one of the villains by forcing him to sever his own foot; the same scenario can be found in 
the horror film Saw (2004). Similarly, I contend that Euripidean tragedies, while not examples of horror fiction 
per se, contain horrific scenes. 
 
6
 De Romilly (1958) 14 n. 1 contains a fuller list of these terms. See Stanford (1983) 27-28 for further 
discussion of their specific implications. 
 
7
 Stanford (1983) 34. 
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terms reveal a broad semantic range. Belfiore has noted the frequent appearances of ἔκπληξις 
and related terms to describe the shocked and frightened reactions caused by the Gorgons,
8
 
whose dangerous powers and repulsive snake-haired appearance one can reasonably describe 
as horrific. Stanford adds that horror, unlike terror (φόβος), ―tends to paralyse and transfix‖ 
and thus the Gorgon was ―the chief emblem of paralysing horror in ancient Greece.‖9 Like 
φρίκη-terms, however, ἔκπληξις-words can denote emotions not related to fear or disgust: for 
example, Plato and Euripides use ἐκπλήσσω to describe those afflicted with intense feelings 
of lust and love (Symp. 192b7, Hipp. 38).  
  The lack of a precise Greek analogue for the modern term ―horror‖ does not, 
however, prove the absence of an analogous emotional response in the ancient world. Greek 
emotional vocabulary in general is often incongruous with modern classification. Some 
emotion-related terms, such as θυμός or ἔλεος cannot be precisely and conveniently expressed 
by one word in English: while modern translations typically render them ―anger‖ and ―pity,‖ 
respectively, the exact meanings are more complicated.
10
 The discrepancies in terminology 
should not prompt us to conclude that Greeks did not experience ―anger‖ as we know it (or 
that we do not experience θυμός) – there are many examples of ancient emotional descriptions 
that fit the modern criteria for anger.
11
 Moreover, there is literary evidence that suggests 
Greeks felt the same combination of emotions, fear and repulsion, that can be found in 
                                                          
8
 Belfiore (1992) 21. 
 
9
 Stanford (1983) 34. 
 
10
Stanford (1983) 21-48, Konstan (2006) 3-40. 
 
11
 Konstan differentiates ancient Greek emotions from modern ones by noting that Greeks ―understood 
emotions as responses not to events but to actions, or situations resulting from actions, that entail consequences 
for one‘s own or others‘ relative social standing‖ (40). This distinction is useful in analyzing Greek descriptions 
of emotions, but should not influence our understanding of the reactions themselves. Konstan notes, for 
example, that the Greeks might not have designated as an emotion (πάθος) sadness resulting from a natural event 
(e.g. the death of a loved one from illness), but that classification does not prove that Greeks did not feel grief in 
such situations.  
12 
 
modern definitions of horror. We should pay careful attention to the language and context of 
the passages in which these emotions seem to appear and use these passages to consider 
ancient attitudes towards this material. I will consider briefly one such instance in tragedy 
and then discuss some of the larger concerns that even a superficial reading presents.  
The Eumenides of Aeschylus provides an illustrative example of horror in Greek 
tragedy. At the beginning of the play, the Pythia is terrified and repulsed after witnessing the 
polluted Orestes and monstrous Erinyes. Her account of the scene conveys horror through 
incorporation of terms relating to fear and disgust (34-59). She clearly indicates her fear at 
the outset of her speech, labeling the material that follows as both terrible to report and 
terrible to behold (ἦ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ’ ὀφθαλμοῖς δρακεῖν). Soon after she notes that she has 
become so frightened that she has reverted to a childlike state (δείσασα γὰρ γραῦς οὐδέν, 
ἀντίπαις μὲν οὖν). The Pythia further highlights the repulsive qualities of these figures: she 
views Orestes as someone defiled and loathed by the gods (θεομυσῆ). She finds the Erinyes 
even more repellent, calling them disgusting (βδελύκτροποι) and noting the foul material 
(δυσφιλῆ λίβα) issuing from their eyes. The Pythia‘s explicit references to the frightening and 
repulsive aspects of these figures reveal her horrified reaction and perhaps serve as helpful 
prompts for the audience‘s response to the Erinyes when they appear onstage.12     
The terms of fear and disgust are helpful for identifying this passage as horrific, but 
we must consider other elements and contextual cues such as the actor‘s gestures and the 
tone of these lines. The Pythia‘s speech contains many such implicit signs of fear and 
                                                          
12
 The relationship between characters‘ emotions and those of the audience is complex. It is not necessarily the 
case, for example, that the original audience shared Creon‘s anger in Antigone or the protagonist‘s joy after 
mutilating her enemy in Hecuba. I agree with Mastronarde (2010) 96-97 that characters without a personal 
stake the play‘s immediate drama, such as the Pythia here or (often) members of the chorus, can provide ―an 
internal analogue‖ for the theatrical audience and thus prompt the appropriate emotional response. Easterling 
(1990) notes that when the characters are more fully engaged in the dramatic conflict, the audience members‘ 
reactions depend on assessments of these characters‘ actions and beliefs.    
13 
 
revulsion. Her frantic repetitions and retractions (δεινὰ ... δεινὰ; γυναικ῵ν ... οὔτοι γυναῖκας), 
her intense physical reaction which prevents her from walking upright, her vivid descriptions 
of dripping blood and oppressive snoring, her allusion to the notorious Gorgons, and her 
judgment concerning the impropriety of the monsters‘ presence inside the temple (κόσμος οὔτε 
... δίκαιος οὔτ’) all suggest extreme emotional disturbance involving the same combination of 
fear and disgust that are explicitly present in emotional vocabulary discussed above.  
This example conveniently includes both implicit and explicit cues for interpreting 
the scene as something horrific, but there are many tragic passages that present similar 
material without the  same detailed emotional vocabulary; though the eponymous hero of 
Philoctetes is explicitly called frightening (δεινός, 147), his repulsive aspects are first 
conveyed through vivid descriptions of his grotesque affliction (e.g. 7-11, 37-38). Therefore, 
if we are to locate and analyze horrific passages in Greek tragedy generally, we must be 
prepared not only to isolate specific terminology related to fear and disgust but also to 
consider other linguistic and performative elements that elicit the same emotional reaction. 
By looking closely at these elements we can discover what ancient audiences found horrific 
and how ancient tragedians like Euripides incorporated horrific material into their plays.   
In the following sections I will provide a more detailed discussion of horror in ancient 
tragedy. I shall begin by looking at the role of fear and horror in Aristotle‘s Poetics. Then I 
will discuss the contribution of modern horror scholarship to our understanding of horror in 
tragedy. Finally, I will present a new approach to horror that incorporates elements of both 
ancient and modern theories and that shall serve as a guide for analyzing the horror found in 
Euripides‘ Hecuba and Heracles. 
 
14 
 
B) Aristotle and Horror  
 Aristotle is the first extant thinker to attempt a thorough schematic account of how a 
poet or speaker generates specific emotional responses from an audience.
13
 Of particular 
concern for this discussion is his analysis of tragedy found in the Poetics, in which the 
philosopher identifies the essential parts of a tragic drama and notes the characteristic 
emotional reactions it elicits from an audience, namely pity and fear. Unfortunately, as I shall 
discuss below, his remarks on fear in the Poetics are often unclear; moreover, he does not 
treat disgust as a significant emotion related to tragedy.   In order to alleviate the first 
problem, I shall first discuss briefly the definition of fear in the Rhetoric before analyzing its 
role in the Poetics. I will then consider his remarks on spectacle and the monstrous, which 
are relevant for our understanding of tragic horror. I conclude, however, that the Aristotelian 
emphasis on form, particularly plot arrangement, does not adequately account for the horrific 
content found in tragedy.        
B.1) Rhetoric  
Aristotle presents detailed accounts of several emotions, including fear, in the 
Rhetoric. The philosopher offers a cognitive account of the emotions: our emotions are 
essentially judgments concerning particular stimuli that cause concomitant physical 
responses.
14
 He thus categorizes emotions based on these cognitive and physical aspects: the 
cognitive dimension entails a judgment of the potential benefits or harms of the stimulus, 
while the physical dimension entails pleasure or pain as a result of that judgment. While 
Aristotle does not discuss repulsion in detail, he defines fear as a pain felt at the thought of 
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some destructive or painful event in the future (ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ 
φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ, 1382a21-1382a22). He further specifies the 
objects of our fear as things of sufficient magnitude and nearness – evils that are essentially 
harmless or very remote are unlikely to trigger our fears (1382a22-1382a27). Furthermore, if 
these threats are very near and very large, the subjects will be totally overcome by intense 
fear (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) and unable to feel any other emotions, such as pity (1385b29-33).15 If an 
orator wants to put his audience into such a state of fear, Aristotle recommends that he ―make 
them feel that they really are in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to 
others who were stronger than they are, and is happening, or has happened, to people like 
themselves, at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected 
time‖ (1383a9-1383a 12). 
  The emphasis on unpredictability suggests that there are two sides to fear-mongering. 
The speaker must present the threat as something identifiable and imminent; vaguely 
foreboding statements do not satisfy the condition of nearness needed to arouse fear. By 
using specific examples of victims who are similar to, or even stronger than, the audience, 
the orator can amplify the immediacy and magnitude of the danger and enhance the listeners‘ 
terror. But, conversely, the threat must also have some mysterious or unpredictable qualities. 
Aristotle stresses the presence of the unexpected in these examples. Though we fear 
particular objects (e.g. violent criminals and disease), these prospects are all the more 
frightening when they occur without forewarning. If an orator wants to frighten his audience 
as much as possible, he should make the threat identifiable and specific, but also something 
that the subject cannot reliably predict and thus avoid.  
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B.2) Pity and Fear in the Poetics 
Although in the Poetics Aristotle identifies fear as one of the predominant emotions 
elicited by tragedy, he does not define it as clearly as he does in the Rhetoric. He makes no 
explicit reference to the latter text in the Poetics, but his treatment of fear in the two works 
seems consistent, for the most part.
16
 The importance of pity and fear for Aristotle‘s 
interpretation of tragedy‘s function is shown by their inclusion in his definition of tragedy 
(1449b24-1449b28), in which he argues that through pity and fear tragedy effects a cleansing 
of these emotions (δι’ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τ῵ν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν). This 
notoriously ambiguous statement has been discussed at length by scholars interested in 
determining the meaning of tragic κάθαρσις,17 but the nature of tragic pity and fear in the 
Poetics is hardly much clearer. Aristotle does distinguish the two, noting that the audience‘s 
pity depends on the excessive and unfair nature of the tragic victim‘s suffering (ἔλεος μὲν περὶ 
τὸν ἀνάξιον) but that fear depends on the similarity between the victim and the audience (φόβος 
δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, 1453a5-1453a6). Pity thus depends on an ethical judgment about the 
victim, fear on the audience‘s ability to identify with him or her. But while this distinction is 
important and will serve as a focal part of my discussion below, it is important to note that 
the pair is, for the most part, inseparable in the Poetics.
18
 Moreover, he does not clearly 
delineate the types of objects that will elicit an audience‘s fear or pity by, for example, 
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isolating a certain scene as especially fearsome or pitiable.
19
 In the Poetics Aristotle is more 
interested in identifying the formal elements of tragedy that will produce both pity and fear in 
the audience than in distinguishing the two emotions. 
 The most important element of tragedy according to Aristotle is the plot, namely the 
way the events of the tragedy are arranged (ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις, λέγω 
γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τ῵ν πραγμάτων, 1450a3-1450a5).  Aristotle champions the story 
and its arrangement because he sees tragedy as an imitation of events and life, not of men 
(1450a15-1450a23). Accordingly, pity and fear are generated by the arrangement of events in 
the tragic plot. The events are most likely to induce fear if they are unexpected and yet 
logically consistent (παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι’ ἄλληλα, 1452a4). Such an arrangement will produce 
wonder (τὸ θαυμαστόν), which Aristotle treats as a critical component of both pity and fear 
(1452a1-1452a11).
20
 There are many different types of arrangement, but Aristotle claims the 
best plot contains a disastrous misfortune (πάθος), a reversal of fortune (περιπέτεια), and a 
recognition of an unknown person or situation (ἀναγνώρισις, 1452a11-1452b34).21 Aristotle 
further qualifies the ideal tragedy – and hence the one most likely to produce pity and fear – 
by identifying the best types of these three components: the best πάθος should occur between 
friends and family (1453b14-1453b22);
22
 the best περιπέτεια should involve a person who is 
neither too virtuous nor too wicked, and he should suffer a change from good to bad fortune 
because of a terrible mistake (1453a7-1453a10); the best ἀναγνώρισις  should occur 
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simultaneously with the περιπέτεια (1452a32-1452b8). In his qualifications of these three 
components, Aristotle defends his recommendations in each case by noting that other 
possibilities (e.g. πάθος  between enemies, περιπέτεια of a wicked man from good fortune to 
bad) would not generate pity or fear. There is then a vital connection between the form of the 
play and the emotional reactions it elicits from its audience.
23
  
Aristotle, interestingly, does not seem particularly interested in the nature of a play‘s 
content (i.e. the types of frightening and pitiable events). Readers of the Rhetoric might 
expect the Poetics to explain how tragic events serve as the objects that, by virtue of their 
nearness or magnitude, elicit the audience‘s emotion, but Aristotle devotes considerably 
more attention to the arrangement of these events. Although he identifies πάθος as a critical 
part of the plot, his treatment of it is not particularly thorough. For example, he begins his 
discussion of πάθος by claiming that he will take up ―what sort of events are frightening or 
what sort are pitiable‖ (ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρά, 1453b14). But he never explicitly defines 
the kind of act that generates these emotions. His treatment instead defines the relationship 
between agent and victim (i.e. enmity, indifference, friendship) and the consciousness of the 
agent when committing the act. Aristotle‘s most explicit comment concerning the type of act 
that is frightening or pitiable can be found in his explanation of character relationships: he 
remarks that the poet should seek acts where family members commit murder (ἀποκτείνῃ) or a 
similar act of violence (τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον δρᾷ) against each other (1453b20-1453b22). His 
limited discussion of πάθος seems to render the nature of the violent act as a negligible 
component of the audience‘s emotional reaction, and this restricted definition leads to some 
problematic conclusions. For example, it seems unlikely that audiences should be equally 
frightened by hearing about Oedipus‘ unwitting murder of his father Laius in Oedipus 
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Tyrannus and Agave‘s deranged dismemberment of her son Pentheus in Bacchae. It also 
seems similarly improbable that they would be unaffected by the agonizing death of the 
princess in Medea merely because she was the enemy of the protagonist. It is perhaps unfair 
to assume that the Poetics forces us into such readings. Aristotle does admit, albeit obscurely, 
that acts of violence committed between enemies might arouse fear or pity through the act 
itself (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος, 1453b18). But he does not elaborate here, or anywhere else, what 
sort of action ―in and of itself‖ would generate such emotions. It is clear that Aristotle finds 
the conditions surrounding the frightening events, including plot arrangement and character 
status, to be more significant sources of fear than the nature of the acts themselves.  
Though Aristotle considers the plot arrangement the most important tragic element in 
arousing the audience‘s pity and fear, I must note several qualifications to this position. First, 
despite its subordination to plot, character (ἦθος) plays an indispensable role in the audience‘s 
emotional reaction. Aristotle‘s definitions of pity and fear in the Poetics, as mentioned above, 
depend on ethical judgment (ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον) and a sense of affinity (φόβος δὲ περὶ 
τὸν ὅμοιον, 1453a5-1453a6), respectively. Even this distinction is problematic: while the 
feeling of affinity is essential for tragic fear in the Poetics, it is associated with pity in the 
Rhetoric (1385b16-1385b19). Conversely, fear in the Rhetoric is usually felt for oneself or 
those close to oneself, as we fear for ourselves what we pity in others (φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα  ἐφ’  
ἑτέρων  γιγνόμενα  ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν, 1382b25-b26). How, then, should we interpret the 
affinity-based fear in the Poetics? Halliwell argues that in the Poetics pity and fear share an 
―interlocking nature‖ depending on sympathetic imagination: the audience members feel pity 
at misfortunes that they can imagine happening to themselves (and thus they also become 
frightened). Conversely their fear at these imagined sufferings can create a sympathetic bond 
20 
 
with characters undergoing these misfortunes.
24
 The consistent pairing of pity and fear in the 
Poetics suggests that Halliwell‘s interpretation is sound. Aristotle views fear and pity as 
codependent emotional elements, which both rely on the audience‘s affinity with the 
characters.  
The nature of this affinity, however, is not immediately clear. In what way is the 
spectator ―similar‖ (ὅμοιος) to the character onstage? Aristotle‘s conception of identification 
seems to be based essentially on ethical judgments, namely the way the audience assesses a 
character‘s virtue as it relates to his or her fortune. Thus we should apply the consideration of 
merit (ἀνάξιος) to fear as well as to pity, just as I noted above that affinity belongs to pity as 
well as fear. Spectators are unlikely to identify with wicked characters and will feel no fear 
from their downfall or success (1452b36-1453a7). Conversely, the audience cannot identify 
with characters who are too virtuous (ἐπιεικεῖς), and they find the suffering of such upstanding 
men to be disgusting (μιαρόν) rather than fearsome (1452b34-1452b36).25 Aristotle concludes 
that the audience is most sympathetic with those who are not completely virtuous or wicked 
and who commit some mistake (ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ μήτε διὰ κακίαν 
καὶ μοχθηρίαν ... ἀλλὰ δι’ ἁμαρτίαν τινά, 1453a8-1453a10).26  
There is no evidence in the Poetics that the audience is meant to identify with the 
characters on any other level besides ethical considerations – modern conceptions of 
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personality or individuality are not applicable here, since Aristotle‘s definition of ἦθος 
depends on προαίρεσις (1450b8-10), a term that in the Aristotelian corpus denotes deliberate 
moral choice.
27
 Even when Aristotle discusses considerations of character unrelated to ethical 
considerations, these are subordinated to moral concerns and are not treated with any depth. 
For example, he mentions likeness (ὅμοιος), the very term that was critical for eliciting fear in 
1453a5-6, as the third most important feature of character besides goodness (χρηστός) and 
appropriateness (ἁρμόττων, 1454a16-1454a28). His discussion of likeness here is not 
enlightening; though Lucas claims that it means ―the characters should be like human 
beings,‖28 Aristotle‘s only observation is that likeness is ―different from‖ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον 
τοῦ…) goodness and appropriateness. As Jones notes, Aristotle‘s terseness here is an 
indication that the reader should refer to the earlier discussion on character types that elicit 
pity and fear (1452b36-1453a10), in which likeness relates to an imperfect but virtuous moral 
state to which the audience can relate.
29
 The audience becomes afraid when someone like 
them, someone whose ethical views match their own, but who is still liable to make some 
mistake, meets with terrible misfortune. 
The ethical dimension here separates tragic fear from ―real‖ fear (i.e., fear of real 
circumstances) as it is presented in the Rhetoric, in which the orator frightens the audience by 
making an a fortiori argument concerning a misfortune that has struck victims stronger or 
more resourceful than the audience (1383a9-1383a12). It is clear that the orator intends to 
arouse in the audience fear for themselves and those close to them: by highlighting the 
victims‘ strength the speaker has found an avenue to target the audience‘s vulnerability. It is 
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not quite as clear whether Aristotle views tragic fear as the audience members‘ fear for 
themselves (like the fear of a rhetorical audience) or fear for the characters in the play, whom 
they also pity. This question has generated much debate. Halliwell interprets Aristotle‘s 
conception of tragic fear as largely (though not entirely) altruistic; if we identify too closely 
with characters, then excessive fear will predominate and we will be unable to feel pity for 
them, as mentioned in Rhetoric 1385b29-33.
30
 Bywater goes even further, claiming that it is 
a ―disinterested fear for another‖ without the personal dimensions found in the Rhetoric.31 
Lear, however, questions this altruistic interpretation and rejects the possibility that the 
audience need only ―identify imaginatively‖ with the characters in the play. He notes 
Aristotle‘s insistence that the audience can only fear things that may happen to them (Rhet. 
1382b31) and argues that tragic fear then must be grounded on the audience‘s recognition 
that they, like the play‘s characters, may possibly suffer terrible fates.32  Similarly, Belfiore 
suggests that translations of φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον as ―fear (is felt) for someone similar‖ are 
misguided; she interprets περί as ―concerning, in the case of,‖ in which case audience 
members realize their vulnerability and thus fear for themselves.
33
 I would contend, however, 
that tragic fear involves both fearing for oneself and for the characters. Aristotle‘s emphasis 
on similarity in the Poetics recalls the self-oriented fear of the Rhetoric, but, as Halliwell has 
noted, the close connection Aristotle maintains between tragic pity and tragic fear suggests 
aesthetic distance between characters and audience. At any rate the philosopher‘s emphasis 
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on moral evaluation suggests that tragic characters needed to earn audience sympathy before 
they could elicit fear.  
B.3) Spectacle and The Monstrous 
Although the Poetics treats fear as the natural consequence of a well-constructed plot 
involving morally sound characters, Aristotle admits that plot is not the only tragic element 
that can generate pity and fear so much as it is the best and most tragic. He notes that 
spectacle, ὄψις, can elicit these emotions, but that this means of achieving an emotional 
reaction is inferior to the proper arrangement of the plot (1453b1-1453b3). Aristotle provides 
several reasons for his disdain of spectacle: it is less skillful (ἀτεχνότερον), requires expensive 
production (χορηγίας δεόμενον), produces merely ―the portentous‖ (τὸ τερατ῵δες μόνον) rather 
than the truly fearsome (τὸ φοβερόν),34 and does not belong to the specifically tragic pleasure 
(οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν, 1453b3-1453b11). The 
majority of these criticisms seem to be based on the poet‘s lack of involvement in creating 
spectacle. The word ἀτεχνότερος denotes not simply poor craftsmanship but a distinction 
between the craft of the poet and those of the stage and costume designers. Aristotle makes 
this point more clearly in an earlier passage where he claims that the construction of 
spectacles belongs more to the art of the costume designer than to the art of the poet (ἔτι δὲ 
κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τ῵ν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τ῵ν ποιητ῵ν ἐστιν, 
1450b19-1450b20).  Similarly, the poet has no authority over the expense of spectacle since 
funding depends on the contribution of the χορηγός, who paid for the training, costuming, and 
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living expenses of the tragic chorus.
35
  The implication here, and throughout the Poetics, is 
that the art of tragedy – or rather the ideal tragedy – belongs singularly to the poet and not to 
the other members who contribute to tragic productions.   
The distinction between τὸ τερατ῵δες and τὸ φοβερόν is a more intriguing feature of 
Aristotle‘s dismissal of ὄψις, since it relies not only on a material difference (i.e., who is 
responsible for particular elements of tragic performance) but also on a difference of 
emotional categories. As I have discussed above, Aristotle‘s definition of fear in the Poetics 
is not particularly thorough, but his treatment of ―the portentous‖ is maddeningly obscure. He 
does not even offer a superficial definition of τὸ τερατ῵δες in the Poetics, and this is the only 
instance of the word in the book.
36
 In Greek literature, the word τέρας and related terms can 
denote omens, wonders, and monsters. This last denotation is particularly interesting within 
the context of this passage: is Aristotle condemning a particular type of content (i.e. monsters 
and/or monstrous situations) that causes something terrifying but not truly fearsome (i.e., not 
producing the fear proper to tragedy)? Does τὸ τερατ῵δες relate to the emotion of horror (i.e. 
feelings of fear and repulsion)? To answer these questions I shall examine the precise 
meaning of this term in the Poetics and the Aristotelian corpus.  
It is not clear whether Aristotle‘s condemnation of ὄψις is based on its tendency to 
show what is generally wondrous and fantastic (e.g. gods flying above the stage, elaborate 
props and costuming) or specifically the morbid and gruesome (e.g. monstrous creatures like 
the Erinyes). Commentators have adopted both interpretations: Lucas translates τὸ τερατ῵δες 
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as ―the portentous,‖ Halliwell calls it ―the sensational‖;37 Else associates it with ―mere 
horror,‖ Belfiore labels it ―the monstrous‖ and defines it as ―a kind of horror very different 
from the true tragic quality, ‗the fearful,‘ that accompanies the pitiable.‖38  I will consider 
both options before addressing the relationship between τὸ τερατ῵δες and τὸ φοβερόν and 
discussing the possibility of horror in the Poetics. 
 The adjective τερατώδης is more often associated with the wondrous and sensational 
than with the horrific: Plato, Isocrates, and the Hippocratic corpus all use the term to indicate 
something marvelous or extraordinary, but not horrific.
39
 But if Aristotle is condemning ὄψις 
because it creates wonder and amazement, then this criticism is inconsistent with his 
numerous endorsements of the wondrous and astounding in tragedy. He calls the wondrous 
(τὸ θαυμαστόν) an essential part of tragedy (δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, 
1460a11-1460a12), and he treats it as a product of a well-constructed plot. Aristotle‘s 
conception of tragic wonder depends on the unexpectedness (παρὰ τὴν δόξαν) of fearsome and 
pitiable events and on the strength of their causal connection with the plot (δι’ ἄλληλα, 
1452a4). The generation of tragic wonder is similar to the orator‘s technique for eliciting fear 
(Rhetoric 1383a9-1383a 12), which depends on his ability to persuade his audience not only 
that a frightening event has happened to others but also that it happened unexpectedly. 
Though the spectators may not have been surprised by the events themselves, as tragic plots 
were usually based on familiar myths, they nonetheless feared for the characters and for 
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themselves, lest they too might suffer such unexpected evils.
40
 Aristotle endorses tragic 
wonder as something compatible with and dependent on these sympathetic fears of the 
audience.
 
 
It is possible, however, that τὸ τερατ῵δες  may designate a specific type of wonder that 
is inappropriate for tragedy.
41
  It might refer to lurid thrill at particularly gruesome sights 
such as the monsters that τέρας-words can denote. Several scholars have interpreted τὸ 
τερατ῵δες in this way and have suggested that Aristotle is here critiquing the macabre 
elements found in the works of Aeschylus, particularly the Eumenides.  Lucas, for example, 
notes that ―[i]t is not known to what [Aristotle] is referring unless it be Aeschylus.‖42 While 
it is unclear whether Aristotle has Aeschylus in mind when condemning spectacle,
43
 
Aeschylus certainly had earned in antiquity the reputation for presenting shocking material. 
For example, it is said that the sight of the Erinyes so completely terrified (ἐκπλῆξαι) the 
audience of Aeschylus‘ Eumenides that children fainted and pregnant women had 
miscarriages (Life Of Aeschylus 1.35-1.38). A few lines earlier, the author notes that 
Aeschylus employed both spectacle and plots to elicit terrified shock (ἔκπληξιν τερατώδη, 
1.29-1.30) from his audience. While this later account of Aeschylus‘ reception is likely 
exaggerated, it provides an example of τὸ τερατ῵δες as a term related to monstrous spectacle 
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critiquing the extravagant spectacle found in contemporary theater of the 4
th
 century.  
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and consequent shock (ἔκπληξις). Contemporary accounts confirm that Aeschylus had a 
reputation for shocking his audience. In Aristophanes‘ Frogs, Euripides claims that he, 
unlike Aeschylus, never resorted to terrifying (ἐξέπληττον, 962) his audience. Aristophanes 
here uses the same terminology, ἐκπλήσσω and related words, found in the more sensational 
account in the Life of Aeschylus. Is there any indication that the Poetics draws a similar 
connection between gruesome spectacle and feelings of terrified shock (ἔκπληξις)?   
It would be useful to consider how ἔκπληξις and its cognates function inside and 
outside of the Poetics. In Greek literature, this set of terms has a broader semantic range than 
θαυμαστός and related words: ἔκπληξις and its cognates can denote simple amazement, but 
they are often used to indicate overwhelming feelings of emotion, usually shock and fear.
44
 
They are frequently found in passages describing the shocked and frightened reactions of 
those confronted with gruesome and monstrous sights. Belfiore has observed that ἔκπληξις 
and the related term κατάπληξις are the standard reactions to the sight of a Gorgon in Greek 
literature.
45
 Aristotle also suggests that those who are totally overcome by terrified shock 
(ἐκπεπληγμένοι) are unable to feel pity (Rhet. 1385b29-33). We might assume that such an 
emotional state is not appropriate for tragedy, in which both pity and fear are operative.
46
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 Stanford (1983) 28-29. Some examples include: Atossa‘s frightened reaction to the messenger‘s catastrophic 
report in Aeschylus‘ Persians, τοία κακ῵ν ἔκπληξις ἐκφοβεῖ φρένας (606); Isocrates‘ description of the fear felt by 
kings when they saw Evagoras, τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταῖς διήνεγκεν, ὥσθ’ ὁπότε 
μὲν αὐτὸν ὁρῶεν οἱ τότε βασιλεύοντες, ἐκπλήττεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς (Evag. 23-24); Thucydides‘ 
account of the panic induced by the lighting of the beacons on Salamis during the Peloponnesian War, ἐς δὲ τὰς 
Ἀθήνας φρυκτοί τε ᾔροντο πολέμιοι καὶ ἔκπληξις ἐγένετο οὐδεμιᾶς τ῵ν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐλάσσων (2.94.1). These 
feelings, as Stanford observes, are not necessarily limited to those of fear; ἔκπληξις is associated with 
overwhelming feelings of love and lust in Plato‘s Symposium  192b7 and Euripides‘ Hippolytus 38.   
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Aristotle‘s conception of ἔκπληξις in the Poetics, however, seems to be limited to 
surprise and amazement, without the specific connotations of intense fear or monstrous 
sights. He does not condemn it as an emotion inappropriate to tragedy, but rather advocates 
its presence in tragic recognition (πασ῵ν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτ῵ν τ῵ν πραγμάτων, 
τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι’ εἰκότων, 1455a16-1455a17). Later in the Poetics he notes that 
impossibilities (ἀδύνατα) are acceptable in poetry if they achieve the end of the work and 
make it ἐκπληκτικώτερον, noting as an example the pursuit of Hector in Iliad 22 (1460b22-
1460b27). There are no monsters or gruesome details in this example, merely an intense 
scene of conflict. Aristotle in fact uses this same example earlier to show how epic can 
present irrational (ἄλογον) events (i.e. Greek soldiers standing awkwardly by as Achilles 
pursues Hector alone) to elicit wonder (τὸ θαυμαστόν, 1460a11-1460a17). Though Aristotle 
does not endorse the presence of such irrational elements in tragedy (1454b6-1454b10), it is 
clear that in both tragedy and epic the element of wonder, be it ἔκπληξις or τὸ θαυμαστόν, is a 
desirable quality. There does not then seem to be much difference in the Poetics between 
ἔκπληξις and τὸ θαυμαστόν, except perhaps in degree.47  
 It is more likely that τὸ τερατ῵δες in the Poetics does not refer to a particular type of 
monstrous spectacle but to the relationship of this spectacle to the arrangement of the plot. 
Outside of the Poetics Aristotle uses τερατώδης primarily in descriptions of abnormalities and 
aberrations, particularly in the case of physical anomalies and mutations in the animal 
world.
48
 In On the Generation of Animals, Aristotle defines τὸ τερατ῵δες as that which 
happens contrary to the usual tendencies (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ τερατώδη τὰ τοιαῦτ’ εἶναι μᾶλλον, ὅτι 
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 Bywater (1909) ad 1454a4 notes the similarity between these terms, while Lucas (1967) ad1460a12 suggests 
that ἔκπληξις is the thrill produced by τὸ θαυμαστόν. Aristotle himself defines ἔκπληξις in Topics as ―an excess of 
wonder‖ (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἔκπληξις θαυμασιότης εἶναι ὑπερβάλλουσα, 126b17).  
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 E.g. EE 1231a4, Gen. Anim. 770a25-770a26, Hist. Anim. 496b18, and Hist. Anim. 544b21.  
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γίγνεται παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ εἰωθός, 772a36-772a37) and he similarly defines τέρας 
as something that is contrary to nature as it usually occurs (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τέρας τ῵ν παρὰ φύσιν 
τι, παρὰ φύσιν δ’ οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, 770b9-770b11). Such deviations include 
creatures with multiple heads (GA 769b26-769b27), chickens with four feet and four wings 
(GA 770a18-770a21), and even in some sense a child not resembling her parents (τρόπον τινὰ 
τέρας), for in her case ―nature has deviated from the type‖ (παρεκβέβηκε γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν τούτοις 
ἐκ τοῦ γένους, 767b5-767b7). These aberrations are in conflict with the philosopher‘s general 
depiction of nature as orderly and logical. He explains in the second book of the Physics that 
nature is not merely coincidental but rather a cause acting for the sake of some purpose (ὅτι 
μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἕνεκά του, φανερόν, 199b32-199b33).49 Aberrations (τέρατα) 
do not contradict this logical arrangement but are merely mistakes (ἁμαρτήματα), which are 
inevitable in any formal system (199a33-199b4). 
  What connection, if any, can be established between these physical anomalies and 
the emotion associated with τὸ τερατ῵δες? While descriptions of abnormalities in scientific 
treatises may not seem relevant to a discussion of aesthetics, the biological references in the 
Poetics indicate that Aristotle‘s approaches in these different works are not wholly 
incommensurable.
50
 He notes that tragic genre itself has a φύσις that has evolved and 
achieved perfection (μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν, 1449a14-
1449a15). Lucas notes the biological parallel: ―the tragic form, like an organic growth,  
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 Cf. Waterlow (1982) 48-92 on this formal definition of nature and the competing material definition Aristotle 
offers in the same chapter.  
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 Biological references in the Poetics can be found at 1448b11-1448b19, 1450b34-1451a6, 1459a20-1459a21 ; 
cf. Belfiore (1992) 3-4 for a defense of using the biological treatises, among others,  in interpretations of the 
Poetics.   
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develops until it reaches its τέλος….‖51 The tragic plot is similarly compared to the living 
body of an animal: the beauty of both depends on proper arrangment and scope (τὸ 
γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, 1450b36-1450b37). This plot arrangement, like nature 
itself, involves logical consistency based on causation (δι’ ἄλλα, 1452a4) and aims at an 
ultimate purpose (τέλος), namely to arouse pity, fear, and wonder from the audience so that 
they may attain a sense of relief (κάθαρσις, 1449b28) or pleasure (τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ, 
1460a17).
52
 The philosopher‘s scientific work confirms the connection between art and 
nature: he introduces τέρατα as mistakes that reveal purpose (as opposed to random accident) 
by noting that writers and doctors also make such errors (Phys. 199a33-199a35). Halliwell 
aptly observes that ―the firmness of his allegiance to phusis as the ultimate explanatory 
principle, in poetry as elsewhere, is uncompromising.‖53 
In the context of the Aristotelian corpus, then, it seems likely that we should read τὸ 
τερατ῵δες in the Poetics as an emotional effect resembling mere shock that results from a 
violation of organic plot arrangement. Halliwell has noted the connection between the logical 
arrangement of the plot and the anomalous intrusion of spectacle, but he still maintains that 
Aristotle here refers to ―unnatural phenomena (grotesque horrors).‖54 The immediate context 
of the passage itself focuses on an aberration of form rather than on one of content: those 
producing τὸ τερατ῵δες have nothing in common with tragedy proper (οὐδὲν τραγῳδίᾳ 
κοινωνοῦσιν) or the pleasure that befits it (ἡδονήν…τὴν οἰκείαν) 1453b9-1453b11), which should 
be found in the action written by the poet rather than the spectacle over which he had no 
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control (1453b9-1453b14). Emotional reactions caused by spectacles alone may entail a type 
of fear (1453b1-1453b3), but because they are independent of the plot they are anomalous 
and inappropriate, and thus do not elicit the same type of fear and pity aroused by the plot. 
These spectacles can involve gruesome monsters, but the mere presence of such creatures 
does not necessarily generate τὸ τερατ῵δες. Other sights that deviate from the plot could 
similarly frighten the audience (e.g. angry gods appearing unexpectedly above the stage, 
actors‘ unwarranted gestures). Moreover, the only passage in the Poetics that explicitly 
mentions gruesome material does not condemn it. In 1448b10-1448b15, Aristotle notes that 
things we find painful (λυπηρ῵ς) to look at in reality, we enjoy (χαίρομεν) when they are 
replicated with the utmost accuracy in art; his examples include grotesque animals and 
corpses (θηρίων τε μορφὰς τ῵ν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρ῵ν). Admittedly, Aristotle is making a 
descriptive comment about art generally and that this pleasure depends on recognition and 
learning, not from tragic wonder or fear at their appearance (1448b15-1448b17). 
Nevertheless there is no evidence that suggests his condemnation of τὸ τερατ῵δες  is an attack 
against such gruesome material. 
Ultimately the Poetics does not associate τὸ τερατ῵δες with any particular type of 
content. Aristotle seems to criticize spectacle on the grounds that it can generate emotion 
inorganically, divorced from the natural growth of the plot. His few remarks on the type of 
content that produces such emotions, however, indicate that deviant and unnatural actions are 
the most fearsome and pitiable. For example, as I mentioned above, Aristotle recommends 
that the πάθος should occur between φίλοι. This advice is certainly consistent with the stories 
found in many extant tragedies, such as those centered on the houses of Atreus and Oedipus. 
But, given Aristotle‘s conception of φιλία outside of the Poetics, such violence among kin 
32 
 
and friends should be considered aberrant and unnatural. The philosopher sees human 
behavior as governed by φύσις, and his depiction of φύσις in his political and ethical works is 
largely consistent with that in his scientific works.
55
 He declares in both the Politics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics that man is by nature (φύσει) a political animal (Pol. 1253a2-1253a3, NE 
1097b11), and intrafamilial relationships in particular are fundamentally governed by nature. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, for example, he claims that the φιλία between parents and their 
offspring extends beyond the human species and can be attributed to nature (φύσει, 1155a16-
1155a21). Similarly man and wife form the first and most essential union, joined for 
reproduction like all living organisms (Pol. 1252a24-1252a31), and a village composed of 
immediate relations is the most natural (μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν, Pol. 1252b16-1252b18).  
 Aristotle‘s examples of tragic πάθος, however, all involve violence between family 
members.
56
 Intrafamiliar violence thus represents a fundamental violation of natural order, as 
the institution of family exists to ensure the members‘ survival (Pol. 1252a24-1252a30) and 
φίλοι generally are supposed to feel pain when the other suffers harm (Rhet. 1381a1-1381a7). 
It is perhaps for this reason that in contemporary Athens there were no specific written laws 
prohibiting parricide and matricide – Athenians evidently found the acts so innately repellent 
that they thought specific prohibition unnecessary.
57
 In his discussion of epic poetry he cites 
less aberrant violence between enemies (e.g. Achilles and Hector). Although he mentions 
violence between φίλοι as something characteristic of tragedy, he does not explain clearly 
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why such anomalous and unnatural behavior should generate fear more effectively than the 
martial hostility found in epic.
58
 I contend that he does not press the distinction between epic 
and tragic violence because he is primarily concerned with the form of the drama rather than 
its content. That tragedy consistently depicts the ―most revolting, the least defensible of 
human actions‖ is, for Aristotle, a given;59 he is more interested in delimiting the proper way 
to present these gruesome crimes than in explaining the repulsion that such acts in and of 
themselves might generate. 
 Although the Poetics offers many important insights into ancient tragedy and its 
reception, it does not give an adequate account of the horrific elements in tragedy. While it 
does include the emotional response of fear, a critical part of horror, in the definition of 
tragedy, its emphasis on an audience‘s ethical evaluation of fictional victims limits its value 
for those trying to identify horrific moments, especially since Aristotle imposes no such 
restriction in the Rhetoric. Moreover, Aristotle does not seem particularly interested in 
analyzing the horrific content that can be found in many of the plays. He does not discuss in 
depth the nature of the violent events (πάθη) that occur in tragedy, concentrating instead on 
the arrangement of these events and the circumstances of the characters‘ relationships and 
decisions. He censures formal incongruity as something monstrously unnatural (τὸ τερατ῵δες) 
and particularly untragic, but does not note how aberrant tragic violence tends to be. There is 
no evidence then that the philosopher condemns horrific monsters or actions in the Poetics, 
as some have claimed from their readings of 1453b1-1453b14. But if we are seeking a 
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thorough account of what sort of material horrified ancient audiences we must look 
elsewhere. 
C) Noel Carroll and Modern Horror 
Since Aristotle does not fully discuss the emotion of horror or the types of content 
that elicit this emotion from an audience, I move now to a field that treats these topics more 
thoroughly, namely modern horror fiction. Horror is a relatively new genre,
60
 but it contains 
a wide variety of entries that make it somewhat difficult to define. Typically, works of horror 
feature many, if not all, of the following: the presence of a monster, often supernatural and 
grotesque, that threatens the main characters; vivid depictions of violence, frequently with 
explicit descriptions or displays of blood and gore; unexpected incidents designed to startle 
and shock the audience; endings that lack a firm resolution, thus suggesting that the threat 
still lingers; and the tendency of such grotesque monsters and graphic violence to elicit 
feelings of fear and disgust from the audience.
61
 Several of these qualities do not apply to 
ancient tragedy: tragic plots, with the exception of that of the Eumenides, do not involve 
supernatural monsters,
62
 and the threat of violence is typically resolved at the end of each 
play or trilogy.
63
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The emotional dimensions of horror, however, are applicable to our understanding of 
Greek tragic response. Fear, as I have discussed, is an integral part of Aristotle‘s conception 
of tragedy‘s function. Moreover, many tragedies contain scenes that present disgusting and 
frightening material, as the examples from the Eumenides and Philoctetes at the beginning of 
the chapter illustrate. It will be useful, therefore, for me to concentrate on modern 
interpretations of horror that analyze the way recent works generate these emotions in their 
audience. In particular I will focus on the work of the philosopher Noel Carroll. His 
approach, like Aristotle‘s, concentrates on the emotional effects of the genre, but he pays 
particular attention to how the content of horror fiction arouses the characteristic emotion of 
the genre. His analysis, which I will discuss more fully below, provides a fruitful model for 
identifying horrific moments in tragedy.  I will conclude this chapter with a brief discussion 
of how Carroll‘s work and other modern treatments of horror can be applied to ancient 
drama.    
Carroll offers a systematic account of the relationship between horror fiction and the 
audience‘s reaction. He pays particular attention to the monsters often found in horror fiction 
and to the way these creatures affect the audience. Such fiction elicits horror (he dubs the 
emotion ―art-horror‖) under the following conditions: first, the audience suffers physical 
agitation related to emotional disturbance; second, this agitation is caused by the presence of 
a monster that is threatening and repulsive; finally, the thought of this monster is associated 
with the audience‘s desire to avoid touching it.64 We saw several of these elements in the 
earlier discussion of Aristotle;
65
 Carroll‘s conception of emotion involves both physical and 
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cognitive components, and the subject‘s cognitive assessment of the stimulus is the ultimate 
determinant of the particular emotional reaction. But his account offers a more thorough 
explanation of the relationship between the object of emotion (the monster) and the subject 
(the audience) than the one found in the Poetics. Horror fiction horrifies its audience not 
merely through its narrative structure but also through a specific type of content not found in 
other genres, namely a monster that is deemed repulsive by the other characters. I shall 
discuss each of these features in more detail below and offer some modifications of Carroll‘s 
position.    
 While there is no need to elaborate on how a horrific monster causes fear,
66
 its 
repulsive qualities are not obvious. Many monsters in the genre are physically disgusting, 
such as zombies marked by rotting flesh and open wounds, aliens composed of oozing slime, 
giant bugs, and other mutant vermin. Disgust, like fear, involves cognition and physical 
reaction: when we recognize that something is somehow contaminated, we feel nauseous. 
This contamination may be related to the sense of taste, as the most basic form of disgust 
entails nausea at unappealing objects that would harm us if ingested. Contamination is often 
applied to other senses not related to taste, and we are disgusted by a variety of stimuli.
67
 
Rozin et al. note nine different categories of stimuli that in North Americans elicit disgust, 
including animals, contact with corpses, and ―violations of the exterior envelope of the body 
(including gore and deformity).‖68 The monsters found in horror and their gruesome acts of 
violence frequently involve such violations. Stephen King argues that horror fiction ―invites 
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a physical reaction by showing us something which is physically wrong,‖ and provides as an 
example a story involving a ―living corpse‖ whose movement is slowed ―because little pieces 
of [him] keep falling off.‖69 Such depictions elicit immediate and instinctive repulsion by 
depicting creatures with patently disgusting features.      
Carroll‘s conception of repulsion is not, however, limited to what is physically 
disgusting. He contends that monsters found in horror fiction are essentially repulsive 
because they are categorically impure, and he applies the anthropological work of Mary 
Douglas to explain this position. Douglas defines impurity and pollution as instances of 
disorder or deviation. Humans avoid what they deem impure or polluted not because it is 
potentially dangerous (as, e.g., rotten food) but because it threatens to undermine the 
normative social structures that govern behavior within a community. As Douglas notes, 
―Culture, in the sense of the public, standardised values of a community, mediates the 
experience of individuals. It provides in advance some basic categories, a positive pattern in 
which ideas and values are tidily ordered.‖70 Anything that contradicts established cultural 
categories presents a threat to confidence in the stability of the community and thus causes 
repulsion. Some of these contradictions are not limited to particular communities; for 
example, most cultures find blood and other bodily fluids to be repulsive since they have 
transgressed the bodily boundaries that kept them internal and have become external.
71
 
Others are limited to particular social groups, as in the dietary restrictions found in the Old 
Testament. Douglas argues that Jewish law did not deem pork unclean because it caused 
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trichinosis, as some have argued, but because pigs defy the categories defined by the ancient 
Jews (i.e. pigs have cloven hooves but do not chew their cud like other herd animals).
72
 She 
maintains that pollution depends on such contradictions, and can only exist when societal 
structures and boundaries are clearly defined. People and objects that defy categorization 
challenge these structures and definitions, and thus are often considered unstable, dangerous, 
and powerful anomalies.   
 Carroll affiliates the monsters found in horror fiction with these dangerous anomalies 
and identifies several categories into which these creatures fall. These include the following: 
interstitial beings (e.g. vampires that are neither living nor dead), hybrid creatures (e.g. 
werewolves, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde), and monsters that are formless (e.g. the Blob) or 
categorically incomplete (e.g. disintegrating zombies, murderous severed hands).
73
 These 
monsters elicit revulsion not because they are physically disgusting (though they often are) 
but because they contradict fundamental assumptions of their victims and of the audience. 
Stevenson‘s novel Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde illustrates clearly this concept. One character 
describes Mr. Hyde, Dr. Jekyll‘s villainous alter ego, in the following way: 
There is something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, 
something downright detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I 
scarcely know why. He must be deformed somewhere…although I can‘t 
specify a point. He‘s an extraordinary looking man, and yet I can really name 
nothing out of the way. 
 
Mr. Hyde is a hybrid monster whose repulsive qualities can be detected despite the absence 
of obvious physical contamination.
74
 Hyde‘s monstrosity involves the contradiction between 
his savage impulses and his civilized appearance. He is a figure utterly divorced from the 
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familiar social and ethical codes that Jekyll and all others follow, yet he looks like an 
ordinary, law-abiding citizen and so causes confusion and revulsion. Confusion and disbelief 
are frequently generated by such transgressive monsters. A familiar trope in horror fiction 
involves one character vainly trying to convince others that such an anomalous creature 
exists.
75
 This reluctance is understandable, as its deviation from familiar categories renders 
the community ignorant and vulnerable.
76
 As King notes, ―it is not the physical or mental 
aberration in itself which horrifies us, but rather the lack of order these aberrations seem to 
imply.‖77 These monsters horrify because they threaten to dismantle the structures which the 
audience takes for granted.  
Carroll‘s definition of monsters provides a sufficient explanation for the generation of 
horror, but his insistence that these monsters be limited to ―creatures not countenanced by 
contemporary science‖ is unnecessary.78 The same contradictory properties that he applies to 
monsters in horror fiction can also be applied to situations and actions. I agree with Holland-
Toll that the most distinctive feature of horror fiction is its ―sense of extreme, exaggerated, 
and unresolvable antinomy, which effectively resists closure and resolution more radically 
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than most other fictions.‖79 This antinomy, that is the contradiction of cultural categories, can 
result from the actions of human characters who are not scientific impossibilities. Many 
examples of the genre feature disturbed individuals who, in and of themselves, are not 
categorically contradictory, but commit acts that both frightening and repulsive.
80
 In the film 
adaptation of The Silence of the Lambs, for example, Hannibal Lector cuts off a guard‘s face 
and wears it on his own. The depiction of Lector‘s act is repulsive on two levels: not only 
does the bloody and gory detail nauseate the viewer, but the notion that someone might 
remove the most recognizable feature of a human and appropriate it as his own defies our 
conception of bodily recognition.
81
 The repulsive component of horror is based on an 
unsettling feeling of disruption, what King calls ―a cold touch in the midst of the familiar.‖82 
Since, according to Carroll, emotional reactions stem from ―the subject‘s cognitive construal 
and evaluation of his/her situation‖ (emphasis mine),83 it seems appropriate to include 
contradictory actions and events as objects of horror. 
 Carroll‘s theory of horror also explains the role of other characters within the story. 
The audience‘s reaction to a threatening contradiction of cultural categories is influenced by 
the reactions of the victims. We may see the same monster (e.g. an ogre) appear in a fairy 
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tale and a horror story. While characters in fairy tales may or may not be frightened by such a 
monster, they treat it as a normal part of their universe; characters in horror not only are 
frightened by the creature but they view it as something revolting and unnatural.
84
 The 
responses of the characters in horror fiction demonstrate the horrific nature of the creature 
and thus prompt the audience to have a similar emotional reaction. The narrative structure of 
horror stories often encourages the audience to share the same dread and revulsion as the 
fictional victims. For example, horror films frequently do not show the audience what the 
creature looks like until the movie is nearly over, leaving viewers as ignorant about the 
dangers as the characters and forcing the audience to confront the hideous spectacle at the 
very moment the victim does.
85
 Carroll claims that this emotional parallel between characters 
and audience, which he dubs the ―mirroring-effect,‖ is a key feature of horror not found in all 
other genres: audiences laugh at the misfortunes of fictional characters in a comedy and do 
not share in Othello‘s jealousy or Achilles‘ wrath.86  
Since the characters within horror fiction signal proper emotional response to the 
audience, the audience‘s horror must depend on some sympathy or identification with the 
characters if it is to achieve the desired emotional effect. Jonathan Cohen, a researcher of 
media studies, notes that an audience member must empathize and identify with a character 
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in order to ―simulate the feelings and thoughts appropriate for the events that occur.‖87 As I 
have discussed, Aristotle‘s conception of audience identification is primarily ethical: the 
best tragic plots involve virtuous, but imperfect figures, figures resembling the audience 
(ὁμοῖος), who suffer as a result of some error. Certainly ethical considerations influence 
audience sympathies. We cheer at the violent deaths of cruel villains, but are anxious when 
a similar threat faces a beneficent hero. But modern studies of audience reaction to fictional 
characters have considered issues outside of Aristotle‘s formulation. Researchers have noted 
that audiences frequently identify with characters who share similar external traits, such as 
age, sex, and race.
88
 It is no coincidence that horror films like A Nightmare on Elm Street 
(1984) tend to attract younger viewers who are more like the teenage victims of the film 
than their deceptive parents or their grotesque killer.
89
 Audiences also tend to identify with 
characters who share internal characteristics such as personality traits or ethical beliefs.  
Though the existence of similarities, both internal and external, between audience and 
fictional characters affects the audience‘s ability to identify with these characters, the process 
of identification has a number of complexities that prevent one from adopting a simple 
formula based on plausibility or resemblance.
90
 For example, one must additionally consider 
how the author of the fiction shapes the presentation of the narrative to influence the 
audience‘s identification. Writers who relate the internal monologue of a certain character or 
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filmmakers who consistently show the action through the point of view of one figure prompt 
the audience to adopt the perspective of that character.
91
  Moreover, audience identifications 
are frequently multivalent and not limited to one character.
92
 These identifications may 
change as the story progresses (e.g. a spectator might initially be drawn to Antigone‘s 
resolution but then ultimately sympathize with Creon as he begins to show remorse) or as the 
author shifts the presentation of the text (e.g. by using the camera to reveal another 
character‘s viewpoint).93 The fluidity and malleability of audience identification is 
particularly important in horror fiction. As Clover notes, viewers of horror films will often 
cheer in the early stages of the film as the villain gruesomely slaughters innocent victims, but 
towards the film‘s end will root for the protagonist to do away with the killer.94  
Carroll acknowledges the complexity of audience identification and ultimately finds 
the concept too problematic when considering an audience‘s emotional reaction to horror 
fiction. He observes that the term identification implies that the viewers in some way see 
themselves as identical to a character; they thus submit to the illusion that the character‘s 
thoughts and feelings are equivalent to their own.
95
 An audience cannot entirely identify with 
a character in a vampire movie because they know these creatures are fantastic, while the 
character must confront them as a genuine threat. Moreover, audiences do not always have 
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the same emotional responses as the fictional characters. While Carroll does argue that horror 
audiences frequently react in ways similar to those of the characters within the fiction, he 
finds that even in horror these emotional parallels have limits. For example, those viewing a 
protagonist wrestling with a hideous monster typically feel suspense and revulsion, while the 
character herself is likely too preoccupied with surviving to register these same emotions.
96
 
Carroll therefore avoids entirely the problem of conflating audience and character by 
concentrating on how the audience assesses the object of these emotions (i.e. the monster) 
and comparing their assessment with that of the character. He suggests that we should label 
the audience‘s interaction with the fictional characters as assimilation.97 When viewers 
assimilate the situation of a fictional character, they consider that character‘s perspective and 
situation, but they also view the circumstance from an external perspective as well. The 
audience, like the fictional victim, recognizes that the horrific creature is a revolting and 
dangerous entity; as Carroll notes, ―the consumer of the fictions and the protagonist share the 
same culture,‖ and so ―can readily discern the features of the situation that make it horrifying 
to the protagonist.‖98 But viewers have the privilege of viewing this struggle from a distance, 
and thus they have the opportunity to process fully the material, that is to ―respond not only 
to the monster, as the character does, but to a situation in which someone, who is horrified, is 
under attack.‖99 The audience‘s sympathy for the fictional victims therefore depends on 
shared cognitive assessment. The mutual recognition of a frightening and repulsive situation 
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allows the audience to sympathize with the character and experience similar, but not 
identical, horror.  
Carroll‘s focus on situational assessments rather than on character identification is a 
useful approach for understanding the relationship between audience and character. His 
theory of assimilation does not contradict the notion that physical and psychological 
similarities influence audience reaction, but it does allow us to concentrate on a relatively 
consistent feature of horror fiction. That is, we need not evaluate the many and complex 
dimensions of character and audience identity to discuss the how the audience relates to the 
characters; instead, we can investigate how the reactions of fictional characters correspond to 
the audience‘s. Carroll‘s arguments are, however, somewhat circular. Fictional characters 
model the appropriate response for the audience, yet the audience‘s relation to the characters 
involves assessing whether this reaction is appropriate. His theory depends on underlying 
cultural similarities between audience and character that allow both to feel horror at violent 
contradictions of cultural categories. But as I noted above he limits his treatment of horrific 
monsters to scientific impossibilities, and this in turn limits his theory of assimilation. The 
unnatural monster is obviously contradictory and repulsive, but horror also includes more 
subtle violations of cultural categories, such as the ambiguously gendered heroine in slasher 
films.
100
 I contend therefore that we must pay careful attention to the nature of the horrific 
contradictions within the context of each fiction.  
D) Application to Greek Tragedy 
 Carroll‘s approach to the horror genre provides a framework for identifying horrific 
content, namely situations, actions, and figures that audience and characters deem frightening 
and repulsive (i.e. which involve a contradiction of cultural categories). Such a framework is 
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a fruitful one for identifying horrific moments in Greek tragedy, especially when one 
considers the limitations of Aristotle‘s Poetics in this regard. I will identify characters and 
events that involve a violent disruption of the cultural principles and distinctions familiar to 
the tragic audience, and I will explain how these horrific moments fit within the context of 
the plays. Since this interpretive approach necessarily involves assessments by characters and 
the audience, my examination of tragic horrors will involve careful readings of the texts and 
discussions of the cultural background of the spectators. The nature of the tragic genre and 
the cultural distance between its audience and modern readers raise some difficulties in using 
Carroll‘s approach to interpret tragedy. I contend, however, that his methods, when 
thoughtfully and judiciously applied, enhance our understanding of tragic horrors and the 
way ancient audiences responded to them. They are particularly useful for interpreting the 
confusing and disturbing plays of Euripides, as I shall explain at the end of this chapter.  
My investigation of the texts will focus on ambiguous and contradictory depictions of 
violence. Tragic horror depends not only on the threat of violence but also on a severe 
disruption of cultural categories. That is, there is a significant distinction between what is 
frightening and what is horrific. Konstan notes the difference in his analysis of Aeschylus‘ 
Seven Against Thebes; while in the first part of the play the chorus fears military invasion (a 
substantial threat but one that does not contradict cultural categories), they later are horrified 
by the notion of fratricide and the pollution such perverse violence causes.
101
 The plays 
occasionally signal such horrific moments through references to the characters‘ confusion or 
disgust in response to violence, but more often the repulsion component of horror can be 
found in the flagrant contradiction of previously established distinctions.  
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My investigations of the Hecuba and Heracles show that Euripides tends to generate 
horror from the following narrative pattern: first a familiar social convention, institution, or 
distinction is established as a plausible source of protection for particular characters; 
afterward these characters suffer violence from the dissolution or perversion of the 
convention, institution, or distinction on which they had relied or which they had taken for 
granted. For example, in the following chapter on the Hecuba I discuss how Agamemnon and 
Polymestor voice traditional assumptions about women, namely that they are physically 
weak and incapable of committing violence; Hecuba‘s brutal vengeance against Polymestor 
contradicts these assumptions and generates horror from Agamemnon and the audience. 
Euripides, like any author of horror fiction, shows his audience ―the way the good fabric of 
things sometimes has a way of unraveling with shocking suddenness.‖102 In the following 
chapters I will discuss how he weaves this social fabric before ripping it into shreds. 
Since an audience‘s horror depends on the ability to relate in some way with fictional 
victims, I will also consider how ancient audiences likely responded to these scenes of 
contradictory violence. Carroll‘s theory of assimilation, which posits that the audience shares 
characters‘ assessments of the repulsive and frightening situations (objects) but need not 
specifically identify with these characters (subjects), is suitable for my investigation of tragic 
horrors. This approach accommodates the broad character types typically found in tragedy, 
which lack the idiosyncrasies and nuanced personalities of modern literary characters. As 
Jones notes, Greek characters onstage are essentially the masks they wear, bearing 
―conventional signs‖ that signified age, sex, and rank, but declaring ―the whole man‖ rather 
than suggesting ―further realities‖ hiding behind them.103 While Easterling suggests that 
                                                          
102
 King (1978) xi. 
 
48 
 
Jones perhaps overstates the importance of the mask, she agrees that tragic characters are 
best understood within the ―dynamics of action and interaction‖ onstage and should not be 
read as fixed and static personalities.
104
 Carroll‘s theory of audience assimilation likewise 
involves situational assessment: the audience relates to fictional characters that respond 
appropriately to their circumstances.     
There are two limitations on applying this approach to tragedy. The first involves the 
nature of tragic discourse. Carroll assumes that because an audience of horror fiction can 
readily assimilate the experiences of the fictional victims through shared cultural 
background, the frightening and repulsive monster or situation is manifestly horrific. While 
characters who have not encountered the monster may doubt its existence, characters who 
have witnessed it never seriously question its horrific potential. In tragedy, however, the 
dramatic conflict often depends on controversy related to these cultural categories, and 
characters offer competing views of the viability of particular conventions, institutions, and 
distinctions. As Goldhill notes, ―the specific genre of tragedy with its disruptive questioning 
highlights these tensions and difficulties in a normative discourse rather than offering any 
harmonized view of the workings of society‘s attitudes.‖105 In the Antigone, for example, the 
struggle between Creon and Antigone involves conflicting attitudes toward the codified law 
of the πόλις and the traditional customs related to the οἶκος, and the play refuses to present its 
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audience with a resolution that clearly establishes priority between the categories.
106
 Any 
investigation of violations of these categories must therefore consider how ancient audiences 
would assess competing claims involving their cultural system. This conclusion leads to a 
second limitation in applying Carroll‘s approach, namely the cultural distance between 
ancient and modern audiences. Modern readers cannot easily detect the significance of the 
particular conventions being disrupted in the plays of Euripides, and thus it is difficult to 
gauge accurately the original spectators‘ response.107 If the distinctions between masculine 
and feminine behavior were not clearly delineated for ancient audiences, for example, then 
they would not react to Hecuba‘s vengeance with the same horror that Agamemnon and 
Polymestor do.     
While these difficulties prevent me from presenting a conclusive and certain account 
of audience reaction, my investigation uses external evidence whenever possible to support 
my positions. Relevant literary sources roughly contemporary with the original performance 
of the tragedy often clarify how an audience likely responded to a particular event or 
character. These sources include historical texts, philosophical works, and forensic and 
political speeches, as well as fictional accounts found in epic poetry and other tragedies. I do 
not use these texts to establish simple definitions of Greek beliefs regarding their cultural 
conventions and distinctions. Diverse and conflicting attitudes towards social mores can be 
found in every society, particularly in the intellectually and socially dynamic climate of fifth-
century Athens.
108
 But I contend that literary sources can offer modern readers perspective 
concerning Greek cultural categories by revealing significant patterns of behavior and 
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thought. My examination does not require that ancient audience members shared identical 
beliefs with each other and with fictional characters but rather that they all shared a cultural 
background defined by particular structures and distinctions.
109
 As Douglas has noted, these 
structures mediate human experience by arranging activities into meaningful and well-
ordered categories.
110
 Literary sources contain many references to categorical distinctions 
that were significant for ancient Greeks. The anticipation of severe objection to female 
Guardians in Plato‘s Republic, for example, suggests that many Greeks saw a strong 
distinction between masculine and feminine behavior (453b7-453d11); this and similar 
comments allow us to infer that ancient audiences likely found Hecuba‘s violation of 
traditional matronly behavior as surprising and disturbing as do the play‘s male characters. In 
the following chapters I will discuss the specific cultural categories found in each play and 
the way Euripides disrupts them: in the Hecuba these include Greek burial traditions, φιλία 
and ξενία, and distinctions between masculine and feminine behavior as well as between regal 
and servile roles; in the Heracles they include the relationship between gods and men, the 
role of the father, and the function of the οἶκος. 
I turn now to a more general question: how do modern interpretations of horror films 
help us to understand the plays of Euripides? For one thing, there is an abundance of 
shocking, frightening, and repellent material within his plays, and any critical reading must 
take this material into consideration. This is not to say that scholars have ignored these  
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horrific elements, but frequently they take the term ―horrific‖ for granted.111 It is tempting to 
label Medea‘s murder of her children or Hippolytus‘ agonizing death, for example, as 
obvious horrors without any further qualification. While I would agree with such 
assessments, I would also contend that our immediate emotional reactions warrant further 
examination. These passages contain a number of categorical contradictions, some of them 
immediately apparent to modern readers (e.g. mother as destructive rather than nurturing 
force, the unnatural and monstrous bull that gores Hippolytus), others requiring at least some 
understanding of Athenian aesthetic and cultural associations (e.g. Medea‘s appropriation of 
stage space and dramatic function typically reserved for gods, the bull‘s association with 
aberrant sexuality).
112
 If these scenes remain as terrifying and repulsive to modern audiences 
as they did for ancient ones, it is a testament to their artistry and not an invitation to take 
them for granted. Carroll‘s work provides a framework for evaluating the contradictions that 
arouse horror without nullifying traditional interpretive strategies; attentive reading of the 
plays and careful consideration of their immediate cultural context can allow modern readers 
to identify important cultural categories operative in the play and, consequently, the horrific 
moments that violate these categories.   
 The application of modern horror theory is particularly useful when considering a 
common source of frustration in Euripidean scholarship, namely the tragedian‘s tendency to 
include a variety of conflicting tones, registers, and actions within his plays. The plot of the 
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Orestes, for example, concentrates on  banal (and anachronistic) political maneuvering 
during its first half only to shift its focus in the second half onto a wild murder plot that 
threatens to undermine mythical tradition before the conflict is resolved by the appearance of 
Apollo ex machina.
113
 Such conflicts permeate the Euripidean corpus, in relation not only to 
larger issues of plot construction (e.g. the bifurcated nature of Andromache, Hecuba, and 
Heracles) but also to the characters‘ attitudes towards the events of the play. For example, 
the carnage found in the second half of the Orestes is interrupted by the appearance of a 
hysterical eunuch whose exaggerated histrionics perhaps add a comic touch to an otherwise 
terrifying scene.
114
  
More importantly, many scholars in the past have attempted to dismiss the elements 
of Euripides‘ plays that do not fit the tragic pattern established by Sophocles and by 
Aristotle‘s endorsement of Sophoclean composition. Euripides challenges this pattern 
through the inconsistent tones and structures of his plays and through the frequently debased 
characters that feature in them.
115
 Kitto, for example, labels several Euripidean tragedies as 
―tragicomic‖ or ―melodramatic‖ – the former silly, the latter grim – for their lack of tragic 
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sincerity and the absence of a central unifying theme. Without these, Kitto argues, tragedy 
can only create excitement for its own sake and is thus too sensational to be in the same 
category with other tragedies.
116
 The denigration of the sensational and uncomfortable 
elements in Euripides, including the perverse violence that generates horror, has been all too 
common. But Michelini correctly notes that these are ―elements of considerable aesthetic 
significance, valid parts of a system of literary meaning that derives from the Euripidean 
plays‘ combative relation to its audience.‖117 We should not ignore the horrific violence in 
these plays or dismiss them as superficial but rather understand them as part of Euripides‘ 
challenging and frequently polemic approach to tragedy.  I propose that a closer examination 
of these horrific elements and how they fit into the aesthetic and intellectual program of the 
Hecuba and Heracles will allow for a greater understanding of each work. 
Another benefit of using modern horror scholarship is that it allows readers to avoid 
overly moralistic readings, a frequent pitfall for Euripides‘ critics. Kitto‘s approach, cited 
above, depended on the assumption that tragedies should have a central unifying theme; 
others, such as Pohlenz, go further in assuming that this theme should involve a moral 
dimension and that the playwright was responsible for the moral education of his audience, a 
task Euripides failed to complete.
118
 The conception of the tragedian as educator can also be 
found in antiquity, most notably in Aristophanes‘ Frogs. In that play Aeschylus and 
Euripides argue over who best taught the Athenians (1006-1098), and Dionysus ultimately 
decides in favor of Aeschylus so that he may give useful advice (1418-1421) and instruct the 
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Athenians (1500-1503). But Dionysus‘ decision does not prove that Euripides or his audience 
was principally interested in tragedy‘s moral function. As Mastronarde has shown, 
Aristophanes‘ debate must be understood within the intellectual context of the performance; 
the author uses comic exaggeration to champion a traditional way of thinking symbolized by 
Aeschylus rather than the more contemporary intellectual or sophistic approach represented 
by Euripides.
119
 Those looking for instructive models of ethical behavior in the Hecuba or 
Heracles are bound to be disappointed: in both plays the few honorable and innocent 
characters suffer repellent violence, and there is little hope that morality offers humanity any 
immediate benefits.  
Recent discussions of Euripides have addressed the inconsistencies in his plays and 
their ambiguous morality by considering the immediate social and literary context of their 
performance. Mastronarde, for example, has noted the variety of emotional registers and 
literary forms in the poetic tradition, arguing that Euripides‘ difficult and contradictory 
material reveals the tragedian‘s interest in ―exploring the potentialities of a living genre.‖120 
Michelini similarly claims that his plays demonstrate competitive desire to distinguish 
himself from other tragedians, particularly Sophocles, whose works featured unified plots 
and consistent characterization.
121
 Other scholars attribute the lack of a clear ethical program 
to the ambiguous nature of theatrical context. Zeitlin, for example, in her discussion of 
Hecuba claims that the play‘s rampant violence and grim outlook reflect the amoral nature of 
the Dionysiac setting.
122
 Such treatments provide valuable insight into the world of Euripides 
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and his audience, and I will frequently refer to these and similar works and other classical 
interpretations in my analysis of the plays and the emotional reactions they elicited from 
ancient audiences. But they do not fully account for the relentless attacks against social 
structures found in Euripidean drama. I contend that the tragedian‘s focus on violent and 
unsettling disruptions of social conventions and distinctions can be better understood by 
recognizing the function of the horrific, which, as I shall argue below, entails challenging the 
cultural preconceptions of the audience. My investigation into this component of Euripidean 
drama allows us to attain a fuller understanding of the plays.   
I believe the function of horrific material in Euripides‘ plays is consistent with the 
aims of modern horror fiction. The horror genre invites its audience to become curious about 
the difficult and problematic features of the material. Carroll notes that a distinctive feature 
of the genre involves ―narratives of discovery and proof‖ in which characters and audience 
must reconcile a terrifying anomaly with their presuppositions about their world.
123
 The 
radical confrontation between normal and paranormal experience is often sensational, but it 
is not devoid of social value. King observes that horror fiction presents sudden and extreme 
disruptions of cultural conventions so that the audience may reflect on their own attitudes 
towards these conventions; thus horror helps its audience ―to understand what those taboos 
and fears are, and why it feels so uneasy about them.‖ 124 While I agree with this assessment 
of the genre, I find King‘s explanation of horror fiction‘s ultimate purpose unsatisfying. He 
views the function of horror as essentially conservative; the presence of monsters and 
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monstrous acts reinforces the need for social conventions, and the defeat of the monster 
reassures the audience that their own conventions are satisfactory. We enjoy horror, 
according to King, because it allows us to see examples of disorder, and thus we can 
appreciate the structured and harmonious nature of our normal lives.
125
  
Holland-Toll‘s offers a more persuasive interpretation of horror‘s function. She 
proposes that horror fiction can be classified into two distinct groupings based on 
relationships to cultural models.
126
 Affirmative horror fiction introduces a monstrous threat 
that is eventually defeated, and the traditional cultural models are reaffirmed and 
strengthened. Disaffirmative horror conversely challenges these models by depicting violent 
subversions that completely disrupt social order and negate the possibility of restoration. 
Holland-Toll contends that the latter model is preferable: ―The most effective horror fiction 
is relentlessly confrontational in its refusal to accept compromise or resolution; the 
exaggeration and the graphic nature of much horror fiction, the relentless rending of social 
constructs, even the constantly recurring strategies of exclusion function to deny even 
‗carrion comfort.‘‖127 The value of disaffirmative fiction is not immediately evident, as its 
audience is left with only unpleasant and irreparable disruptions of the social fabric. But this 
type of fiction performs an important function within society. Rather than offering models of 
appropriate behavior that can be emulated, disaffirmative horror provides its audience with 
―a means to think about [themselves], defining certain aspects of a social reality which the 
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 Holland-Toll (2001) 14-25. She actually offers three categories, but the second group (―mid-spectrum‖) is 
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audience and readers share.‖128  It provokes its audience with difficult questions instead of 
mollifying them with clear solutions and thus encourages them to reflect on the instability of 
their cultural categories and perhaps reassess them.    
    I contend that Euripides‘ Hecuba and Heracles are similarly disaffirmative fictions. I 
will argue in the following chapters that the violent cultural disruptions found in these plays 
resist simple resolution and thus deny the possible restoration of the social fabric. Hecuba 
and Heracles may find some comfort at the ends of their respective plays, but as a result of 
horrific violence they have lost not only their families but also their faith in the institutions 
they had erroneously assumed would protect them. Even though Hecuba and Heracles are 
anomalous characters, the horrific suffering that they both experience and commit occurs 
because of the fragility of social structures that apply to everyone around them. Consequently 
there is little indication that these structures offer reliable security for anyone.  
It was through these disaffirmative horrors that Euripides encouraged his audience to 
think critically about their vulnerability in an unstable world. This critical engagement 
provided valuable practice for the audience. Active engagement in political dialogue and 
public deliberation in Athens required ―rapid but thoughtful assessment of different opinions 
and narratives,‖129 and the ability to process contradictory claims. Yet the function of horrific 
extends beyond political advantage. The disaffirmative tragic horrors found in Euripidean 
drama reflected the disintegrating values and social structures of the world around them. As 
Thucydides famously observed, the excessive brutality of the Peloponnesian War caused a 
fundamental disruption in the social order that extended even to the meaning of words; 
familiar distinctions between bravery and cowardice, prudence and recklessness, and trust 
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and suspicion no longer applied in a world where a bloodthirsty ally was dearer than one‘s 
own family (3.82.3-3.82.8). In the Hecuba and the Heracles Euripides did not reassure his 
audience by offering them hope for the restoration of order but presented them a fascinating 
and grim portrait of its irreparable disintegration.   
 
  
 
 
II. HORROR IN EURIPIDES‘ HECUBA 
 The Hecuba serves as a suitable starting point for a discussion of horror in tragedy. 
Even a casual reader of the play cannot fail to notice its many disturbing elements. Child 
murder, mutilation, human sacrifice, and multiple ghosts are central features of the play‘s 
plot, and Euripides‘ ambiguous presentation of this material does little to ease the feelings of 
discomfort such material arouses.  Modern scholars have found the tragedy‘s depiction of 
unrelenting violence to be ―emotionally problematic‖ and have noted that it ―plays havoc 
with every affective tone established.‖1 The play has for this reason, among others, been 
considered particularly difficult to interpret;
2
 some have even argued that the play can be 
properly called a tragedy and not simply a horror play.
3
  
It is not clear, however, whether ancient audiences found the play similarly 
disturbing.We can only speculate concerning their reactions, as the few ancient sources that 
refer to this play primarily cite gnomic phrases and other choice quotations without 
consideration for their dramatic context.
4
 It is interesting to note, however, that Renaissance 
audiences appreciated the play‘s carnage. Stiblinius ranked it first among the Euripidean 
plays largely because of its atrocitas and includes in his praise a list of the play‘s most 
                                                          
1
 Hogan (1972) 66-67. Mossman (1995) 3 cites Hogan as an illustrative example of critical attitudes toward the 
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 Mossman (1995) 3. The apparently bipartite structure of the play has also generated critical controversy. Cf.  
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gruesome elements: habet enim, Hecubam captivam, Polyxenam mactatam, Polydorum 
crudeliter interfectum, Polymestorem exoculatum, liberosque eius misere laniatos atque 
occisos.
5
 Therefore while we may find Hecuba to be ―one of the most brutal and grim plays 
of a brutal and grim tragedian,‖6 we cannot take for granted that the original audience shared 
our assessment. In this chapter I will argue that the play‘s brutal violence and its 
contradiction of familiar cultural categories were, in fact, constructed to elicit horror from its 
fifth-century audience. I will analyze the effects of the play‘s horrific material and show how 
a reading of the play as disaffirmative horror can contribute to our understanding of it.   
 There have been many distinct attempts to account for the brutality of the Hecuba, 
but for the sake of simplicity I will discuss three significant trends here before I move on to 
the play itself. The first kind of approach finds the violence within the play to be shocking 
and repugnant, and condemns its perpetrators, including Hecuba, as morally degraded. 
Abrahamson‘s interpretation of the work as a ―concentration camp play‖ is illustrative: he 
argues that the horrific violence suffered by Hecuba and her family causes her to experience 
an ethical breakdown that compels her to return atrocity for atrocity.
7
 The second interpretive 
approach agrees that Hecuba suffers gross indignities and repellent violence, but sees her 
revenge against Polymestor as fittingly severe and morally unproblematic: ―There is nothing 
inhuman by Greek standards about Hecuba‘s revenge. It is extreme, but so was the crime that  
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provoked it.‖8 Since both views address the play‘s final portion, I will discuss them more in 
the final section of this chapter. I note here, however, that these two approaches are limited 
by their moralistic tendencies. This is not to claim that ethical considerations are absent in the 
play; in fact my examination will show that they are quite prominent. But they are are part of 
a larger system of cultural categories that Euripides relentlessly assaults in this play without 
providing hope that this system can be repaired. Those who attempt to extract a clear moral 
lesson from the repulsive and terrifying material will be limited by the tragedian‘s refusal to 
provide a clear verdict in the play. The ambiguous and confusing nature of the play‘s 
violence – including both its ethical and non-ethical dimensions9 – likely generated more 
questions than answers from ancient audiences.
10
    
I therefore align my interpretation of the horrors in the Hecuba and their context with 
approaches that distance themselves from moral assessments of the play. Zeitlin, for 
example, argues that the play‘s excessive violence must be considered within its Dionysiac 
context (including both Bacchic references in the text itself and the ritual nature of its 
performance). She contends that though the gruesome material ―puts maximum pressure on 
our moral sensibilities,‖ the religious considerations should prevent judgmental readings that 
interpet the play ―with the single aim of repudiating the moral world the play presents.‖11 
This is a welcome shift from the moralistic approaches mentioned above, but it gives 
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 I do not intend to create a sophisticated distinction between ethical and non-ethical here or in the dissertation 
as a whole. Although there is a substantial overlap between things considered transgressively repulsive and 
those considered immoral (e.g. Douglas‘ (1966) 42-58 explanation of Jewish dietary restrictions), subjects can 
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unwarranted significance to the few references to Dionysus found in the play.
12
 Mossman 
claims that the Hecuba can be appreciated on aesthetic grounds: the play‘s ―dramatic 
technique‖ – including structure, stagecraft, characterization, plot, and the rhetorical effect of 
the speeches – are worthy of admiration.13 She contends that through this technique Euripides 
elicited confusion and doubt from his audience, as the play closes with the world in 
disorder.
14
 I agree with Mossman‘s assessment of the play‘s aesthetic merits and her 
acknowledgement of the play‘s disturbing nature, and I shall use her study to support several 
of my own interpretations. I do not think, however, that her comprehensive account of the 
play gives full consideration to the specific horrors found within it and their cumulative 
effect. While she recognizes, for example, the ambiguous nature of Hecuba‘s character,15 she 
does not fully analyze the pervasive contradictions related to Hecuba and her actions 
throughout the second half of the play: Hecuba defies the fundamental distinctions between 
male and female, queen and slave established in the first half of the play. I propose that a 
more detailed investigation into the Hecuba‘s horrific material and its context in the drama 
and within fifth-century Greece will illuminate some of the more difficult questions posed by 
Euripides in this play.  
 My examination is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I analyze 
how the ghosts found in the first half of the play create a gruesome and unsettling atmosphere 
that will remain throughout the drama. In the second, I discuss horrific aspects found in the 
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deaths of Hecuba‘s two children, particularly their killers‘ distortions of φιλία-based 
exchange. In the final part, I consider Hecuba‘s macabre revenge as a breakdown of 
traditional conceptions of law, political status, and gender. While  I am not particularly 
concerned with debates over the play‘s apparent lack of unity,16 I do think that my 
examination shows that throughout the play there is a consistent pattern involving the horrific 
disintegration of social structures. Ultimately I argue that we should not simply interpret the 
horrific material in terms of moral approval or condemnation of particular characters but that 
we should rather appreciate the ambiguity and discomfort these scenes generate. Euripides, 
like producers of modern horror, reveals that the civilized qualities on which the Greeks 
pride themselves ―are as subject to alienation and subversion as they are to validation and 
reaffirmation.‖17 The dramatic setting of the Hecuba may be remote, but its values and 
structures are very similar to those of the audience. By disaffirming the stability of these 
values and structures within the play Euripides revealed to his audience how easily their 
world might similarly fall apart. 
A) Humble Spectres and Gruesome Gifts: Ghosts in the Hecuba 
The opening of the Hecuba is striking because this is the only instance in the extant 
tragedies in which a dramatic prologue is delivered by a ghost. While ghosts do appear 
onstage in Aeschylus‘ Persians and Eumenides, the audience is prepared for these scenes 
either by an elaborate ritual introduction (Persians) or by events that occur earlier in the 
dramatic trilogy (Eumenides). Moreover, in both of these cases the ghost represented a well-
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 The first half of the play focuses on Polyxena‘s sacrifice, while the second centers on the discovery of 
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known historical or mythological figure. The sudden and unannounced appearance of the 
ghost of the relatively unknown Polydorus therefore had the potential to mystify and shock 
the unprepared audience.
18
  
In order to determine more precisely the effect of his appearance at the play‘s 
opening, I will consider its literary and cultural context, the possible staging of this scene, 
and the function of Polydorus‘ ghost within the context of the Hecuba, particularly the 
relationship between his spirit and that of Achilles. Though this approach is not exhaustive 
and will not resolve all difficulties, it does provide a valuable framework for our 
interpretations of this scene. I argue that Euripides‘ depiction of Polydorus is ironic: on the 
one hand, a potentially dangerous figure is revealed to be pathetic and harmless; on the other, 
the heroic ghost that serves as Polydorus‘ counterpoint demonstrates the capacity for 
gruesome excess within the traditional code of honor. The opening reveals the disturbing 
atmosphere of the play that governs the repellent acts of violence within it. This is a world in 
which horrors come from unexpected sources, where they are the products of the banality of 
human experience rather than of supernatural forces.
19
 
A.1) Cultural and Literary Context 
Ancient Greek attitudes concerning ghosts are difficult to pinpoint because, like most 
Greek beliefs about the afterlife, they were typically not declared as explicitly as other 
religious beliefs were.
20
 While we would like to know all the associations that ghosts had for 
ancient audiences, our sources present differing accounts that suggest that these associations 
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were context-dependent and highly malleable by individual authors. Despite this variability, 
there is significant evidence that ancient audiences considered ghosts, especially those 
belonging to people who died violently and prematurely without proper burial, to be 
potentially dangerous threats.
21
  This is significant for our understanding of the opening of 
the Hecuba, especially since Polydorus‘ ghost is not discussed by any other character in the 
play who might clarify how the audience should react to his presence. I shall argue below 
that Euripides contrasts the audience‘s preconceptions of vengeful ghosts with the pathetic 
features of Polydorus. 
Due reverence for the dead was a customary practice for ancient Greeks,
22
 and in 
cases where the dead were neglected or mistreated their ghosts posed a significant threat to 
the living. Johnston defines three types of ―restless dead‖ that can be found in Ancient Greek 
and other cultures: the unburied (ἄταφοι), those who have died prematurely (ἄωροι), and those 
who have died violently (βιαιοθάνατοι).23 The ἄταφοι are consistently depicted as bitter and 
unhappy: Patroclus‘ spirit tells Achilles that he cannot join with the other spirits in Hades and 
is condemned to wander until he receives proper burial (Il. 23.71-74); Herodotus relates that 
the ghost of Melissa, Periander‘s wife, was buried without clothing and so suffered, cold and 
naked in the afterlife (5.92η); Elpenor reminds Odysseus that if he does not receive the due 
honors he will bring vengeance with the help of the gods (μή τοί τι θε῵ν μήνιμα γένωμαι , Od. 
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11.73).
24
 The ἄωροι, according to Tertullian, had not completed their allotted time on earth, 
and so they were condemned to haunt the place where they had died.
25
 Hecate included them 
in her band of violent ghosts, possibly for this reason.
26
 The dangerous potential attributed to 
such ghosts is corroborated by curse tablets, which are frequently found near grave-sites of 
ἄωροι. 27 The βιαιοθάνατοι were also frequently summoned in curse tablets,28 but they were 
more widely feared because of the threat of pollution associated with their deaths. Antiphon 
warns judges that those who unfairly judge in favor of a murderer will bring the burden of 
the victim‘s vengeance, μίασμα, to the whole community (Tetr. 3.1.3).29 Even when 
murderers received purificatory rites to cleanse the blood from their hands, these attempts 
prove futile if the victim‘s spirit still rages, as Clytemnestra‘s does in the Eumenides.30 
 Though Greek attitudes towards ghosts are not uniform and consistent, Johnston‘s 
categorization of the restless dead explains why certain spirits are more dangerous than 
others. Significantly, she notes that all three types of restless dead possess a liminal and 
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transitional status: lack of burial, premature death, and death by violence prevent spirits from 
becoming fully integrated into the world of the dead.
31
 These spirits are thus neither fully 
alive nor fully dead according to Greek standards, and this defiance of cultural categories 
makes them unsettling. It is true that the restless dead are also pitied for the marginal status 
and the suffering they experience in the afterlife,
32
 and ancient authors often choose to focus 
on this aspect of their situation, particularly when the material concerns the victim‘s family.33 
But the terrifying and repellent qualities of these ghosts cannot be dismissed, particularly 
when they interact with the living. Tragic depictions of such interactions, in particular, 
highlight their horrific potential.  
  Onstage appearances of tragic ghosts mark disturbing experiences for the other 
characters and presumably for the audience. In Aeschylus‘ Persians, the ghost of Darius is 
not unwelcome: he is summoned by his wife Atossa, he does not intend any harm against the 
living, and he does not fit into any of the categories of restless dead mentioned above. But 
the narrative structure and the immediate reaction of the chorus highlight the shocking nature 
of the appearance. The first references to Darius involve simple propitiations asking him to 
provide help from below, and there is no indication that he himself will visit the living. He is 
lumped together with the gods of the underworld and the dead generally (219-221, 522-523), 
and he is initially asked to send up gifts to the light and retain everything harmful below 
(ἐσθλά σοι πέμπειν τέκνῳ τε γῆς ἔνερθεν ἐς φάος, / τἄμπαλιν δὲ τ῵νδε γαίᾳ κάτοχα μαυροῦσθαι 
σκότῳ, 222-223). Atossa‘s first reference to necromancy therefore was likely surprising for 
                                                          
31
 Johnston (1999) 9-11. Cf. Garland (2001) 101-103. 
 
32
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the original audience.
34
 Her request is unorthodox, as Darius himself remarks that he had 
difficulty convincing the gods of the underworld to let him return (688-692). And though 
Darius later shows himself to be a piteous figure, the chorus members are at first awestruck 
(σέβομαι 694 and 695) by his appearance and are too frightened (δίομαι 700 and 701) to 
discuss the dire fortunes of the kingdom, though this fear is partly an extension of their 
previous dread of the living king (σέθεν ἀρχαίῳ περὶ τάρβει 696).  
 If an invited ghost can be frightening, an unwelcome one, like Clytemnestra in the 
Eumenides, can be even more terrifying. She appears onstage to chastise the sleeping Erinyes 
for not chasing Orestes;
35
 her influence over the foul goddesses, whom the terrified Pythia 
vividly describes in lines 50-56, illustrates how dangerous she can be. Clytemnestra‘s 
appearance is likely as frightening as that of the Erinyes; she graphically describes and points 
to the wounds she bears as the result of her violent death (103) – typically ghosts resemble 
the physical form of their former bodies, including the mutilation done at their demise.
36
 
Unlike Darius‘, her death was caused by violence, and she is consequently unable to live 
peacefully in the underworld (αἰσχρ῵ς δ’ ἀλ῵μαι 97).37 She is scorned by the other spirits for 
her previous crimes and needs retribution for her own death, but she cannot exact vengeance 
without the help of the Erinyes. Her admonition is focused solely on rousing the goddesses so 
that they can exact terrible punishment from Orestes. I shall discuss below in more detail the 
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 Hickman (1938) 21-24. 
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 It is not entirely clear whether her ghost actually appears onstage. Taplin (1977) 365-369 does not rule out the 
possibility that the audience only heard her voice coming from offstage, but he notes several reasons for 
preferring an onstage appearance, including the delayed reveal of her identity (an immediate identification 
would be welcome for an audience that could not see her) and her specific prompts to look at her form.   
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parallels between Clytemnestra‘s ghost and the ghost of Polydorus in the Hecuba; for now I 
note that Darius and Clytemnestra, the only other onstage ghosts in extant tragedy besides 
those in the Hecuba, are depicted as unusual, frightening, and potentially dangerous figures. 
This tragic trend, in addition to the general anxieties about restless ghosts discussed above, 
suggests that the unprompted presence of the ghost at the opening of the Hecuba was at least 
somewhat unsettling. I will argue below that Euripides exploits the horrific potential of 
Polydorus‘ ghost but subverts his audience‘s expectation by presenting him as a pathetic 
figure, especially in contrast with the cruel spirit of Achilles. 
II.2) Staging Polydorus 
Since Polydorus receives no verbal introduction prior to his entrance, the staging of 
this scene significantly influenced the audience‘s reaction. The ghost might have seemed 
fearsome and repulsive, but it is also possible that he appeared more ethereal and pathetic.
38
 
Reconstructing the staging of any ancient play is, of course, highly tentative since we have 
no stage directions aside from the comments made by the characters themselves.
39
 But we 
can achieve a more plausible, if not conclusive, conception of the visual scene by considering 
not only cues within the text but also other sources, particularly other tragedies, that provide 
social and dramatic context for the scene. I argue that the staging of Polydorus‘ ghost is 
consistent with, though unfortunately not proof of, the position I will elucidate more fully in 
the next section: the sight of this ghost at the beginning of this play is horrific, but Euripides 
subverts his audience‘s initial horror by contrasting the ghost‘s dreadful appearance with his 
pathetic speech. My discussion here will focus on the location of the actor and his costuming. 
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 Scholars are divided concerning where the ghost stood as he delivered his 
monologue. Some argue that the actor delivered the prologue from on high, either on the 
skene roof or suspended from the mechane,
40 
but Lane has convincingly argued that such a 
staging is unnecessary and obtrusive: no other ghost in the extant tragedies appears above the 
stage, and the textual evidence for Polydorus on high is not compelling;
41
 furthermore the 
ghost‘s decision to depart in order to avoid contact with Hecuba (γεραιᾷ δ’ ἐκποδὼν χωρήσομαι 
/ Ἑκάβῃ, 52-53) suggests that he is on her level.42 The presence of the ghost on the stage 
level gives the character a frightening immediacy that might be lost if he were on the 
theologeion or mechane. While it is true that figures on high can terrify other characters and, 
presumably, the audience (e.g. Iris and Lyssa in Heracles, Medea at the end of Medea), the 
distance between these figures and the characters onstage reveals superior, typically divine, 
power that cannot be overcome. Ghosts, on the other hand, do not pose the same type of 
threat that the gods do: they are specifically chthonic figures that are most frightening when 
they are in close contact with the living. Hecate, whom I mentioned above, is an illustrative 
example: she, a goddess, exerts her influence from afar by sending the vengeful ghosts in her 
service against living victims. Polydorus‘ ghost confirms that his presence onstage is 
frightening in his departing remarks: he wants to avoid confronting Hecuba, who comes 
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avoid human contact (76).    
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onstage already frightened of his spirit (φάντασμα δειμαίνουσ’ ἐμόν, 54); seeing his ghost 
immediately before her would thus only intensify her fear.
43
   
 The actor‘s costume is difficult to discern since no other character sees Polydorus‘ 
spirit nor does the ghost describe his appearance in detail. It is not immediately clear whether 
the actor‘s costume and mask resembled the appearance of the dangerous ghosts mentioned 
above or whether he donned less gruesome garb. Scholars have offered both suggestions.  
Nussbaum, for example, assumes that the character ―retains the appearance of the living child 
without decay or wound‖ so that Euripides may shock the audience through the contrast 
between his innocent appearance and the dark opening lines (Ἥκω νεκρ῵ν κευθμ῵να καὶ 
σκότου πύλας / λιπών, ἵν’ Ἅιδης χωρὶς ὤικισται θε῵ν, 1-2).44 While this would create a 
profound effect, there is no basis for the firmness of her conviction.  In fact, many have 
argued that these lines appear flat and unadorned, especially in comparison to a similar 
passage Sophocles‘ Polyxena.45  
Gregory‘s suggestion that the ghost donned slashed and bloodstained clothing seems 
more persuasive; she notes that such an appearance would befit Polydorus‘ mutilated corpse 
and rent clothing, on which Hecuba and Agamemnon comment explicitly (716-720, 733-735, 
782), since Greek popular belief held that spirits resembled their bodies.
46
 Literary evidence 
supports the notion that ghosts resembled their corpses: Odysseus sees in Hades spirits with 
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 As Gregory (1999) ad 53-54 notes, Hecuba‘s fear is not caused by actually seeing Polydorus; rather, as we 
learn later (68-97), she is stirred by dreams concerning the fate of her children. That Hecuba fears for her son 
and that his ghost is unlikely to do her harm is an important consideration. 
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 Nussbaum (1986) 397-8 and 504n. 2.   
 
45
 The lines of Polyxena are as follows: ἀκτὰς ἀπαίωνάς τε καὶ μελαμβαθεῖς / λιποῦσα λίμνης ἦλθον, ἄρσενας χοὰς / 
Ἀχέροντος ὀξυπλῆγας ἠχούσας γόους (fr. 523 Radt). Calder (1966) 54-55 condemns Euripides‘ prologue as a 
―prosaic travel narrative‖ and considers it derivative.  Mossman (1995) 46 disagrees with his critique, but agrees 
that the Sophoclean precedent explains the swiftness of the reference. 
 
46
 Gregory (1999) ad 1-97. 
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spear wounds (Od. 11.40-41); the ghost of Melissa, Periander‘s wife, appeared naked before 
him since he had buried her without ceremonial attire (Hdt. 5.92η). Dramatic productions 
also seem to have followed this precedent: the ghost of Darius likely appeared on stage in 
majestic attire, since the chorus attribute their fear of him to his former regal status (Pers. 
694-696);
47
 Clytemnestra‘s spirit explicitly calls attention to the wounds she bears as the 
result of her violent death and the lack of due treatment following it (Eum. 103).
48 
 If 
Polydorus appeared onstage without any signs of the mutilation he suffered or the neglect 
shown to his corpse, this costuming would deviate significantly from literary and dramatic 
convention. It is impossible to rule out innovation in this case, especially given the 
innovative use of a ghost to deliver the play‘s prologue. But, as I will argue, this scene‘s 
effect remains strikingly original, in fact is more so, without deviating from traditional visual 
representations of ghosts. 
The gruesome appearance of Polydorus‘ ghost likely horrified the original audience. 
As I noted in the section above, ghosts frequently elicited fear and repulsion from ancient 
Greeks, particularly those liminal spirits who were killed violently and did not receive proper 
burial. This horrific effect is consistent with Polydorus‘ remark that Hecuba enters ―fearing 
my phantom‖ (φάντασμα δειμαίνουσ’ ἐμόν, 54).  Soon after she emerges, Hecuba echoes 
Polydorus‘ remark by claiming she has been roused by ―fears, phantoms‖ (δείμασι φάσμασιν, 
70) in her dreams. Her description of these dreams indicates that they were particularly 
monstrous (μελανοπτερύγων μᾶτερ ὀνείρων, 71) and violent (εἶδον γὰρ βαλιὰν ἔλαφον λύκου αἵμονι 
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 Cf. Taplin (1977) 115, who does not comment explicitly on the costuming but notes that his appearance must 
be ―majestic.‖ 
 
48
 Mossman (1995) 50 correctly notes that Polydorus, unlike Clytemnestra, does not call attention to his 
physical wounds or clothing in his monologue.
 
But we should not accept this as evidence that his appearance 
did not reflect his violent death and the mistreatment of his corpse. Polydorus ghost addresses no internal 
audience within the play, nor does he share in Clytemnestra‘s desire to arouse anger and indignation at his 
mistreatment. 
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χαλᾶι / σφαζομέναν, 90-91). I am not suggesting that Hecuba‘s remarks are meant to describe 
literally the costuming of Polydorus‘ ghost, as has been suggested.49 I do contend, however, 
that the repetition of key terms relating to fear and ghosts as well as the following morbid 
descriptions of Hecuba‘s dream imply that Polydorus‘ spirit was costumed in a manner that 
reflected the macabre tone of the dream. 
 The contrast between the pathetic tone of Polydorus‘ speech and his horrific 
appearance is striking. Some scholars have avoided this contrast by arguing that the 
costuming should reflect his humble words. Mossman, for example, proposes that ―this ghost 
appear as delicate and fragile as possible‖ in order to distinguish himself from the powerful 
ghost of Achilles, which appears (offstage) to the Greek army demanding a human sacrifice 
for his tomb (35-44).
50
 But the difference in power is not the only point of consideration here. 
Achilles appears before the army above his tomb dressed in gold armor (110), which 
illustrates not only his military prestige but also the considerable effort the Greeks have made 
in giving him a proper burial.
51
 Polydorus‘ ghost announces that he has received no such 
burial (ἄταφος, 30), thus making his note that Achilles‘ spirit appears over his tomb (37) all 
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 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1909) 446-447, for example, interprets Hecuba‘s comment on ―black-winged 
dreams‖ (71) as an indication that Polydorus‘s ghost, like some depictions of spirits on amphorae, appeared 
either on stage or in Hecuba‘s dream as a figure with black wings. The desire to consult iconographic evidence 
is understandable, but unfortunately representations of ghosts in antiquity are not consistent: while some vase 
paintings depict ghosts as winged, others present spirits as virtually indistinguishable from the living. Cf. 
Vermuele (1979) 29-32. Moreover, given the frequent designation of dreams as ―winged‖ in Greek literature, 
Gregory (1999) ad 71 is probably right in condemning Wilamowitz‘s suggestion as ―too literal-minded.‖ 
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 Mossman (1995) 50. She does not, however, adopt Nussbaum‘s position that the ghost should appear simply 
as a child, but instead argues that his costume most likely indicated clearly that ―he was royal and that he was 
dead,‖ perhaps including an ―unnaturally pale‖ mask (50 n. 9). 
 
51
 Cf. Scott (1918) 682-684 on the presence of armor in funeral rites, including those of Eetion (Il. 6.417-419), 
Elpenor (Od. 12.12-15), and Ajax (Ajax 576-577).  Achilles‘ famous armor was not of course included in his 
burial, but his corpse was adorned with ―immortal clothing‖ (ἄμβροτα εἵματα, Od. 24.59). At any rate, the 
contrast between the description of his gleaming arms here and the later description of Polydorus‘ mutilated 
body (716-720) is striking.   
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the more significant. Polydorus‘ torn and bloody clothing would emphasize the difference 
between the dreadful treatment of his body and the honors shown to that of Achilles. 
I contend that Euripides presented the pathetic ghost of Polydorus in horrific 
costuming in order to demonstrate a sharp contrast between appearance and reality. This 
would not be the only such instance in which a character‘s costuming is more frightening 
than his or her actions. For example, the chorus in the Heracles is initially terrified by the 
grotesque appearance of Lyssa, but the ensuing dialogue reveals that she is the only divine 
voice of reason, whereas Iris and Hera are the bloodthirsty proponents of violence (814-858). 
I argue that Euripides here similarly presents Polydorus‘ ghost as a horrific figure whose 
threatening nature dissipates as his prologue reveals that he is uninterested in violent 
retribution. Such a staging would create a chilling atmosphere for the audience, an 
atmosphere in which appearance and reality are not in accord and in which violence comes 
from unexpected sources. This account of the staging of Polydorus‘ ghost fits with the 
disaffirmative tone of the play, as I shall argue throughout this chapter, as well as with the 
limited evidence we have for ghosts in Greek culture and in tragedy.  
II.3) The text of the Hecuba         
Polydorus‘ ghost at the beginning of the play presents potential dangers that are 
ultimately discarded by the end of his monologue. I would like to discuss three features of his 
character that would likely generate feelings of fear and repulsion from the audience: his 
correspondence with literary precedents for dangerous spirits, the liminal and ambiguous 
nature of his self-identification, and the disturbing dreams his presence generates for his 
mother.  
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Polydorus‘ ghost reveals that he possesses all of the traits associated with particularly 
dangerous ghosts. As I mentioned earlier, Johnston has noted that violent and restless ghosts 
frequently belong to those who have not received proper burial and who have been killed 
violently, particularly if they were very young. Polydorus‘ body lies neglected in the ocean 
and unburied (ἄταφος, 30), he suffered a violent death at the hands of Polydorus (κτείνει με ... 
κτανών, 25-27), and he was killed at a young and vulnerable age, a point that receives 
particular emphasis (παῖς  3; παισί, 12; νεώτατος, 13; οὔτε γὰρ φέρειν ὅπλα / οὔτ’ ἔγχος οἷός τ’ ἦ 
νέωι βραχίονι, 14-15). I also argued above that such ghosts were likely repulsive because of 
their liminal nature. Since they have not fulfilled their natural life or received proper burial, 
they belong to neither the underworld nor the world of the living. They defy the essential 
distinction between living and dead and consequently are endowed with destructive power.  
The opening monologue of the Hecuba further establishes Polydorus‘ liminal nature 
by having him identify both with his spirit and with his corpse. There are seven shifts in first-
person subject between Polydorus qua ghost and qua corpse. He introduces himself as a 
spirit residing in Hades (Ἥκω νεκρ῵ν κευθμ῵να καὶ σκότου πύλας / λιπών, 1-2). He then 
associates himself with his corpse by claiming that he lies on the beach (κεῖμαι δ’ ἐπ’ ἀκταῖς, 
ἄλλοτ’ ἐν πόντου σάλῳ, / πολλοῖς διαύλοις κυμάτων φορούμενος, 28-29). His remark that he 
hovers over his mother‘s head reveals that he has resumed identifying as a ghost (νῦν δ’ ὑπὲρ 
μητρὸς φίλης / Ἑκάβης ἀίσσω, 30-31). Following this, he pronounces that he will appear 
(φανήσομαι, 47); the audience might interpret the verbal resonance with the appearance 
(φανείς, 37) of Achilles‘ ghost as an indication that Polydorus is referring to himself as a 
spirit, but the next line reveals that he means as a corpse on the beach (δούλης ποδ῵ν πάροιθεν 
ἐν κλυδωνίῳ, 48).  He then describes his request to the gods below (ἐξῃτησάμην, 49) to show 
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that he is again presenting himself as a ghost, but his request ―to fall into his mother‘s arms‖ 
(κἀς χέρας μητρὸς πεσεῖν, 50) again assumes an identification with the corpse. His departing 
remarks indicate that his final self-reference is as a spirit (γεραιᾷ δ’ ἐκποδὼν χωρήσομαι, 52). 
The character‘s confused identity is further revealed through the comments σ῵μ’  ἐρημώσας 
ἐμόν (31) and φάντασμα δειμαίνουσ’ ἐμόν (54), which are nearly identical in meter and phrasing 
and in which Polydorus distances himself from his corpse and spirit, respectively.
52
  
The latter phrase is particularly intriguing because it is unclear how Hecuba, the 
subject of δειμαίνουσ’, relates to Polydorus‘ ghost. She incorporates the same vocabulary into 
her monody soon after she emerges onstage: τί ποτ’ αἴρομαι ἔννυχος οὕτω / δείμασι φάσμασιν; 
(69-70). The proximity of these lines indicates that this verbal echo is significant and that 
Polydorus‘ ghost is correct in claiming that his presence causes his mother to fear. The 
specific way in which the ghost relates to Hecuba‘s dream, however, is not quite as certain. It 
is difficult to ascertain whether Polydorus‘ ghost appears directly in Hecuba‘s dream or 
whether he is in some way causing the dream. This is not a case of dream visitation, as 
Gregory rightly observes, since Hecuba‘s confused description of the dream makes clear that 
she has not communicated directly with her son‘s spirit.53 She associates the intense fear 
(οὔποτ’ ἐμὰ φρὴν ὧδ’ ἀλίαστον / φρίσσει ταρβεῖ, 85-86) generated by the dream with Polydorus‘ 
fate (ὦ χθόνιοι θεοί, σώσατε παῖδ’ ἐμόν, 80), but she never acknowledges explicitly that she has 
seen her son‘s spirit. She mentions, moreover, multiple apparitions (φάσμασιν), as opposed to 
the singular used by Polydorus‘ ghost earlier.  Lane contends that it is possible that one of 
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 See Gregory (1992) for a defense against those who consider 54 spurious.  
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 Gregory (1999) ad 53-54. 
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these apparitions belongs to Polydorus, but concedes, with Gregory, that there is no evidence 
that such is necessarily the case.
54
  
There does, however, seem to be evidence that the presence of Polydorus‘ ghost is 
causing the dream. Hecuba‘s concern for her son soon after she wakes and her later 
recognition that her visions related to him (ὄψιν … ἃν ἐσεῖδον ἀμφὶ σοῦ, 704-6) suggest that the 
source of the dream had an interest in Polydorus‘ fate. The notion that proximity with a ghost 
causes disturbing dreams is not unprecedented. Clytemnestra‘s ghost in the Eumenides 
attempts to rouse the Furies by detailing her sufferings and urging them to take vengeance on 
Orestes, and in so doing she ―creates a climate for their dream‖ without necessarily appearing 
directly to them in their sleep.
55
 Similarly, the presence of Polydorus‘ spirit causes Hecuba to 
experience macabre dreams full of violent images, including the bloody slaughter of a deer.  
These horrific elements of Polydorus‘ ghost are undercut, however, by his lack of 
interest in attaining vengeance. Though in many respects he resembles dangerous ghosts with 
which tragic audiences would be familiar, the miserable fate suffered by Polydorus does not 
arouse his wrath. Clytemnestra‘s spirit lists the indignities she has suffered, in both the world 
above and below, as reasons why the Furies should be enraged (μηνίεται) on her behalf and 
take vengeance on Orestes (Eum. 94-139). Polydorus‘ ghost delivers a monologue that 
follows a similar pattern: he first recounts the brutal nature of his death, the neglect shown to 
his corpse, and the consequent restlessness of his spirit (Hec. 1-34); then he explains his 
desire – not for vengeance, but to fall into his mother‘s hands and to obtain proper burial (49-
52). The fourteen-line passage separating his suffering and his wishes serves several 
important functions. They of course provide the audience with essential background 
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 Lane (2007) 291, Gregory (1999) ad 53-54.  
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 Gregory (1992) 269. 
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information (i.e. the appearance of Achilles‘ ghost and its significance for Polyxena and 
Hecuba) that one expects to find in an opening monologue. But they also generate dramatic 
tension by delaying the revelation of the ghost‘s purpose and by offering a point of 
comparison, Achilles‘ ghost, which the audience can consider when reacting to Polydorus‘ 
spirit. 
The change in subject from Polydorus‘ current status to the circumstances in the 
Greek camp creates suspense concerning his ghost‘s intentions. He ends the account of his 
sufferings by noting that he has been hovering over his mother for the previous two days (30-
34). Though it is clear he intends no harm for his ―dear mother‖ (μητρὸς φίλης), he does not 
indicate initially the purpose of his visit. Given the precedents for the behavior of ghosts, the 
original audience could not rule out that Polydorus might want in addition to burial 
vengeance against the man who killed him and neglected his corpse. When he resumes his 
own account, he begins by proclaiming ―I will appear‖ (φανήσομαι, 47); he uses the same verb 
to indicate the appearance of Achilles‘ ghost (φανείς, 37), and this verbal similarity perhaps 
suggests that he will make similar demands upon his mother for due honors. But Polydorus is 
referring to his body here, not to his ghost (48), and his spirit never communicates his wishes 
to his mother openly. He instead pleads with the gods below for burial, and burial only 
(ὅσονπερ ἤθελον τυχεῖν, 51), at his mother‘s hands. The simplicity and innocence of his appeal 
is made all the more striking by this lack of direct interaction between Polydorus and his 
mother. Though he influences her dream, Hecuba does not understand it fully until later (ὄψιν 
… ἃν ἐσεῖδον ἀμφὶ σοῦ, 704-6). Moreover, Polydorus‘ body is discovered only while Hecuba‘s 
fellow slave looks for water for Polyxena‘s burial; Polydorus‘ request is thus answered only 
indirectly and as a consequence of the gruesome request of another ghost, that of Achilles.  
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 The description of Achilles‘ ghost in the monologue introduces an important 
juxtaposition that affects our interpretation of Polydorus‘ ghost. Euripides does not 
frequently incorporate ghosts into his tragedies: Polydorus and Achilles are the only 
significant ghosts within the extant Euripidean corpus.
56
 We should not, therefore, assume 
that the representation of these two spirits is merely coincidental. Rather, they pose a 
significant contrast that reveals not only the important distinction between appearance and 
reality in this play, but also the instability of the characters‘ (and, by extension, the 
audience‘s) assumptions about honoring the dead. As in my discussion of Polydorus‘ spirit, I 
will look at significant literary precedents as well as the play itself in my examination of the 
function of Achilles‘ ghost, particularly how it may be compared with the ghost of 
Polydorus. 
As I noted above, Polydorus‘ ghost possesses characteristics of the restless ghosts that 
Greeks considered to be most threatening, but his pitiful nature defies expectations.  
Achilles‘ ghost seems to present the opposite predicament: he suffered an honorable death 
and received proper burial, but he is discontented and wants further offerings, he is able to 
communicate his wishes directly to the Greek army, and he significantly affects the course of 
action in the first half of the play. Euripides does not provide many details concerning the 
Greek soldiers‘ treatment of Achilles prior to this appearance, but there is little to suggest 
that the Greeks did not honor him with a proper burial after his death.
57
 The play contains 
repeated references to his tomb, which occur in all three accounts of his appearance (37, 93, 
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 Hickman (1938) notes the presence of ―pseudo-ghosts‖ in the extant plays (e.g. hallucinations of 
Clytemnestra in Orestes, the phantom double of the eponymous protagonist referenced in Helen) and  
inconclusive descriptions found in fragments (e.g. the tale of Glaucus in Polyidus and the brief return of the 
fallen hero in Protesilaus). 
 
57
 The audience was familiar with the funeral of Achilles from accounts found in the Aethiopis and in Od. 
24.43-94.  
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109).
58
 These references to honored burial are in stark contrast with the treatment of 
Polydorus, who remains unburied (ἄταφος, 30), so that his spirit does not have a fixed 
location where he can appear. He claims to have deserted his body (31) in order to visit his 
mother, but he also claims to have come up from the underworld (1-2). As I noted earlier, 
this migratory nature is characteristic of ghostly unrest and is understandable in the case of 
Polydorus.  
It is unclear, however, why Achilles‘ spirit should be discontented with the tomb and 
burial provisions provided by the Greeks. Euripides is not the first to mention the sacrifice of 
Polyxena at Achilles‘ tomb, nor is it likely that he is the first to depict Achilles‘ spirit 
demanding this sacrifice.
59
 But even these earlier treatments do not fully explain why 
Achilles‘ ghost demands such an offering. His desire for human sacrifice is perhaps 
prefigured by the sacrifice of twelve Trojan youths that he carried out for his dead 
companion Patroclus (Il.21.25-32, 23.175-177). Homer‘s remark that Achilles ―plotted evil 
deeds in his mind‖ (κακὰ δὲ φρεσὶ μήδετο ἔργα, 23.176) suggests that this act was meant to 
appease his own wrath rather than to honor Patroclus, whose spirit requested only immediate 
burial and a shared grave with Achilles (21.65-92). King proposes that Achilles‘ request may 
also be related to the ―vengeful nature of Greek hero-ghosts.‖60 These hero-ghosts are 
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 Cf. Gregory (1999) ad 37 for the location of the tomb on the Thracian side of the Hellespont, instead of the 
traditional location on the other side. 
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 The sacrifice of Polyxena was first referenced by the author of the Sack of Ilium, as reported by Proclus in 
Chrestomathia fr. 239 Severyns. Achilles‘ demand for this sacrifice may have been in Simonides, but Conacher 
(1961) 4 notes that the author of On the Sublime 15.7 only writes that Simonides vividly presented the hero‘s 
ghost, and he does not explicitly mention Polyxena. . Cf. Gantz ( 1993) 657-659 on variations of the myth . 
Sophocles‘ Polyxena, to which the author compares Simonides‘ depiction of Achilles‘ ghost, was likely 
produced not long before Hecuba and therefore may have been the most familiar to the audience, though 
unfortunately we know little about the context of the appearance of Achilles‘ ghost in fr. 523 Radt. Cf. 
Mossman (1995) 31-32 for a brief discussion of literary antecedents and 42-47 for a more detailed examination 
of the relationship between Polyxena and Hecuba.  
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 King (1985) 49.  
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frequently found as active agents in local Greek legends, typically plaguing communities for 
grievances suffered by the heroes while they were alive or for disgraces to their sanctuaries 
after they had died. For example, a hero-ghost at Temesa, enraged at the local population 
who stoned him to death for raping a virgin, demanded a yearly sacrifice of a beautiful 
maiden.
61
  
In the Hecuba Achilles‘ ghost does not appear to be angry at a past wrong so much as 
he seems discontented with the offerings that have been given to him. In each account of his 
appearance there is a reference to his desire for a γέρας, a Homeric term for a prize of honor 
(41, 94, 115). The emphasis on this type of reward may be a specific reference to the quarrel 
between Agamemnon and Achilles in the first book of the Iliad, in which the merit of the two 
heroes and the rewards due to them, specifically foreign concubines, is of particular concern. 
Just as Agamemnon refuses to give up his concubine and go ―ungifted‖ (ἀγέραστος, Il. 1.119), 
so Achilles‘s ghost is angered at being denied a prize of honor (ἀγέραστον, Hec. 115).62 The 
presence of the adjective in both texts is significant: it is not a common term in either the 
Iliad or the Euripidean corpus,
63
 and so audiences likely detected the Homeric echo, 
especially given the familiar epic context. The similarity in circumstances, however, only 
reveals the ―aberrant quality‖ of this sacrifice.64 Whereas the transmission of concubines to 
living heroes was a standard way of rewarding successful heroes, the same honor is not 
typically conferred to the dead. Homeric warriors honor their dead with ritual offerings, 
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 Rohde (1925) 135-136. The story of the hero-ghost at Temesa can be found in Pausanias 6.6.4-6.6.11.  
 
62
 Cf. Mossman (1995) 31-34 and King (1985) passim for a discussion of the parallels between Achilles in the 
Hecuba and in Iliad 1 and 9. 
 
63
 It occurs only here in the Iliad, and Euripides uses the term here and again in Bacchae 1378. There are no 
other examples of the word in tragedy. 
 
64
 Gregory (1999) ad 113-15. 
82 
 
lamentation, proper washing and adornment of the body, cremation before burial, and a 
social gathering usually including feasting and funeral games.
65
 The dead suitors in the 
Odyssey, for example, complain that their bodies have not been cleansed and their friends 
have not lamented them, actions that are labeled ―the prize of the dead‖ (γέρας … θανόντων, 
24.188-190). Human sacrifice for a fallen warrior is highly irregular, one that Garland deems 
―unique and horrifying.‖66  
Achilles‘ request in the Hecuba thus should horrify by its violent distortion of 
customary behavior. He appropriates a familiar term that represents a common practice 
among the living, but employs it in order to receive an uncommon gift, one that generates 
fear from the victim‘s family (καὶ τόδε δεῖμά μοι, Hec. 92) and forces the Greeks to commit a 
perverted sacrifice that would likely cause revulsion. In Greek literature human sacrifice is 
almost always presented as a savage act.
67
 Herodotus identifies human sacrifice as a practice 
found primarily among uncivilized foreigners, such as the Scythians and Taurians; when the 
Greek king Menelaus sacrifices two boys in Egypt, the historian calls the act impious (πρῆγμα 
οὐκ ὅσιον, 2.119.2).68 The eponymous maiden of Iphigenia among the Taurians considers the 
Taurians savage and their practice of human sacrifice unspeakable (30-41). The chorus of 
Agamemnon consider the king‘s decision to sacrifice his daughter to be impious and unholy 
(δυσσεβῆ ... ἄναγνον ἀνίερον, Ag. 219-220).  
In the Hecuba, however, Achilles‘ appearance and perverse request do not seem to 
elicit fear or revulsion from the Greek generals. Some have interpreted the lack of emotion in 
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 Garland (1982) passim, Finley (1964) 138-139. 
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 Garland (1982) 72, in discussing Achilles‘ sacrifice of the Trojan youths for Patroclus.  
 
67
 Segal (1974) 301-307 discusses human sacrifice and cannibalism as characteristic behaviors of uncivilized 
peoples. 
 
68
 Cf. Hughes (1991) 8-10 on human sacrifice in Herodotus. 
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the Greeks‘ response as evidence against the horrific nature of this ghost. King, for example, 
argues that the Homeric reference found in the ghost‘s speech and the ―mundane politics‖ in 
the ensuing debate among the Greeks illustrate that Achilles‘ spirit ―has not arisen simply 
from the dark regions of Greek religion; this ghost is a literary caricature.‖69 I contend, 
however, that the Greek generals here are not reliable indicators of the ghost‘s emotional 
effect. The horror of this scene largely depends not only on Achilles‘ misappropriation of an 
acceptable form of honorable recognition, but also on the willingness of the Greeks to accept 
this misappropriation without significant hesitation or doubt. The chorus‘ description of the 
debate reveals that the perversity of human sacrifice is never considered, not even by those 
opposed to the sacrifice. Agamemnon is the only voice on the opposing side mentioned by 
the chorus, and his efforts are explained as an attempt to promote Hecuba‘s interest (i.e., 
because of his relationship with her other daughter Cassandra, 120-122). Hecuba alone 
recognizes the aberrance of the act by noting that an animal sacrifice (βουθυτεῖν) would be 
more fitting than human sacrifice (ἀνθρωποσφαγεῖν, 260-261). The latter term is a hapax 
legomenon that condenses the perversity of ritual slaughter and human victim into a single 
word.
70
 In contrast, the Greek debate concerns only the marginal status of the human victim 
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 King (1985) 51-52. 
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 Adkins (1966) 199 and Gregory (1999) ad 260-62 note that her condemnation (μᾶλλον πρέπει) is not 
particularly vehement and argue that if Euripides had wanted to emphasize the repellent qualities of human 
sacrifice he would have had Hecuba label the act as κακόν, αἰσχρόν, or ἀνόσιον. It is true that Hecuba‘s comments 
concerning  human sacrifice here are not as strong as those she makes in Trojan Women (ἀνοσίων προσφαγμάτων, 
628), but this is not an indication that neither Hecuba nor the audience found the act repellent. The chorus‘ 
earlier report of the Greek debate made clear that the issue at stake was not whether they should offer human 
sacrifice but rather whether they should sacrifice Polyxena. Hecuba, accordingly, mentions the impropriety of 
the sacrifice without particular emphasis so that she can suggest a more fitting victim (i.e. Helen) without 
hypocrisy (262-270). 
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(δούλων σφαγίων, 135) and the prestige of the dead hero who will receive her (ἄριστον Δανα῵ν 
πάντων, 134) without regard for whether such a sacrifice is appropriate.71   
The ambiguous limits of Achilles‘ power underscore the horrific nature of the 
Greeks‘ ready assent to commit human sacrifice. The Greeks are not frightened by his 
ghost‘s appearance, nor do they consider the implications of denying his request. Some 
scholars have suggested that Achilles is preventing the soldiers from leaving (κατέσχ’, 38; 
ἔσχε, 111) by stopping the winds. These scholars thus see a parallel between the sacrifices of 
Iphigenia and Polyxena: the Greeks sacrifice the former to induce Artemis to prevent adverse 
winds and allow them to travel to Troy (Ag. 104-255); they sacrifice the latter to appease 
Achilles and thus end the adverse winds blocking their return home.
72
 While this explanation 
would clarify how Achilles holds back the Greek army, it cannot be supported by the text. 
For one, the Greeks were already at sea when Achilles appeared; the chorus notes that 
Achilles stopped the ships as their sails were already pressed against the forestays (111-112), 
which would be impossible if the winds were adverse at this point.
73
 Moreover, Agamemnon 
mentions the lack of favorable winds after the sacrifice of Polyxena (898-901).
74
 Therefore, 
if this sacrifice had been intended to improve sailing conditions, it was ultimately 
                                                          
71
 Pace Kovacs (1987) 86, who claims that Odysseus‘ mention of δούλων σφαγίων (135) suggests ―that the 
shedding of human blood, even that of a slave, was deemed by some to be a repugnant measure.‖ His later 
contention that the chorus‘ account does not describe a debate about the identity of the victim (i.e. suggestions 
for alternate victims) is correct (113-114), but Euripides withholds any other arguments against sacrificing 
Polyxena besides her connection to Agamemnon. The only signs suggesting that the Greeks in this play find the 
act of human sacrifice to be repugnant are Odysseus‘ offhand remark at 395 and Neoptolemus‘ hesitation before 
slaying Polyxena. See my discussion on pages 94-99 below on the Greeks‘ acceptance of the sacrifice.     
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 E.g. Collard (1991) ad 33, Hughes (1991) 61-62, Anderson (1997) 59-61. 
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 Kovacs (1987) 145n. 58.  
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 Agamemnon attributes the weather conditions to a god (οὐ γὰρ ἵησ’ οὐρίους πνοὰς θεός, 900), not to Achilles. It 
is unlikely that the Greek king is using θεός to refer to Achilles. Kovacs (1996) 63-65 ) notes that neither the 
appellation nor the ability to control the winds are associated with dead heroes in Greek literature before the 
Hecuba. He concedes that Achilles‘ spirit, like those of other heroes, may have some limited powers, but that 
the Greeks are more worried here that ―like anyone else he can put the kibosh on an enterprise by uttering words 
of bad omen at a crucial time‖ (65). 
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unsuccessful, and the lack of any mention of this failure in the second half of the play would 
seem clumsy.
75
 Achilles‘ ghost does not then pose any immediate physical threat to the 
Greeks; rather, he incites his living comrades to commit a savage act in the guise of honoring 
the dead. 
The juxtaposition of the ghosts of Polydorus and Achilles, then, reveals two horrific 
elements found in the Hecuba. The first of these is the subversion of the traditional Greek 
conceptions of ghostly activity. Polydorus‘ ghost suffers unrest as a result of his brutal 
murder and the neglect of his corpse, but does not crave vengeance as many other spirits do 
in such circumstances. This ghost is liminal in nature and potentially threatening, but the 
potential horror of his character is defused by the modesty and innocence of his desire for 
burial alone.  Achilles‘ ghost does not have the same cause for complaint nor does his spirit 
possess the liminal features that violent ghosts typically exhibit. He nevertheless demands a 
prize that entails the slaughter of an innocent maiden, and he perverts a traditional method of 
honoring the living by applying it to the dead. The second horrific element is found not in the 
ghosts themselves but in the behavior they inspire in others. Polydorus‘ ghost can only 
communicate indirectly with his mother through dreams that cause Hecuba to feel intense 
fear and confusion. He shares his prophetic knowledge with the audience, but he does not or 
cannot convey this important information to the mother whom he loves and laments; Hecuba 
does not glean any useful information from the dream, learnin its true meaning only after she 
finds his body. Achilles‘ ghost communicates openly with the Greeks and convinces them to 
commit a monstrous act of human sacrifice. Despite his powerful appearance, he does not the 
incite sacrifice through the exertion of physical power, as a god might, but by 
misappropriating a familiar practice among Homeric warriors. It is the Greeks‘ acceptance of 
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 Gregory (1999) xxix-xxxi and ad 900, Kovacs (1996) 63-5. 
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this misappropriation that brings about the death of Polyxena. These elements create an 
unsettling atmosphere that will be sustained throughout the play, an atmosphere in which 
threats emerge from unexpected places and in which established codes of conduct are 
neglected or perverted.   
B) τίνα δὲ καὶ σπεύδων χάριν; Foul Friendship in the Hecuba  
 
 I would now like to discuss more fully violations of these codes of conduct and how 
they contribute to the horrific nature of Polydorus‘ murder and Polyxena‘s sacrifice. 
Polydorus‘ ghost informs the audience at the play‘s beginning that Hecuba will see ―two 
corpses of her two children‖ (δυοῖν δὲ παίδοιν δύο νεκρὼ κατόψεται, 45). The use of the dual 
number and the repetition of the word δύο in this terse summation closely joins the fates of 
Polydorus and Polyxena in the audience‘s mind: 76  Hecuba‘s two children are reduced to the 
same state by the play‘s end, both innocent victims of murderous φίλοι (Odysseus and 
Polymestor, respectively). This is not to say that the differing circumstances of their deaths 
are insignificant for our understanding of these violent acts. Rather, Euripides explores how 
the killers‘ different assessments concerning bonds of φιλία and the obligations these 
relationships entail can lead to similar horrific consequences. I will examine the repellent and 
frightening qualities of each murder separately, as well as the justifications offered by those 
responsible for each death.  As above, I will consider the cues within the text and relevant 
contemporary sources in determining the emotional effect of these scenes. I argue in this 
section that the horrific violence in the play arises because of the fragility of private bonds of 
φιλία. The killers of Hecuba‘s children, namely the Greek soldiers (particularly Odysseus) 
                                                          
76Hecuba‘s use of the dual in her request to bury her two children together confirms that she considers their 
deaths to be closely related (ὡς τώδ’ ἀδελφὼ πλησίον μιᾷ φλογί / δισσὴ μέριμνα μητρί, κρυφθῆτον χθονί, 896-897).  
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and Polymestor, offer distinct, yet mutually reinforcing, conceptions of φιλία that allow them 
to destroy those who most need their protection.    
 To understand how φιλία operates in the Hecuba, I would like to discuss briefly its 
importance in fifth-century Athens as well as Greek tragedy. The term indicates not simply 
affection, in fact such feelings need not necessarily apply,
77
 but rather a ―series of complex 
obligations, duties and claims.‖78 A Greek‘s φίλοι included his immediate family members, 
remote kinsmen, close friends, members of his tribe, guest-friends, and political allies, 
among others; he was expected to defend their interest whenever possible.
79
 Such 
relationships depended on acts of reciprocity that solidified these bonds: parents were 
expected to raise their children and the children, in turn, were expected to honor their 
parents‘ graves; fathers endowed their daughters with dowries and other marriage gifts to 
show goodwill to their sons-in-law and secure the bond between the married couple, as well 
as the two houses being joined;
80
 guest-friends, as φίλοι belonging to separate communities, 
defined their relationship through exchanges of gifts and favors.
81
 Bonds of φιλία were at the 
core of ethical, legal, and political matters: ―to help one‘s friends and harm one‘s enemies‖ 
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 Adkins (1963) 36. 
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 Goldhill (1986) 82.  
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 This traditional and inclusive conception of φιλία has been challenged by Konstan (1997), who argues for a 
more restrictive sense involving friendship (not kinship) based on affection, not on obligation. I, however, agree 
with Belfiore (2000) 19-20, who gives a spirited defense of the traditional conception using examples from 
tragedy and Aristotle while acknowledging that in many cases Konstan‘s emphasis on affection is warranted. 
My discussion of the Hecuba should make clear why we should not dismiss the importance of mutual obligation 
in φιλία. 
 
80
 Lacey (1980) 107-110. 
 
81
 See Herman (1987) 16-31 on ξενία as a type of φιλία. He defines ξενία as ―a bond of solidarity manifesting 
itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units‖ (10). 
The exchange of armor between Diomedes and Glaucus in Il.6.212-236 is a paradeigmatic example. 
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was a fundamental principle that could justify almost any action.
82
 There were obstacles, 
however, that prevented one from always assisting his φίλοι, particularly when he had to 
choose between competing claims of obligation. For example, the democratic culture in 
Athens encouraged citizens to seek the communal interest of the πόλις over their familial 
relationships.
83
 The tensions between such competing claims proved to be fertile ground for 
tragic conflict. 
Tragic acts of violence frequently occur between φίλοι, and Aristotle argues that such 
conditions are the most likely to arouse pity and fear from the audience (Poet. 1453b19-22). I 
contend that violence against a φίλος additionally generates feelings of horror, in that those 
harming their kin or friends, whether this act is intentional or not, violate a significant 
cultural category associated with mutual protection and benefit. To slay one‘s mother, as 
Orestes does, is to commit a paradoxical act that defies a fundamental bond established by 
nature and held sacred by society.
84
 Greeks depended on φίλοι to promote their safety and 
interest in the private and public spheres; without these relationships, one was vulnerable to 
attacks from enemies within the community and from those outside of it. It is essential to 
understand the nature of the bonds of φιλία in the Hecuba in order to gauge the effect of the 
killings within the play. Both Polyxena and Polydorus are involved, directly or indirectly, in 
φιλία with their killers, but the killers neglect these relationships in favor of material gain or 
competing claims from other relationships.   
 
                                                          
82
 Dover (1974) 180-181. The Greeks adherence to this principle should not be overstated, but I agree with 
Pearson (1962) 17-18 that ―popular ethics does not abandon a traditional precept simply because it is found not 
be universally applicable.‖ Cf. Blundell (1989) for a more detailed discussion of this principle as it appears in 
Greek tragedy. 
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 Pericles‘funeral oration is the most commonly cited text in support of this claim (Th. 2.40).  
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 Cf. Goldhill (1986) 84 on how ―the language of kinship attempts to deal with the family at war with itself.‖ 
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B.1) Odysseus, Hecuba, and the Sacrifice of Polyxena 
  
 The relationship between Hecuba and Odysseus is difficult to define because they 
each have different conceptions of it: while Hecuba believes that Odysseus is a φίλος and is 
obligated to protect her daughter, Odysseus denies φιλία between the two and therefore 
dismisses the claims that such a bond would entail. The ―great contest‖ between them (ἀγὼν 
μέγας, 239) is a debate fundamentally concerned with the implications of Polyxena‘s sacrifice 
for preexisting bonds of φιλία. The audience is confronted with competing claims about the 
nature of this killing, and their interpretation of the act depends largely on the position they 
accept: is the sacrifice an honorable offering to a φίλος who deserves reward or the callous 
murder of a φίλος out of political ambition? I contend that neither position is completely 
tenable and that this scene is not meant to illustrate the complete moral failings of either 
figure. Rather, the irreconcilability of these competing conceptions and the horrific result that 
follows demonstrate a larger crisis in the play, namely the breakdown of φιλία as a source of 
protection for the weak and its role as a primarily destructive force in the play. 
 Euripides‘ deviation from traditional myth demonstrates his interest in challenging 
traditional conceptions of φιλία. The original audience had no reason to assume the existence 
of any significant relationship between a Greek soldier and the captive slave of his ally. The 
play introduces Odysseus as the foremost proponent of sacrificing Polyxena, and he 
convinces the Greek generals by emphasizing mutual obligations between Greeks (Δαναοὶ 
Δαναοῖς) and noting that the sacrifice of a slave (δούλων σφαγίων) should not deter them from 
honoring their comrade (131-140). Like the other generals, he does not explicitly mention the 
name of the sacrificial victim, much less any claim she might have on his friendship. But in 
the later confrontation between Hecuba and Odysseus the tragedian radically complicates this 
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situation.  In supplicating Odysseus Hecuba makes an appeal to his previous supplication of 
the queen and her decision to spare his life, and this Euripidean innovation reveals a 
surprising twist to their conflict (239-250).
85
  Her reference to this previous favor is 
powerful, as reciprocity is one of the most compelling arguments a suppliant can offer: such 
appeals call attention not only to the previous benefits offered but also to the relationship 
established between the two after the acceptance of the first supplication.
86
 It is clear then 
that Euripides is inviting the audience to consider seriously this slave‘s claim to φιλία with 
her conqueror, a claim that otherwise might be casually dismissed.
87
  
 Hecuba considers her act of mercy to be the foundation of a bond of φιλία between 
Odysseus and herself. She explicitly uses the term φίλος twice in reference to their 
relationship: once in condemning Odysseus‘ act of harming φίλοι (οἳ τοὺς φίλους βλάπτοντες οὐ 
φροντίζετε, 256), then appealing to him within a formal supplication (ἀλλ’, ὦ φίλον γένειον, 
αἰδέσθητί με, / οἴκτιρον, 285-286).  She makes a connection between this bond, generated by a 
previous act of goodwill, and the favor, χάρις, Odysseus consequently owes her. To spare 
Polyxena is to return the favor (ἀντιδοῦναι δεῖ σ’ ἀπαιτούσης ἐμοῦ, 272; χάριν τ’ ἀπαιτ῵ τὴν 
τόθ’, 276), but to commit the sacrifice is to be ungrateful (ἀχάριστον) and to gratify (πρὸς 
χάριν) the masses over the φίλοι who deserve his favors (254-257). Though she never says so 
explicitly, Hecuba‘s conception of φιλία here is very similar to ξενία. She was supplicated by 
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 The mention of Helen at 243 suggests that Euripides is drawing from the story of Helen‘s recognition of 
Odysseus in Troy (Od. 4.242-268). The notion that Hecuba was also privy to this recognition is found only here, 
perhaps because, as the scholion on 241 notes, it is implausible. 
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 Naiden (2006) 79-84, 116-122. He notes, however, that references to reciprocity frequently offend the one 
being supplicated, perhaps because the reminders seem impertinent. Aristotle claims that appeals to favors 
received are unpleasant because it reminds the one being supplicated of previous weakness (EN 4.1124b12-17).  
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 Adkins (1966) 197-201 argues that even with this private claim, Hecuba ―as not merely not a member of the 
group but a prisoner of war and a slave … has really no rights at all.‖ Adkins‘ position depends on the notion 
that the competitive values operative in Homeric poetry have not substantially changed in the plays of 
Euripides, a position that, as I will argue below, is difficult to maintain given the many complications in this 
dialogue.  
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a hostile stranger, she accepted his plea and conferred a benefit upon him, she believes this 
χάρις established a bond of friendship between the two, and she expects that this bond will 
continue, being inherited by her descendants.
88
  
Hecuba‘s interpretation of the situation is not unreasonable. Successful supplication 
of a foreign enemy frequently ends in ξενία. Odysseus‘ tale of his supplication of the 
Egyptian king is one such example (Od. 14.257-286).
89
 Her position is complicated, 
however, by her oblique reference to Odysseus‘ words at the moment of the previous 
supplication; after she asks him if he remembers what he said at that moment, Odysseus 
declines to repeat his words and instead dismisses whatever vows or pledges he had made as 
―inventions of many words to avoid death‖ (πολλ῵ν λόγων εὑρήμαθ’ ὥστε μὴ θανεῖν, 250).  
The audience thus does not know what specific commitments Odysseus has made, nor can 
Hecuba rely on the words of the man she considers a φίλος.  
φίλος and χάρις are important terms in Odysseus‘ rebuttal, but he does not accept that 
these terms apply to the relationship between Hecuba and himself. Though he acknowledges 
that Hecuba‘s mercy deeply affected him (242) and vows that he would save her life were it 
at stake (301-302), he does not recognize any φιλία between them. Rather, the only person 
Odysseus labels φίλος in this scene is Achilles. The φιλία between the two heroes has no 
personal dimension: Odysseus does not discuss any instance of direct interaction between the 
two nor any feelings of intimacy such as Achilles and Patroclus share in the Iliad. It is 
Achilles‘ military service that makes him a φίλος to all Greeks, and Odysseus considers it 
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 This fits many of the elements of model ξενία formation proposed by Herman (1987) 41-72. 
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 It is true that there is a wide variety of situations involving supplication and consequently the expectation of 
ξενία or other form of φιλία is not a guarantee; hostages also supplicate their captors for freedom with promises 
of ransom or beg for a life of slavery over death. Cf. Naiden (2006) 116-122 and Herman (1987) 54-58. But 
neither Hecuba nor Odysseus mentions a financial dimension to the previous supplication, and therefore the 
implications of Hecuba‘s mercy are all the more difficult to pinpoint. 
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shameful (αἰσχρόν) to treat a man as a friend while living but fail to honor him as such in 
death (306-312). He therefore maintains that Achilles, not Hecuba, deserves χάρις from the 
Greeks (315-320), and that to deny the fallen hero his prize would be an ungrateful act 
(ἀχάριστοι, 137) that would, moreover, harm the living as well as the dead by destroying the 
army‘s morale.  The essential values are thus not in question: both parties agree that one 
should provide χάρις to his or her φίλος. Yet the two characters do not agree on what 
constitutes φιλία and what obligations it entails: while Hecuba is exclusively interested in 
private relationships generated and maintained by acts of personal goodwill that continue into 
successive generations, Odysseus favors political alliances that ultimately serve communal 
interest.
90
 
Scholars have not hesitated to choose sides in this contest: while most reject 
Odysseus‘ claims as calculating and heartless, a few see Hecuba‘s arguments as 
unconvincing, however pitiable her situation may be.
91
 But Euripides refuses to offer his 
audience a clear moral victor in this debate. Odysseus triumphs in the end because he wields 
political authority over Hecuba (οὐ γὰρ οἶδα δεσπότας κεκτημένος, 397), not because he has 
made a more convincing case.
92
 But by presenting Odysseus as a fervent spokesman for 
conventional values Euripides has made this argument more than a simple matter of might 
over right.
93
 His professed loyalty to fallen comrades is consistent with both Homeric and 
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 Cf. Stanton (1995) 16-19 on private and political conceptions of φιλία in this play. 
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 Critics of Odysseus note that his speech is refined and well-constructed, but so patently cruel that audiences 
would find it unappealing. These critics include Abrahamson (1952) 123, Conacher (1961) 16-18, Hogan 
(1972) passim, Reckford (1985) 115, Mossman (1995) 116 among many others. Kirkwood (1947) 64-65, 
Adkins (1966) 96-100, Heath (1987) 66 and Michelini (1987) 144-148 maintain that Hecuba‘s arguments, while 
emotionally moving, do not effectively counter Odysseus‘ articulation of Greek values. 
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 As Kastely (1993) 1038 notes, ―when power is held unequally, force determines the outcome, and further that 
the force need not actively repress speech, because the inequality of the speakers renders rhetoric irrelevant in 
the determination of the encounter.‖  
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fifth-century practice.
94
 Moreover, his commitment to honor communal will over private 
relationships reflects popular political sentiment that would have been familiar to the play‘s 
audience. Pericles, for example, renounced his claim to family property during the first 
invasions of the Peloponnesian War because he feared the Spartans might refrain from 
destroying it because of the ξενία between himself and Aristarchus; such a move, whether it 
was well-intentioned or deliberate political sabotage, would have offended Athenians whose 
lands had been ravaged.
95
 Hecuba‘s accusation that Odysseus is purely interested in flattering 
the masses to secure his own personal interest is dubious (254-257); Odysseus is a character 
notorious for his interest in profit,
96
 but there is no indication in this play that he will receive 
any private benefit from this sacrifice.
97
 Hecuba‘s anger, however righteous it may be, 
perhaps leads her to make stinging attacks rather than persuasive arguments.
98
 While her 
supplicatory stance and appeal to reciprocity serve as powerful emotional appeals, she cannot 
comprehend Odysseus‘ fervent and exclusive commitment to the military any more than 
Odysseus can appreciate her devotion to personal relationships. 
It is precisely through the irreconcilability of these two competing notions that 
Euripides develops the horror of the situation: the frustrated debate validates neither position, 
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 Pace Reckford (1985) 115, Odysseus‘ arguments do not reflect the absence of moral and religious values, but 
rather what Michelini (1987) 90-91 calls ―outrageous virtue‖ – that is his willingness to follow traditional 
values to ―eccentric and abnormal lengths.‖ 
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 Cf. Adkins (1966) 196-200.  
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 Th. 2.13. Cf. Herman (1987) 1-9 and118-161on the tensions between upholding private relationships of ξενία 
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 Cf. especially Philoctetes 108-111. 
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 His stated interest in receiving a distinguished tomb for himself (319-320) reflects conventional heroic values 
and is not particularly damning; in fact, it is the traditional nature of this wish, as I shall argue below, that 
makes it so problematic in this context, as it highlights the unorthodox nature of Achilles‘ request. 
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and the failure to reach mutually acceptable definitions ensures that the contest will end in 
slaughter. The uncertain nature of values in this debate makes Hecuba‘s plight all the more 
unsettling. She is not the victim of a heartless villain who denies that one should honor φίλοι, 
but rather suffers at the hand of one who would utterly invalidate her conception of φιλία. 
Odysseus accuses her and all foreigners of failing to recognize φίλοι (οἱ βάρβαροι δὲ μήτε τοὺς 
φίλους φίλους / ἡγεῖσθε, 327-328). That Odysseus can make such an accusation against one 
pleading for her daughter‘s life reveals not only the discrepancy in their conceptions of φιλία 
but also highlights the fragility inherent in both conceptions. Odysseus claims that his 
definition of φιλία, which entails honoring one‘s dead comrades, is responsible for Greece‘s 
prosperity (εὐτυχῇ, 330); he also remarks, however, that he prospered (ηὐτύχουν, 302) from 
Hecuba‘s previous act of mercy. Therefore while Odysseus and Hecuba have disparate 
conceptions of φιλία, he derives benefit from both, she from neither; had she followed the 
principles espoused by Odysseus in this debate, the Greek would not be in a position to harm 
her daughter. In this play no good deed goes unpunished; the bonds of φιλία are too unstable 
to protect the weak in moments of crisis. 
Similarly fragile in this debate is the duration of friendship and gratitude for favors. 
Hecuba believes that her previous χάρις created a bond of φιλία and that this bond should, as 
frequently happens with ξενία and other types of φιλία, become inherited by her daughter 
Polyxena. Odysseus does not accept this proposition, claiming that his only obligation lies 
with Hecuba (301-302). His claim that favor is long-lasting (διὰ μακροῦ γὰρ ἡ χάρις, 320) 
seems contradictory in this context, since the χάρις he received from Hecuba did not create an 
obligation that extended to succeeding generations of her family. The longevity of gratitude 
is further undercut by the specific type of χάρις that Odysseus mentions before this comment. 
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He explains that he expects a conspicuous tomb from his allies and that this χάρις would be 
sufficient reward for his service – but it is because this same favor failed to satisfy Achilles 
that the Greeks need to provide him with another χάρις. Just as Hecuba‘s explicit reference to 
her past mercy fails to move Odysseus, Odysseus‘ reference to an impressive tomb indirectly 
recalls the Greeks‘ failure to appease Achilles with this traditional type of χάρις.  The 
ineffectiveness of these two favors reveals the limitations of such offerings generally: a 
previous χάρις does not guarantee future goodwill or protection from those one considers 
φίλοι. It is thus significant that the audience never learns how Achilles‘ ghost responds to the 
sacrifice, whether this violent offering will suffice or whether he will need additional 
offerings of this type in the future.
99
 But even more disturbing than this possibility, however, 
is the notion that the ineffectiveness of previous favors leads not only to the dissolution of 
some relationships (i.e. Odysseus and Hecuba) but also to acts of gruesome violence 
undertaken to retain other relationships.  
I have already discussed the horrific nature of human sacrifice above, but Euripides 
further amplifies this horror through Odysseus‘ presentation of the act as an acceptable χάρις 
between φίλοι. Human sacrifice in tragedy is typically depicted as an offering made by 
humans to gods in order to avert an immediate crisis; tragedians thus can exploit the tension 
between the sacrificants‘ aversion to committing such gruesome acts and their fear of the 
danger resulting from not committing them.
100
 Odysseus concedes that he would rather not 
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 In the Heracleidae, Iolaus accepts the maiden‘s offer to be sacrificed to Persephone and thus save her family 
and host city, but because of his worries about pollution will not command her to do so or forbid her from doing 
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sacrifice Polyxena (μηδὲ τόνδ’ ὠφείλομεν, 395), but he does not suggest that he fears any 
immediate danger from not committing it; Achilles‘ ghost has made no threats or promises in 
relation to this request, nor do the Greeks at any point consider the potential dangers of his 
anger or benefits of his goodwill. Instead, Odysseus appeals more broadly to the tradition of 
honoring fallen comrades and the long-term dangers to the army‘s loyalty should such honors 
be denied. But his unwavering commitment to this principle requires him to provide an 
unorthodox favor, human sacrifice, instead of the more traditional ones requested by Hecuba 
(i.e. sparing her daughter‘s life) and expected by Odysseus (i.e. proper burial). The sacrifice 
of Polyxena thus raises the unsettling notion that such perverse acts of violence are an 
acceptable form of social currency. 
The performance of the sacrifice, which Talthybius reports to Hecuba, confirms that 
this type of exchange is disturbing even within the context of war. Many readers of the play 
have interpreted the sacrifice as a showcase for Polyxena‘s heroism and have consequently 
found the scene to be lacking in horror, especially in comparison with Hecuba‘s vengeance at 
the play‘s end.101 Daitz, for example, claims that Polyxena‘s willingness to die transforms 
―the revolting murder of a slave into a moving spectacle of human strength, dignity, and 
renunciation.‖102 The problem with these readings is, as Segal has noted, that they ―confound 
the admiration we are supposed to feel for the victim with the circumstances of her death.‖103 
It is true that the Greeks admire Polyxena‘s virtue, but this admiration does negate their 
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willing participation in a brutal act; moreover, as I argued above, their assessments of the 
sacrifice are not reliable indications of the audience‘s reaction. One of Hecuba‘s objections to 
the sacrifice is the inherent dehumanization of the act: it is substitution of human for 
traditionally animal victims (βουθυτεῖν vs. ἀνθρωποσφαγεῖν, 260-261). Talthybius‘ report 
confirms that the Greeks, at least initially, treated her like an animal.  He tells Hecuba that 
young men surrounded Polyxena ―in order to check the leaping of your calf‖ (σκίρτημα 
μόσχου σῆς καθέξοντες, 526). Not only do the Greeks conceive of Polyxena as a traditional 
animal victim, the assumption that she might leap (σκίρτημα, another word typically 
associated with skittish animals)
104
 reveals that they (or at least Odysseus and his men) have 
taken no account of the willingness and courage she demonstrated earlier by accepting her 
fate (342-378). The first part of Talthybius‘ report reveals that the soldiers were determined 
to conduct this sacrifice as they would any other, and thus, like Odysseus, their total 
commitment to honoring their comrade prevents them from seeing the perversion of their 
act.
105
  
Polyxena, however, disrupts the proceedings by reminding the Greek soldiers of her 
humanity. Her speech of assent (546-552) is not a mindless expression as was commonly 
elicited from animal victims,
106
 but a meaningful signification (ἐσήμηνεν), just like 
Neoptolemus‘ command to Talthybius (σημαίνει, 529). Her repeated references to her desire 
to die a free woman (ἑκοῦσα, ἐλευθέραν … ἐλευθέρα) serve as a rebuttal to Odysseus‘ dismissal 
of  δούλων σφαγίων (135), the argument that ultimately won over the Greek soldiers. She 
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bares her torso before her death, and Talthybius provides a detailed description of her body 
parts, including her breasts, shoulder, and navel (558-560). The herald‘s explicit comments 
on the female body and his erotic appraisal of it (κάλλιστα, 561) violates ―the rigidity of 
tragic decorum‖ – descriptions of these parts of the female body are usually limited to brief 
and conventional remarks.
107
  This shocking act of exposure forces her killers to 
acknowledge her ―corporeal reality … as a human sacrificial victim.‖108  
Polyxena develops this point further by giving Neoptolemus a choice: he can strike 
her chest or slit her throat. The choice is significant because sacrificial victims traditionally 
have their throats cut, while chest wounds are more commonly associated with the deaths of 
epic heroes.
109
 It is only at this point that Neoptolemus, whom Polydorus has earlier 
condemned as bloodthirsty (μιαιφόνου, 24), seems disturbed by Polyxena‘s behavior and loses 
resolve (οὐ θέλων τε καὶ θέλων, 566). It is easier to feign animal sacrifice than to admit to 
killing another human being. But after he slits her throat in the manner of an animal 
victim,
110
 the Greeks do not show any other signs of regret for their role in taking away her 
life. Talthybius‘ comments on the final state of Polyxena‘s body are telling: he mentions 
briefly the bloody aftermath of the killing (κρουνοὶ δ’ ἐχώρουν), but expounds more fully on her 
forethought (πρόνοιαν) in concealing her genitals as she died (568-570). The statement reflects 
the Greeks‘ attitude towards Polyxena‘s final reminders of her own humanity: their praise for 
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her nobility (ἀρίστῃ, 580) deflects the gruesome nature of her death and their agency in 
executing it.  
The Greek admiration of her death, as Kastely notes, thus serves as ―a transfiguring 
lie that allows power to rest comfortably in its own brutality.‖111 The soldiers initially 
approved the sacrifice on the basis that a slave‘s life was negligible and that their comrade 
deserved compensation (χάρις); Achilles‘ ghost specifically demanded a prize (γέρας), 
suggesting a submissive concubine like Briseis or Chryseis in Iliad 1.
112
  Polyxena‘s 
demonstration of her own worth seems only to increase their admiration for her without 
making them question the nature of the exchange or confronting the conflict between 
Achilles‘ desire for a slave in Hades and Polyxena‘s refusal to be one. That the sacrifice has 
no effect on the situation in the Greek camp – the soldiers still cannot leave Thrace because 
of adverse winds, Agamemnon still defers to the will of the masses, the soldiers still consider 
Hecuba‘s other child an enemy (ἐχθρόν, 859) – is a testament to the banality of their 
violence.
113
 Though Euripides provides many details that attest to the unsettling and repellent 
nature of the sacrifice, Talthybius and the Greek soldiers, like Odysseus, fail to see the 
contradictions in incorporating horrific and aberrant violence into their system of social 
exchange.   
Euripides gives the final word concerning the sacrifice to Hecuba, and she, unlike the 
Greeks, recognizes that her daughter‘s virtue does not absolve them from their repellent 
crime.  While she agrees that her daughter‘s final acts confirm her nobility (γενναῖος, 592), 
she does not trust the ―unbridled mob‖ (ἀκόλαστος ὄχλος, 607) of Greek soldiers to provide 
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her child with proper burial. It is unclear what harm Hecuba fears,
114
 but her distrust of the 
mob seems warranted given the communal nature of the debate that sealed her daughter‘s 
fate and the execution of the sacrifice that ended her life. Though scholars have attempted to 
characterize Odysseus as particularly vile in comparison with the sympathetic figures of 
Talthybius and the common soldiers,
115
 the entire army subscribes to the same philosophy 
that condones brutality for the sake of honoring their peers.  The relative ease with which 
they all adopt, defend, and ultimately ignore aberrant violence in their system of social 
exchange reveals the fragility of the φιλία in this play. Traditional acts of goodwill, such as 
Hecuba‘s mercy towards Odysseus, may appear to secure binding relationships, but they 
ultimately offer little security: the recipient can discount previous declarations and deny 
obligations to protect those related to the previous benefactor. Moreover, the reciprocal 
nature of φιλία can be twisted so as to include horrific acts of violence that are contrary to the 
principles that define civilized communities. 
B.2) Hecuba and Polymestor: Guest-friends 
Polymestor, like Odysseus, bears responsibility for the death of a child of Hecuba.  
But his murder of Polydorus is more patently heinous than the sacrifice of Polyxena: he was 
involved in an undeniable bond of ξενία with his victim‘s family, he committed the murder 
deceitfully, and he was motivated by greed alone. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hecuba 
and other characters condemn his crime more vehemently than the sacrifice conducted by the 
Greeks. They rightly label Polymestor‘s disregard for the sanctity of the guest-friend 
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relationship and of the right to proper burial as abhorrent, and their reactions illustrate the 
horrific nature of the crime. While I argued above that Polyxena‘s sacrifice is an example of 
banal horror resulting from excessive commitment to traditional practice, Polymestor‘s crime 
shows, on the contrary, complete disregard for customary obligations. But despite 
Agamemnon‘s protestations against Polymestor‘s outrageous cruelty, Euripides presents the 
Greek‘s judgment as a condemnation of political rather than moral failing: the Thracian is not 
necessarily more vicious than Odysseus, but he does not defend his viciousness with the 
same rhetorical finesse. In this section, I will follow the play‘s chronology by looking first at 
Polymestor‘s crime and then considering his defense. Although the horrific nature of the 
Thracian‘s crime seems obvious, it is still worth analyzing because it shapes the audience‘s 
reaction both to the act itself and to Hecuba‘s vengeance. 
Polymestor commits murder against a ξένος. While Euripides never elucidates fully 
the nature of the relationship between Hecuba and Odysseus, he leaves no doubt that 
Polymestor and Hecuba are joined by an established bond of ξενία. Polymestor is called a 
ξένος of the Trojan house twelve times in the play by multiple characters, and this status is 
frequently given particular emphasis. In the first mention of the murder, for example, 
Polydorus‘ ghost leaves the identity of the perpetrator in suspense by enjambing the subject 
of the verb into the following line (κτείνει με χρυσοῦ τὸν ταλαίπωρον χάριν / ξένος πατρ῵ιος, 25-
26).   The unsettling juxtaposition of murder and guest-friendship continues throughout the 
play. Before Hecuba makes an accusation against her son‘s murderer, she calls his guardian 
Polymestor a ―Thracian man‖ (Θρῂξ ... ἀνήρ, 682); but when the chorus asks Hecuba to 
identify the killer, her immediate reply is ―my, my guest-friend‖ (ἐμὸς ἐμὸς ξένος, 709). 
Similarly, Agamemnon initially refers to the Thracian king by name in discussing Polydorus‘ 
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stay in Thrace (771); but after Hecuba refers to the killer as ξένος (774), the Greek king 
accepts the term and repeats it when describing the murder and its aftermath (κτανών νιν, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, ἐκβάλλει ξένος, 781). The disturbing combination culminates in Agamemnon‘s ultimate 
condemnation of ξενοκτονεῖν, ―guest-friend killing,‖ the only instance of the verb in Greek 
tragedy.
116
 The unorthodox verb is appropriate for an unorthodox situation that would likely 
elicit revulsion from the audience.   
  Polymestor‘s murder of his guest-friend and the neglect of his corpse are considered 
vile and repellent actions by Hecuba and Agamemnon, and contemporary sources suggest 
that the play‘s audience would have a similar reaction.  Hecuba‘s condemnation of her 
Thracian ξένος reveals her extreme revulsion at his deeds: 
ἄρρητ’ ἀνωνόμαστα, θαυμάτων πέρα, 
   οὐχ ὅσι’ οὐδ’ ἀνεκτά. ποῦ δίκα ξένων;  
   ὦ κατάρατ’ ἀνδρ῵ν, ὡς διεμοιράσω 
  χρόα, σιδαρέωι τεμὼν φασγάνωι  
   μέλεα τοῦδε παιδὸς οὐδ’ ὤικτισας.  
 
 Unspeakable unnamable acts, beyond wonders! Not holy nor at all bearable!  
Where is the right of guest-friends? Cursed of men, how you tore apart 
 his skin, having cut with an iron sword the limbs of this child here, nor at all  
did you pity him. (714-720) 
 This passage contains an abundance of terms that highlight the shocking and horrific 
qualities of his crimes. The important features include the unspeakable nature of killing a 
guest-friend, Polymestor‘s impiety, and the grotesqueness of his mutilation of his young 
guest-friend. I will discuss each of these features in detail, as they play a significant role for 
the play as a whole as well as for this particular passage.   
The term ―unspeakable acts‖ (ἄρρητα) indicates the severity of the categorical 
violation here. In tragedy the term is used to denote particularly repellent deviations from 
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customary behavior, such as Phaedra‘s love for her stepson Hippolytus (Hipp. 602) or the 
incest and parricide committed by Oedipus (OT 465, OC 1001). The term also has legal 
implications: the use of ἀπόρρητα against another constituted a form of verbal abuse so 
damaging that it could be prosecuted in court.
117
 We do not have a complete list of these 
unspeakable words, but Lysias mentions several in his speech Against Theomnestus. The 
examples he provides are compound nouns that pointedly juxtapose terms that are normally 
incongruent, such as ―father slaying‖ (πατραλοίαν) and ―mother slaying‖ (μητραλοίαν).118 
Unspeakable terms were reserved for abhorrent acts that contravened fundamental human 
values. Parricide, for example, was deemed so perverse that there was no specific law 
prohibiting it;
119
 Solon reportedly left it out of his law code because he hoped no law would 
be needed (διὰ τὸ ἀπελπίσαι, DL 1.59). Words that conjured such unnatural and repellent 
notions and turned them against another citizen were considered to be very dangerous since 
they generated ―complex and ambiguous feelings of fascination and recoil‖ in those who 
heard them.
120
 It is likely that murdering one‘s guest-friends belongs to the category of 
unspeakable acts.
121
 Aristophanes suggests that those who wrong guest-friends share the 
same miserable fate in the underworld as those who beat their parents (Frogs 146-151). 
Isocrates similarly joins the killing of guest-friends with the killing of family members, as 
well as other taboos ―excelling in impiety and cruelty‖ (τ῵ν ὑπερβαλλόντων ἀνοσιότητι καὶ 
δεινότητι) such as incest, mutilation, and cannibalism (12.121-122). Aeschines is perhaps, 
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then, using one of these ἀπόρρητα when he calls Demosthenes a ξενοκτόνος for killing a guest-
friend whom Demosthenes suspected to be a spy; Aeschines‘ denunciation of this impiety 
(ἀσέβημα) and Demosthenes‘ response were apparently so upsetting that the jury shouted in 
protest (Against Ctesiphon 224). We should, then, treat Hecuba‘s assessment of Polymestor‘s 
crimes as ἄρρητα as an indication that she considers them to be particularly horrific, and we 
should moreover assume that the audience would have shared her assessment.  
If the audience found the murder of a guest-friend to be shocking, then the details 
concerning the mutilation of his corpse could only add to their feelings of horror. Although 
Polydorus‘ murder had been revealed in his opening monologue, Hecuba is the first character 
to describe explicitly the wounds and disfigurements on Polydorus‘ corpse. Literary evidence 
suggests that Greeks found the practice of bodily mutilation to be abhorrent. The earliest 
Greek examples can be found in the threats of Homeric warriors in the Iliad, who often vow 
to let their enemies‘ corpses become food for dogs and birds. The violent context of these 
threats, delivered in the passion of battle, reveal that such punishment was considered 
severe,
122
 but its potency is confirmed by traditional Greek burial practice: to deny another‘s 
corpse burial was to prevent that person‘s soul from obtaining peace, and to allow the corpse 
to be violated was to amplify his suffering.
123
 Classical sources confirm that Greeks of the 
fifth century also considered such mutilation to be disturbing. Herodotus notes, for example, 
that Pausanias refused to decapitate the slain Persian general Mardonius, denouncing such an 
act as fit for barbarians and claiming that he preferred pious (ὅσια) actions and words (9.79). 
The historian notes several other instances of mutilation in his Histories that corroborate both 
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elements of Pausanias‘ assertion.  Non-Greek rulers are frequently the agents of 
disfigurement, responsible for cutting in half the sons of treasonous citizens, putting an 
enemy‘s skull in a wineskin, and flaying a dishonest judge and using his skin for the next 
judge‘s seat (7.39,1. 214, 5.25), among other examples. When Herodotus notes instances of 
Greeks committing acts of disfigurement, he often calls attention to the impiety of their 
behavior: after impaling her enemies and cutting off the breasts of their wives, Pheretime 
became infested with maggots and thus revealed the gods‘ anger at such activity (2.202-204); 
the gods punished the Apollonians with famine and plague for blinding a shepherd who had 
slept while on watch (9.93). Even among foreigners mutilating another is often treated as 
impious: an Egyptian thief who decapitated his brother, who had become ensnared in a trap, 
calls this action the most unholy thing he had done (ἀνοσιώτατον, 2.121ε); an Ethiopian king, 
after a dream instructed him to cut in half all the priests of Egypt, fled rather than commit an 
impious act (ἀσεβήσας) and thus be punished (2.139).     
 Hecuba similarly draws a connection between the mutilation of her son‘s body and 
Polymestor‘s impiety. She repeatedly accuses him of impiety and puts these accusations in 
places of prominence; she mentions her most impious guest-friend (ἀνοσιωτάτου ξένου) and his 
most impious deed (ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον) at the beginning of her first plea for Agamemnon‘s 
help (790-792) and after exacting vengeance she concludes her defense speech by asking 
Agamemnon to refrain from helping a guest-friend neither devout nor pious (οὔτε εὐσεβῆ ... 
οὐχ ὅσιον ... ξένον, 1234-1235).124  Soon after denouncing Polymestor‘s crime as ―not holy‖ 
(οὐχ ὅσι’), Hecuba draws attention to the disfigurement of her slaughtered son. She claims 
that Polymestor tore his skin apart (διεμοιράσω χρόα) and cut his limbs with a sword (τεμὼν 
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φασγάνῳ μέλεα). The verb διαμοιράω is particularly vivid: it is not a common word, and 
outside of the Hecuba it usually denotes the dividing and apportioning (μοῖρα) of goods, such 
as roasted meat (Od. 14.434, Ath. 1.12e), for the sake of fairness.
125
 In this case, however, 
the body being divided belongs to a human, not an animal, and it is not done to preserve 
friendship through equal shares but rather to destroy a friend to obtain all of his. The striking 
use of a typically mundane verb highlights the shocking cruelty of this mutilation and the 
banality of the killer‘s motive.126  
Hecuba later appeals to the sight of her son‘s corpse to achieve justice. After 
encountering the corpse of Polydorus unexpectedly, Agamemnon reacts to the sight with 
shock and revulsion (ἔα· τίν’ ἄνδρα τόνδ’ ἐπὶ σκηναῖς ὁρ῵ / θανόντα Σρώων; 732-733).127 
Hecuba appeals to his horror by emphasizing the gruesome mutilation suffered by her son. 
When he remarks that her guest-friend killed her son and neglected his corpse, she specifies 
that Polymestor has cut up (διατεμών, 782) her son‘s body. She then explicitly asks 
Agamemnon to look at the body again (τὸν θανόντα τόνδ’ ὁρᾳς, 833), hoping that the shocking 
sight will provoke him to take action. Her attention to her son‘s mutilated corpse confirms 
the horrific nature of Polymestor‘s crimes: it serves not only as testament to the unspeakable 
murder of a guest-friend but also highlights the repellent treatment he received after his 
death.  
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  On the surface, Polymestor‘s actions seem more obviously than those of Odysseus. 
This disparity may be evidence that Euripides intends to put the Greek hero in a position of 
favorable contrast: if the audience was unsure how to react to a human sacrifice committed 
by another Greek, they would no doubt find the savage Thracian‘s brutality to be inexcusably 
horrid and be satisfied with his fittingly gruesome punishment. There is no denying that 
Polymestor‘s actions are more reprehensible than those of Odysseus, especially considering 
the Thracian‘s dishonesty and greed, traits not displayed by the Greek hero.128 But if 
Euripides intends to distinguish these two characters and their motives for killing Hecuba‘s 
children, he undercuts this distinction through the similarities between their statements 
defending these killings. The ἀγών between Hecuba and Polymestor, like the earlier ἀγών 
between Hecuba and Odysseus, raises the possibility that even obviously horrific crimes 
could become acceptable in the political arena.  
 Polymestor, like Odysseus, dismisses his relationship with Hecuba and her family and 
presents the killing as an action promoting Greek interest. When asked by Agamemnon to 
explain the reason for his punishment, he admits killing Polydorus without dissimulation 
(τοῦτον κατέκτειν’, 1136). This is a change from his dishonesty prior to Hecuba‘s revenge 
(989-997) and the statement‘s starkness resembles Odysseus‘ admission of his role in 
persuading the Greek army to sacrifice Polyxena (οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι, 303). Polymestor‘s defense 
thus depends not on a denial of the crime itself or of his role in it, but rather on an argument 
concerning his motivation. He contends that he murdered Polydorus for the benefit of 
Agamemnon (σπεύδων χάριν … τὴν σήν, 1175-1176) and claims that by killing his enemy 
(πολέμιόν γε σὸν κτανών, 1176) he prevented him from restoring Troy and seeking vengeance 
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(1138-1139). Polymestor‘s designation of the act as a χάρις invites the same considerations 
that were at stake in the debate between Hecuba and Odysseus. Though Hecuba maintains 
that Polymestor should have remained true to his φίλος despite the trouble of the Trojan 
family (1226-1229), Polymestor  presents his allegiance to the Greeks, his political φίλοι, as 
more binding. His defense before Agamemnon does not explicitly acknowledge his ξενία or 
φιλία with Polydorus, though he admits that Priam had sent the boy to him to be reared in 
safety (1133-1134). This is another change from his previous interaction with Hecuba, in 
which he readily mentioned the φιλία between them (ὦ φίλτατ’ ἀνδρ῵ν Πρίαμε, φιλτάτη δὲ σύ, 
/ Ἑκάβη, 953-954; φίλη μὲν εἶ σύ, 982). After his punishment, however, he only refers to his 
φιλία with the Greeks, addressing Agamemnon with the same term of intimacy that he 
previously had addressed Hecuba (ὦ φίλτατ’, 1114). Conversely, he labels Polydorus as an 
external enemy, πολέμιος, in order to stress that his alliance with the Greek side trumps any 
personal relationships he might have with their foes.  
Though it is obvious to the audience that his justifications are specious, it is important 
to note that Polydorus is not fabricating a relationship between himself and the Greeks. He 
mentions his φιλία with the Greek army before his punishment (προσφιλὲς δέ μοι τόδε / 
στράτευμ’ Ἀχαι῵ν, 982-983); moreover, Agamemnon confirms that the Greek army considers 
him to be φίλιος and Polydorus to be ἐχθρός, and he privileges the Greeks‘ relationship with 
Polymestor over Hecuba‘s claim to φιλία with him (858-860). Polymestor loses the contest 
only because Hecuba proves that he withheld the gold, the true motive for the murder, from 
those whom he claims to be allies and who needed his help (1217-1225, 1243-1246). The 
similarities between Polymestor‘s defense and that of Odysseus are significant because they 
both present situations in which murder of innocents with whom one is intimately connected 
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can be considered acceptable. Polymestor‘s argument fails not because he committed a 
horrific murder against an innocent φίλος but because this murder was not, as he claimed, in 
the best interest of the Greeks (οὔτ’ ἐμὴν δοκεῖς χάριν /οὔτ’ οὖν Ἀχαι῵ν ἄνδρ’ ἀποκτεῖναι ξένον, 
1243-1244). The presence of the debate itself confirms that such violence could be 
considered a viable form of honoring one‘s political allies, a notion first raised by the earlier 
sacrifice of Polyxena; Agamemnon had recognized the injustice and repugnance of 
Polymestor‘s crime before Hecuba exacted vengeance (850-853), but these considerations 
had not been enough to motivate him to participate actively in punishing him.  
The second part of his judgment thus seems somewhat disingenuous: he makes a 
broad claim about the difference between Greeks and foreigners, noting that murdering 
guest-friends is ―easier for you (foreigners), but this is shameful for us Greeks‖ (τάχ’ οὖν παρ’ 
ὑμῖν ῥᾴδιον ξενοκτονεῖν· / ἡμῖν δέ γ’ αἰσχρὸν τοῖσιν Ἕλλησιν τόδε, 1247-1248). This claim to 
ethnic superiority is reminiscent of Odysseus‘ earlier insinuation that Greeks prosper over 
non-Greeks because they honor their φίλοι (328-331). Whereas Odysseus‘ claim seems 
patently contradictory (for there is no question that Hecuba, in trying to save her daughter‘s 
life, has great respect for φιλία), Agamemnon‘s similar remark subtly reinforces this 
contradiction. The Greek can condemn the murder of a guest-friend as both selfish and 
shameful, but his army is no less willing to slaughter the innocent when it is politically 
expedient. Therefore while his judgment against Polymestor is sound, his final remark 
introduces a note of hypocrisy that undermines the stability of φιλία: neither he nor the 
Thracian actively upholds private bonds of friendship when competing political or material 
advantage is present. The precedent of Polyxena‘s sacrifice and Polymestor‘s incorporation 
of the argumentation used by Odysseus suggest that in situations of political benefit to those 
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in power there is little protection from or retribution for even the most repellent crimes 
against φίλοι. 
The play ends, as Polydorus predicted, with Hecuba left to tend to the ―twofold 
corpses‖ (διπτύχους νέκρους, 1287) of her children. Though the circumstances of their deaths 
and the motivations of their killers are quite different, both children suffered perverse ends 
(Polyxena and human sacrifice, Polydorus and mutilation) and in each case a bond of φιλία 
failed to protect them. Not only do Hecuba‘s claims to intimacy prove futile, but the killers 
use alternative claims to φιλία as pretexts for the brutal slayings for which they are 
responsible. The Hecuba demonstrates how these bonds, the very ones on which all Greek 
citizens depended for protection within their community and especially outside of it, can be 
twisted to harm those who most need that protection. The horrific acts of violence found 
within the play are appropriated by the killers as instances of honoring one‘s φίλοι rather than 
as betrayals of φιλία. This appropriation sets the Hecuba apart from other tragedies that 
depict violence against φίλοι. Typically these instances of violence occur in extraordinary 
circumstances, such as ignorance of the victim‘s identity (e.g. Oedipus‘ murder of Laius in 
Oedipus Tyrannus, Iphigenia‘s plan to sacrifice Orestes in Iphigenia at Taurus), divine 
compulsion (e.g. Apollo‘s command to Orestes in Choephoroe, Artemis‘ demand for the 
sacrifice of Iphigenia in Agamemnon), or in retaliation to a previous act of betrayal (e.g. 
Clytemnestra‘s revenge against Agamemnon in Agamemnon, Medea‘s murder of her own 
children to destroy Jason in Medea). But in the Hecuba the killers are motivated by much 
more mundane considerations: Odysseus advocates human sacrifice not as a means of 
averting an immediate crisis, but as a natural part of the system of rewarding political allies 
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with χάριτες; Polymestor‘s interest is purely material, his desire for gold trumps any concern 
for protecting his ξένος.   
Carroll notes that one of the distinguishing features of modern horror is that the 
characters within the story consider the gruesome monsters and the repulsive acts of violence 
to be completely abnormal. In many of these modern horror stories secondary characters, 
particularly those who should provide assistance to potential victims, simply refuse to believe 
the stories of the protagonist: incredulous sheriffs, soldiers, and politicians who scoff at the 
wild stories of unnatural occurrences are familiar staples of the genre. But even more 
frightening than the inept authorities who fail to protect are those that succumb to the horrific 
circumstances and incorporate them into the existing structure – essentially converting the 
abnormal into the normal. In Ira Levin‘s Rosemary’s Baby, for example, a veil of normalcy 
conceals the horrific circumstances in which the protagonist is unwittingly involved. 
Rosemary Woodhouse is deceived by a Satanic cult into delivering the Antichrist. The cult 
achieves this goal through their conformity with social mores and their adoption of 
traditional parental roles: their members are predominantly elderly, including the leaders who 
enjoy gossip, travelling, and storytelling; their group includes a well-respected obstetrician 
who prescribes Rosemary plenty of organic vitamins; they ―protect‖ Rosemary from outside 
influence that might cause her stress or tension. Similarly, the killers in the Hecuba depend 
on normalcy to effect their gruesome aims. Odysseus and Polymestor both present the 
murder of innocents as an acceptable form of social exchange among political allies.
129
 No 
Greek in this play explicitly questions this premise, though Euripides‘ inclusion of gruesome 
details and repellent juxtapositons likely caused discomfort for his audience. Rather than 
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confirm the stability and security of φιλία properly practiced, the Hecuba challenges 
fundamentally the protective value of friendship by revealing how claims of dutiful φιλία can 
be used to destroy as well as to preserve. 
C) Fugitive Queen and Bloody Mother: Hecuba’s Vengeance 
I now turn to the play‘s most detailed depiction of violence, Hecuba‘s mutilation of 
Polymestor and her killing of his sons.   One of the most pressing scholarly controversies 
concerns the radical shift in focus from Hecuba‘s immense suffering depicted in the first 
parts of the play to the gruesome violence she inflicts towards its end. Some readers see in 
this shift the inconsistency of Hecuba‘s character in the play. Kirkwood, for example, argues 
that there is an ―appalling transformation‖ that results in two Hecubas: ―one is a figure of 
passive suffering … in sharpest contrast, there is the vengeful Hecuba, the fiend incarnate 
.…‖ 130 Others argue that only the circumstances, not her character, undergo significant 
change: ―Where each of her children are concerned, Hecuba sets to work at once, in one case 
trying to prevent, and in the other to avenge, a killing.‖131 This disagreement is firmly rooted 
in terms of ethical evaluation: those who see transformation in Hecuba condemn the 
corruption of her character;
132
 those who do not find any significant inconsistency defend the 
righteousness of her behavior and dismiss the possibility that her actions are disturbing.
133
  
In this section I will suggest that such ethical evaluations do not sufficiently account 
for the ambiguous nature of Hecuba‘s vengeance. Euripides shows little interest in providing 
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Hecubas, and Gregory (1991) 110 for other arguments on the consistency of her character.  
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his audience with simple moral instruction,
134
 and in fact he complicates almost every 
episode with conflicting considerations, both ethical and non-ethical.
135
 The contradictory 
aspects of Hecuba‘s character should not merely be condemned or explained away in such 
absolute terms. Other scholars, such as Mossman and Zeitlin, have noted the limitations of 
moralistic readings of the Hecuba. While my reading of the play is heavily indebted to their 
work, particularly Mossman‘s, I contend that my application of modern horror scholarship 
offers a different perspective concerning the function of the play‘s violence. While Mossman 
is content to acknowledge that moral approval is not a necessary part of tragic enjoyment and 
that ambiguity is ―integral to the drama,‖ she does not account fully for Euripides‘ relentless 
attacks against the social and cultural structures familiar to his audience, nor does she 
provide a detailed explanation of the effects of the disturbing ambiguity found in the Hecuba. 
I contend, however, that we can gain a fuller appreciation of these ambiguities by comparing 
the play to modern horror fiction, in which such contradictions play a central role. Carroll 
notes that the monsters that appear in works of horror frequently defy conventional cultural 
categories.
136
 Hecuba, like these monsters, contradicts the rigid categorical schemes that the 
other characters in the play take for granted:
137
 she exerts both royal power and servile 
obedience, and her behavior blurs the distinction between masculine aggression and female 
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passivity. In this section I will explore how Euripides establishes traditional cultural 
categories involving law, political status, and gender during the first half of the play before 
challenging them in the second half, where Hecuba confounds familiar distinctions between 
slave and queen, mother and killer. 
I propose that we can achieve a fuller understanding of Hecuba‘s character and her 
revenge by acknowledging these contradictions and examining how they serve as disruptive 
forces within the world of the play and potentially within the world of its audience. As in 
most horror fictions, the Hecuba shows its audience a place in which familiar codes and 
social structures fail to protect innocent victims from violence. Hecuba is a fitting protagonist 
for such a world; she is both victim of cruel circumstances and agent of similarly monstrous 
violence. I therefore offer an interpretive model found in modern horror scholarship, namely 
that of the Final Girl in slasher films, in order to explain the significance of her ambiguous 
nature within this environment. I conclude that Euripides‘ provocative manipulation of 
familiar political and gender distinctions serves not only as a sensational form of 
entertainment but also as an invitation for the audience to question the stability of their 
assumptions.  
C.1) The Limits of νόμος 
Hecuba‘s status as a woman and a slave initially serves as an obstacle to her desire to 
avenge Polydorus. She explains to Agamemnon that she is ―a nothing‖ (μηδέν, 843) and thus 
incapable of achieving vengeance on her own. Her assessment here seems consistent with the 
cultural distinctions of the play‘s original audience. In fifth-century Athens neither women 
nor slaves were considered fully responsible agents. Women were constantly under the 
supervision of guardians, κύριοι; if a woman‘s κύριος died she either remained in the household 
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under the guardianship of an adult male in the immediate family (usually her son) or, if no 
such man was present, was transmitted to another male relative.
138
 There were many laws in 
place to protect women from violent abuse,
139
 but only adult male citizens were able to 
initiate legal action and represent themselves in court; women thus depended on their κύριοι to 
plead their cases and take full advantage of this legal protection.
140
  As Gould notes, 
Athenian law defines a woman as someone ―incapable of a self-determined act, as almost in 
law an un-person, outside the limits of those who constitute society's responsible and 
representative agents….‖141 Slaves similarly relied on their owners for protection against 
violence. While Athenian law prohibited citizens from attacking slaves belonging to another, 
only the owner could prosecute in cases where such attacks occurred. Conversely, if the slave 
committed a crime the owner was almost always held accountable in some form, as the law 
assumed that ―a slave was normally under his owner‘s supervision and control.‖142 Since 
slaves and women were vulnerable to abusive violence, they relied on the law and their 
guardians to protect them; there was little opportunity for them to redress this abuse on their 
own, and the Athenian community, if its laws are any indication, likely doubted their 
capacity to do so.
143
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 Athenians did recognize that slaves were capable of violence. Hunter (2000) 5-6 notes that slaves were 
brought to trial in their own name when they committed a wrong without prompting from their master. But she 
also observes the ideological distinctions between slaves and free men: slaves could not train in the palaestrae 
and gymnasia nor could they participate as hoplites in the army, and so they were considered physically inferior 
to the citizens who regularly engaged in these practices (14-15). 
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 It is not surprising then that references to the law play a considerable role in Hecuba‘s 
defense of her children. In her debate with Odysseus, she makes an anachronistic appeal to 
ἰσονομία, a familiar democratic notion that granted equal protection under law for all citizens 
and, according to Hecuba, for slaves (νόμος δ’ ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς τ’ ἐλευθέροις ἴσος / καὶ τοῖσι δούλοις 
αἵματος κεῖται πέρι, 291-292).144 Hecuba similarly condemns Polydorus‘ murder on the 
grounds of its illegality. In her first plea for Agamemnon‘s help, she calls upon law (νόμος) as 
the supreme force in human affairs and argues that it is by law that men distinguish unjust 
and just acts (νόμῳ … ἄδικα καὶ δίκαι’ ὡρισμένοι, 800-801). Though her use of νόμος here is 
likely a reference to universal law,
145
 she believes Agamemnon is no less bound to enforce it 
than the written laws he is authorized to maintain. She argues that Agamemnon, as ruler, is 
obligated to ensure that men who kill guest-friends pay the penalty (δίκην δώσουσιν, 803). 
Though this phrase is not uncommon in tragedy, it is usually limited to instances when one 
character is exacting or threatening to exact vengeance on another. The appeal to another 
authority to enforce this retribution impartially thus calls to mind another context, namely 
punishments determined by a judge.
146
 She concludes this speech by reminding Agamemnon 
of his civic duty to ―serve justice‖ (τῇ δικῇ θ’ ὑπηρετεῖν, 844) by punishing the wicked.147  
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Hecuba needs Agamemnon to serve not only as a judge distributing punishment, but 
also as a representive bringing forth the charge. The Greek king is not only a political 
authority responsible for enforcing the law but also a φίλος of Hecuba and her son, according 
to her, by virtue of his relationship with Cassandra (824-835).
148
 Given the legal associations 
in this context Hecuba seems to be asking Agamemnon to plead her case as her κύριος. As a 
female slave who is in her words weak (δοῦλοι τε κἀσθενεῖς, 798) and ―a nothing‖ (μηδέν, 843), 
she wants Polymestor to be prosecuted and needs a φίλος who will represent her interests. She 
reinforces this point by referring to Polydorus as Agamemnon‘s in-law (κηδεστήν, 834). This 
claim perhaps exaggerates a soldier‘s responsibility to his concubine‘s family;149 there is no 
reason to assume, however, that soldiers always held their wives and concubines in sharp 
distinction,
150
 especially since Agamemnon has shown earlier a desire to protect Cassandra‘s 
kin (120-122). Hecuba‘s first speech to Agamemnon thus calls for him to fulfill two 
complementary roles, that of an impartial judge who can ―stand at a distance, like a painter‖ 
(ὡς γραφεύς τ’ ἀποσταθείς, 807) in assessing her case and that of a prosecutor seeking 
retribution for a family member.  
 Though Hecuba‘s pleas for just and legal retribution are valid, she does not find 
satisfaction through legal recourse. Agamemnon initially refuses to serve as either prosecutor 
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or judge. He cannot pursue the case as a prosecutor out of personal obligation because, like 
Odysseus, he privileges his responsibilities to the Greek army over any private bonds of φιλία 
he may have with Polydorus (εἰ δ’ ἐμοὶ φίλος /ὅδ’ ἐστί, χωρὶς τοῦτο κοὐ κοινὸν στρατῶ, 859-
860).
151
 He seems more willing, however, to perform judicial duties. He agrees with 
Hecuba‘s assessment of Polymestor‘s injustice and he asserts that he wants to act on behalf 
of justice (οὕνεκ’ … τοῦ δικαίου) and to provide the punishment for which she is asking (τήνδε 
σοι δοῦναι δίκην, 852-853).  
But the strength of his assertion dissipates as his speech continues. He begins by 
expressing a strong wish to help (indicative βούλομαι, 851). He then adds an unlikely 
condition (future less vivid protasis) and impersonal construction that reveal his lack of 
commitment in upholding justice: ―if somehow it might come about so that it be well for 
you‖ (εἴ πως φανείη γ’ ὥστε σοί τ’ ἔχειν καλ῵ς) and the army might not assume that he 
punishes Polymestor as a favor to Cassandra (Κασσάνδρας χάριν, 854-856). The mixed 
condition reveals the impotence of the king and, by extension, the law, since the validity of 
the law depends on authorities who can enforce it. Agamemnon does not challenge the 
injustice of Polymestor‘s crimes, but he cannot handle the case as a judge because the Greek 
army, which considers Polymester a φίλος (858), will not accept him as a disinterested party, 
nor can he offer Hecuba any other solution that will address the injustices she has suffered.
152
 
His offers to assist her depend not on any political or judicial authority that would enable him 
to punish injustice but on contingencies over which he has no control. 
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It is surprising then that so many scholars have seen Hecuba‘s first appeal to 
Agamemnon as successful on the basis of his rather limited offer of support.
153
  His initial 
promises to help are each followed by conditions that he not have to defend his actions 
before the army (852-855, 861-863). He does not suggest any alternatives through which 
Hecuba might attain her goal of vengeance, nor does it appear that he thinks such an 
alternative might exist. Hecuba‘s request was predicated largely on her utter helplessness and 
his tremendous authority (841-843); his first reaction to her declaration to pursue vengeance 
independently is filled with disbelief rather than support (π῵ς οὖν; 876). It seems likely then 
that his offer to be a ―willing‖ (θέλοντα, 861) partner is, much like Odysseus‘ offer to save 
Hecuba‘s life while she begged for her daughter‘s, essentially meaningless, if not 
disingenuous. Though Agamemnon may not be as callous as Odysseus, he is similarly 
unwilling to commit himself as an active proponent of Hecuba‘s cause despite his 
sympathies. Even the time he grants to Hecuba so that she can pursue vengeance on her own, 
which he considers a personal favor (σοι δοῦναι χάριν), he grants only because the winds 
prevent the army from sailing (898-899).  
His final words to Hecuba before she enacts her vengeance reflect his passivity: 
    γένοιτο δ’ εὖ πως· πᾶσι γὰρ κοινὸν τόδε, 
ἰδίαι θ’ ἑκάστωι καὶ πόλει, τὸν μὲν κακὸν 
   κακόν τι πάσχειν, τὸν δὲ χρηστὸν εὐτυχεῖν. 
 
But may it somehow turn out well. For this is common to all, both to each 
man in private and to the city, that the wicked man suffer something wicked, 
and that good man prosper. (902-904)  
 
This gnomic comment serves as a counterpoint to the end of Hecuba‘s first plea: while she 
claims that justice depends on a good man actively punishing the wicked (ἐσθλοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς 
τῆι δίκηι θ’ ὑπηρετεῖν /καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς δρᾶν πανταχοῦ κακ῵ς ἀεί, 844-845), Agamemnon can 
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offer Hecuba only fond wishes, not action. His wishes may accurately reflect the traditional 
Greek concept of reciprocal justice, but the comment rings hollow here: good deeds (e.g. 
Hecuba‘s mercy towards Odysseus) are not always rewarded, and wicked ones will not be 
punished unless someone actively pursues justice. The failure of reciprocal justice in the 
Hecuba provides the impetus for the brutal acts of vengeance in the final section. 
C.2) Hecuba’s Vengeance 
After Agamemnon refuses to assist Hecuba, the play moves into a new direction of 
horror. Hecuba‘s interactions with Odysseus and Agamemnon reveal a world in which 
standard sources of protection – i.e. obligations stemming from interpersonal relationships, 
codes of law and justice enforced by political authorities – fail to prevent or correct acts of 
perverse violence. The perpetrators, in fact, use these very same standards as justifications 
for their crimes. Hecuba, recognizing Agamemnon‘s impotence, formulates a plan to achieve 
justice independently. Although Agamemnon has acknowledged that her desire for 
retribution is reasonable (852-853), her behavior in the last part of the play reveals several 
disturbing contradictions in her character. Other scholars have identified the shift in her 
character as a moral breakdown: Kirkwood, for example, argues that after νόμος fails Hecuba 
she becomes utterly lawless herself and has ―embarked on the career of moral 
degeneration.‖154 I shall argue below that Hecuba‘s vengeance does involve transgressive 
behavior, but that we should not limit our interpretation to legal and ethical codes. Hecuba 
herself emerges as a contradiction of normative political and sexual categories taken for 
granted by other characters and likely by the original audience as well. Moral assessments of 
her character fail to recognize the provocative tensions Euripides has developed here and 
throughout the play. I contend that her gruesome vengeance and ambiguous character are part 
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of the fundamentally unstable world of the Hecuba. To praise or condemn her behavior 
seems to miss the point, as the rules by which one might make such assessments no longer 
apply in such a world.  
Hecuba‘s first reaction to Agamemnon‘s refusal to act foreshadows the dangers of 
allowing individuals to ignore legal restrictions. She lists written laws as one of the obstacles 
preventing men from ―acting in their custom according to their will‖ (νόμων γραφαὶ / εἴργουσι 
χρῆσθαι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην τρόποις, 867-868). Her tone suggests that this is a sympathetic 
remark acknowledging Agamemnon‘s impotence without condemning it. But the Greek king 
did not mention written law as a reason for his refusal – on the contrary, he conceded that 
Hecuba had justice on her side, but the political situation prevented him from enforcing it. 
This consideration sheds a different light on her comment. Hecuba presents the prohibitive 
force of law as something regrettable, but a member of the play‘s original audience might 
have considered the same statement as a point of pride.
 155 
Her attack on city majorities 
(πλῆθος πόλεως, 866) is similarly problematic. While the sacrifice of Polyxena has shown that 
the masses can approve terrifying decisions, the reference to the πόλις evokes the civic 
context of the audience, where the notion that communal benefit trumps individual will was a 
basic principle of Athenian democracy.
156
 Hecuba‘s attack against written laws and 
democratic values implicitly undercuts the audience‘s cultural framework and reveals the 
potential threat she can bring.  
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Gregory observes that Hecuba‘s complaint here reflects a return to an ―aristocratic 
perspective‖ after her attempts to appeal to Athenian and universal laws that protect the weak 
(291-292, 799-805).
157
 I would agree that her revenge plot does entail the re-adoption of her 
former regal disposition, but it also depends on her willingness to embrace and exploit her 
slave status. She presents both versions of herself, queen and slave, as they benefit her. 
Consequently, neither the other characters nor the audience can be entirely sure which 
Hecuba they are seeing. After Agamemnon‘s refusal to help, she depicts the Greek king as a 
slave by noting that he, like all other men, is not free (οὐκ … ἐλεύθερος) but a slave (δοῦλος) to 
the obstacles mentioned above. The observation initially seems sympathetic: just as Hecuba 
is a slave to the Greeks, so Agamemnon is a slave to the various social constraints limiting 
his power. But as she continues, Hecuba deliberately plays with the traditional conceptions of 
master and slave.  She promises to make Agamemnon free of fear (ἐγώ σε θήσω τοῦδ’ 
ἐλεύθερον φόβου, 869), using the same expression Agamemnon used earlier in his offer to 
make her life free of slavery (ἐλεύθερον / αἰ῵να θέσθαι, 754-755). Then her refusal of his offer 
revealed that she, unlike Polyxena (357-368, 551-552), was not particularly ashamed to live 
as a slave, provided that she could attain vengeance against the wicked (τοὺς κακοὺς δὲ 
τιμωρουμένη, 756). Now she assumes not only the freedom to act on her own but also the 
position of queen and master over the Greek king.  
Hecuba‘s attitude towards her fellow slaves further illustrates her ability to balance 
her regal disposition and servile rank. Agamemnon dismissively calls the other slaves ―spear-
captives‖ (αἰχμαλώτους) and ―prey of the Greeks‖ (Ἑλλήνων ἄγραν, 881). Hecuba dubs them a 
band of Trojan women (Σρῳάδων ὄχλον) who will join with her (σὺν ταῖσδε, 880-882), in 
contrast to the band of Greeks whom Agamemnon fears and serves (ἐπεὶ δὲ ταρβεῖς τῶ τ’ 
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ὄχλῳ πλέον νέμεις, 868).158 In the presence of Polymestor, however, she readopts the persona 
of a humble slave and calls them captives (αἰχμαλωτίδων, 1016), using Agamemnon‘s 
nomenclature to convince the Thracian that they are harmless. Similarly, Hecuba uses her 
former regal status in her forceful summons of Polymestor, instructing her messenger to tell 
him that the former queen of Troy (ἄνασσα δή ποτ’ Ἰλίου) calls and that her need is a priority 
(σὸν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ κείνης χρέος, 891-892). But in the presence of the Thracian king she 
assumes a more humble tone, refusing to look at him directly and claiming that she is 
ashamed to be seen in her current station (968-973).  
Hecuba‘s ability to adopt both regal and servile dispositions is not the only source of 
tension in her character. She also defies traditional distinctions between masculine and 
feminine behavior. Polymestor‘s willingness to dismiss his guard and enter the tent depends 
on his presumption that the absence of men signifies safety from violence (981, 1017) – a 
fatal misconception that Hecuba is all too willing to exploit. Polymestor is not the only 
character who overestimates Hecuba‘s physical limitations: Agamemnon similarly assumes 
that a band of women cannot overpower a man (π῵ς γυναιξὶν ἀρσένων ἔσται κράτος; 883; θῆλυ 
μέμφομαι σθένος, 885). Hecuba assuages his doubts with a brief mythological reference to the 
Danaids and Lemnian women (886-887). She does not dwell on these examples, nor does she 
allow Agamemnon to reply before she changes the subject to specific preparations. But 
though Hecuba‘s casual reference may serve as a concise demonstration of women‘s ability 
to overcome men, these mythological allusions hold a deeper significance for the audience 
and, consequently, for their interpretation of her plot. In both myths, a female collective 
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 Cf. Michelini (1987) 154-155 for Hecuba‘s disdain for ―the mob‖ and democratic subservience to it. Stanton 
(1995) 18 notes that the ὄχλος of Trojan women are ―clearly … of inferior status‖ to Hecuba. One wonders if the 
former social distinctions should hold true among slaves in the Greek camp, but at any rate their allegiance to 
their former queen is never in question. 
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slaughters not just one man but (virtually) all of a male collective. These acts of wholesale 
murder subvert traditional Greek patriarchy: instead of fulfilling their social roles by 
submitting to their husbands or prospective mates, they violently reject traditional duties and 
assume dominance by destroying their male partners.    
The story of the Lemnian women is particularly gruesome, inasmuch as the 
disgruntled wives of the island kill not only the husbands who have rejected them, but the 
whole male population (save Thoas, who is merely exiled) for the sake of completion.
159
 The 
chorus of the Choephoroe deem the tale the foremost example of female horrors (κακ῵ν δὲ 
πρεσβεύεται τὸ Λήμνιον / λόγῳ, 631-632). Herodotus notes that the macabre story was so well-
known throughout Greece that ―Lemnian deeds‖ was a proverbial expression for any act of 
excessive cruelty (νενόμισται ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὰ σχέτλια ἔργα πάντα Λήμνια καλέεσθαι, 
6.138.4).
160
 Even Hecuba‘s brief reference to the Lemnian women conveys the severity of 
their violence: whereas the Danaids simply ―overpowered‖ (εἷλον) the sons of Aegyptus, the 
Lemnian women ―utterly depopulated‖ (ἄρδην … ἐξῴκισαν) their island of men. Hecuba‘s 
comparison thus presents disturbing implications: in seeking just retribution, she puts herself 
into the category of violent women who did not kill a single unjust offender but completely 
destroyed an entire population and consequently overturned a patriarchal system.  Just as 
Hecuba‘s revenge plot generates tension between her former role as queen and current slave 
status, so also it creates a conflict between restoring a system of orderly justice and 
overthrowing it completely. Agamemnon‘s naiveté thus elicits an unexpected and potentially 
horrifying response. He blames (μέμφομαι) women on the grounds that they are weak, but 
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 Cf. Burkert (1970) 6 for a succinct account of the myth and a brief survey of ancient sources.  
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 Gregory (1999) ad 886-887. It should be noted, however, that Herodotus refers to two instances of Lemnian 
violence as the source of the expression, the myth discussed here and the later murder of Attic women and their 
children committed by the Pelasgians. 
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Hecuba‘s mythological allusions remind him that women have committed devastating actions 
of violence that are far more worthy of blame than mere physical weakness.  
Euripides then uses the plotting scenes before the vengeance to establish familiar 
assumptions regarding feminine and servile behavior and to introduce some subtle 
disturbances of these assumptions in Hecuba‘s character. These contradictions of traditional 
distinctions will become more obvious in the vengeance itself, as I shall argue below. I note 
first, however, that though Polymestor and Agamemnon fail to recognize Hecuba‘s deviance 
from these familiar cultural categories, their false assumptions can hardly be attributed to 
incompetence. On the contrary, viewers have witnessed Hecuba act in a way consistent with 
their assumptions during the first parts of the play. Polydorus‘ ghost pities Hecuba for her 
intense suffering and his lamentation for her downfall gives no indication that she is capable 
of punishing her enemies (55-58). Other characters deliver similar sentiments, corroborating 
the notion that she is pitiable and helpless.
161
  Moreover, Euripides makes frequent mention 
of her old age and sex, and her consequent physical weakness: Hecuba‘s first words refer to 
herself as an old woman (τὴν γραῦν) and beg for physical support from her fellow slaves (59-
61). Polyxena warns her not to fight with more powerful men, noting that such a conflict 
would result in her aged body being thrown to the ground and wounded (405-408). Hecuba 
does, in fact, end up on the ground on several occasions in the early parts of the play, either 
kneeling in supplication (273-286, 752-753) or throwing herself to the ground in grief (438-
504, 683-687).
162
 The repeated sight of her on the ground reinforces the audience‘s 
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 E.g. Talthybius (580-582), Agamemnon (850-851), the attendant who finds Polydorus‘ body (667-669), and 
Hecuba herself (798, 843).  
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 Cf. Michelini (1987) 173-176 on Hecuba‘s awkward postures during the play‘s first half. 
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impression of her helplessness. Agamemnon‘s doubt concerning Hecuba‘s physical strength 
is therefore an assessment the audience likely shared.  
After the conception of her plan, however, the audience witnesses a new side of 
Hecuba‘s character. Whereas her earlier weakness was confirmed by her frequent position on 
the ground, she remains standing continuously after she announces her plot. The different 
postures she adopts before Polymestor illustrate her ability to exploit these contradictory 
physical features. During their first meeting, Hecuba refuses to look directly at the Thracian 
king, maintaining that shame prevents her from meeting his gaze. The false modesty recalls 
Hecuba‘s earlier interaction with Agamemnon, where she turned her back on the Greek king 
in fear that he might reject her plea (739-740). But after Hecuba and her allies finish 
mutilating Polymestor and killing his children, she resumes the confident stance she 
displayed when announcing her plan to Agamemnon. She invites the chorus to watch her 
mutilated victim ( ὄψῃ,1049; ὁρᾷς, 1053); it is now the blind Polymestor who does not, 
because he cannot, meet her gaze as she beholds her work from afar. Her position above 
Polymestor further confirms her physical dominance: while Hecuba stands apart 
(κἀποστήσομαι, 1054) from the wounded Thracian, he is crawling on all fours like an animal 
(1056-1058). The stark contrast between Hecuba as prostrate victim and as conqueror 
standing upright further illustrates her contradictory nature. 
These ambiguous features of Hecuba‘s character are essential for understanding the 
horrific violence she enacts. Like the impure monsters Carroll observes in modern horror 
fiction, she defies traditional cultural categories and thus generates discomfort from the 
audience.
163
 Admittedly, she does not meet the precise criteria for horrific monsters proposed 
by Carroll: the categorical contradictions in her character are not as obvious and innate as, 
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 Carroll (1990) 27-35. 
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say, Dracula‘s defiance of the traditional distinction between life and death. But Carroll 
admits that characters who blatantly contradict familiar cultural categories, like Norman 
Bates in Psycho (1960), are ―abnormal‖ and ―interstitial‖ figures and thus can stand in for 
monsters as ―powerful icon[s] of impurity.‖164 It is thus reasonable to align Hecuba with such 
impure figures as a result of her own ―impurities‖ (e.g. the unclear distinction between ruler 
and slave, male and female in her character). These monstrous features of her behavior are 
essential for understanding the audience‘s reaction to her vengeance. As these contradictory 
characteristics begin to surface in her plotting, the audience is likely to be somewhat 
disturbed at her casual violation of familiar distinctions relating to political and gender status. 
These impurities thus serve as the foundation for the extreme violence at the play‘s end. 
Neither Agamemnon nor the audience knows exactly what she plans to do, but the 
ambiguous features of her character foreshadow her willingness to defy expected patterns of 
behavior: that is, it is because of these contradictory features that her brutal vengeance, once 
it is finally revealed, can surprise and horrify the other characters as well as the audience. I 
shall discuss below the graphic and disturbing violence in Hecuba‘s vengeance before 
returning to the contradictory elements of her character as they appear in her revenge. 
The surprising incorporation of mutilation into Hecuba‘s revenge adds to the horrific 
tenor of violence in the play. Before her attack the precise nature of her plot was unclear, and 
its grotesque nature had not been anticipated by anyone other than Hecuba herself.
165
 As I 
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 She claims that she will ―plot some evil against‖ (τι βουλεύσω κακὸν, 870) and ―avenge‖ (τιμωρήσομαι, 882) 
her son‘s killer. The former remark may, in fact, be a subtle revision of Agamemnon‘s assumption that Hecuba 
wants him to ―plot this murder against‖ Polymestor (τόνδε βουλεῦσαι φόνον, 856). But though she does not 
specifically vow to murder Polymestor, her comments concerning the revenge seem to corroborate the 
assumptions of other characters, and the audience, that she is planning to kill the Thracian king along with his 
sons. 
128 
 
mentioned earlier, Greeks considered mutilation to be savage and repulsive.
166
 This attitude 
is confirmed in the Hecuba: the continuous onstage presence of Polydorus‘ disfigured corpse, 
the impetus for Hecuba‘s revenge, serves as a testament to Polymestor‘s brutal crime.167 The 
repeated references to the mutilation of the Trojan prince (716-720, 782, 833), moreover, 
draw attention to the excessive cruelty of his fate. Euripides also pays particular attention to 
the act of mutilation found in Hecuba‘s revenge, evoking similar feelings of dread and 
discomfort found in the discovery of Polydorus‘ corpse. After Polymestor enters Hecuba‘s 
trap, his first offstage cry reveals that he has been blinded (ὤμοι, τυφλοῦμαι φέγγος ὀμμάτων 
τάλας, 1035).  The revelation that she has also killed his children comes in his second cry 
(1037), even though his later account of the murder indicates that he witnessed his children‘s 
death before being blinded (1160-1167). The mutilation receives similarly privileged 
placement in Hecuba‘s account of the event (1045-1046, 1050-1051) and Agamemnon‘s 
initial reaction to its aftermath (1117-1118).
168
 Hecuba, moreover, relishes describing her 
victim‘s blind state, emphasizing his disfigurement through polyptoton (τυφλὸν τυφλῶ, 1050) 
and contrasting repetition, such as when she tells Polymestor that he will not see (οὐ … ὄψῃ, 
1046) his children living, then in the first word of her next line tells the chorus that they will 
see (ὄψῃ, 1049) the wounded Polymestor emerging.  
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 Pace Mastronarde (2002) 131-132.  I acknowledge that the textual evidence supporting the continued 
presence of the corpse is not certain – i.e. Polymestor might not be literal in claiming to see what he thinks is 
Polyxena‘s corpse, Hecuba‘s use of τοῦδε in reference to Polydorus (1219) might be anaphoric, as Mastronarde 
argues, rather than deictic. But given the lack of evidence for moving the body after Agamemnon‘s departure, I 
agree with Gregory (1999) ad 1049-1051 and Mossman (1995) 63-68 that having Polydorus‘ corpse remain 
onstage fits with the few textual references we have and allows for better dramatic effect. I discuss the 
significance of the corpse‘s presence on pages 139-140 below. 
 
168
 Mossman (1995) 190. 
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The horrific consequences of this mutilation are further established by the emergence 
of Polymestor onstage. Immediately after the offstage cries and Hecuba‘s reappearance 
onstage reveal the true nature of her plot, the chorus and the audience are given an 
opportunity to witness the physical effects of the disfigurement. Because Hecuba decided to 
mutilate rather than murder him, Polymestor is not harmless corpse but rather a disturbing 
figure still capable of harming his attacker. In stark contrast to his earlier portrayal of regal 
politeness, he now resembles a savage and ferocious beast: he walks on all fours and leaps 
like an animal (τετράποδος βάσιν θηρὸς ὀρεστέρου / τιθέμενος ἐπὶ χεῖρα καὶ ἴχνος, 1058-1059; ἐκ δὲ 
πηδήσας ἐγὼ / θὴρ ὣς διώκω, 1172-1173) and longs to consume the flesh of his enemies 
(σαρκ῵ν ὀστέων τ’ ἐμπλησθ῵, 1071). Several scholars have claimed that the blinded 
Polymestor here recalls the wounded cyclops Polyphemus, a paragon of the uncivilized and 
bestial in the Odyssey.
169
 Such an allusion would further highlight the blind Polymestor‘s 
monstrous qualities, though there is more than enough material within the context of this play 
to suggest that the audience would find his behavior dreadful and repulsive. For example, 
when Polymestor learns that Hecuba is near, he reacts so violently that Agamemnon restrains 
him and commands him to ―remove the savagery from (his) heart‖ (ἐκβαλὼν δὲ καρδίας τὸ 
βάρβαρον, 1129).170  
Polymestor‘s mutilation has also left him looking physically repulsive: both 
Polymestor and Agamemnon reference the blood around his eyes (ὀμμάτων αἱματόεν βλέφαρον, 
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 Cf. Segal (1990) 123 n. 45 for brief survey of the scholarship and Zeitlin (1991) 70-71 on the structural 
similarities between their situations, including the violation of ξενία, revenge consisting of blinding, and the 
mutilated victim‘s vain attempt to grope for his attackers.  
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 The Greek‘s association of animal savagery with foreignness (τὸ βάρβαρον) is not unorthodox; the notion that 
non-Greeks were lawless and savage barbarians was a common sentiment, and has already been voiced by 
Odysseus earlier in the play (328-331). It plays a significant role in Agamemnon‘s later judgment, which 
condemns guest-friend murder as characteristic of non-Greeks (1247-1248). Cf. Segal (1974) passim for a more 
general discussion. 
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1066; αἱμάξας κόρας, 1117).171 At any rate, Agamemnon reacts to the Thracian king‘s 
appearance with an expression of unwelcome shock (ἔα, 1116).172 Significantly, this is the 
same expression he makes earlier when confronted with the body of Polydorus (733). The 
implication of this reaction to Polymestor‘s mutilation is thus twofold: first, Agamemnon is 
genuinely surprised to see Polymestor disfigured in this way, even if he does feign ignorance 
concerning the culprit;
173
 second, the sight of the Thracian‘s mutilated face is, at least 
initially, repulsive, much like the sight of a corpse. Agamemnon reserves judgment until he 
has heard both Hecuba and Polymestor explain their cases, but his first impression confirms 
that Polymestor‘s disfigurement has transformed him into a revolting sight. 
But Polymestor is not the only monstrous figure in this episode. The emphasis on 
mutilation in Hecuba‘s vengeance further illustrates her categorically contradictory 
characteristics discussed above. The inclusion of disfigurement develops the tension between 
her former regal status and her current position as a slave. Acts of disfigurement were 
frequently executed by (typically Eastern) despots as punishments against insubordinate 
inferiors, and consequently they reaffirm the status of the despot as master and the victim as 
slave.
174
 Herodotus provides many examples of this type of mutilation: the Egyptian king 
Apries cuts off the nose and ears of a herald who failed in his mission (2.162), Xerxes severs 
in half the eldest son of a subject who requested that this one son be released from military 
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 The actor‘s mask may have been painted around the eyes to reflect these wounds, though it is unclear 
whether such adornment would be necessary or observable. Mitchell (1998) 244-245 notes that tragic characters 
describe eyes in great detail, including veins and eyeliner, though certainly such details either would not have 
been painted on masks or would not have been observable for most of the audience, to whom the actor‘s masks 
would look like ―pinheads.‖  
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 Cf. note 127 above.  
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 Gregory (1999) ad 1116-1119. 
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 Hartog (1988) 332-335; Hall (1989) 159 cites Hecuba‘s vengeance here as ―an example of ‗barbaric‘ 
justice.‖ 
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service (7.39), and Xerxes‘ wife severely mutilates a sister-in-law who has unintentionally 
won her husband‘s affection (9.112).175 The act of blinding is a particular vicious form of 
punishment; Herodotus relates a tale in which a Thracian king, angry at his sons for joining 
the Persian army, commits the ―monstrous deed‖ (ἔργον ὑπερφυές) of ripping out their eyes 
upon their return as their reward (μισθόν) for disobedience (8.116-117).176 Hecuba, like the 
despots just mentioned, considers her act of mutilation to be a just punishment for 
Polymestor‘s crimes (δίκην δέ μοι / δέδωκε, 1052-1053; σοῦ γέ μοι δόντος δίκην, 1274). She had 
previously asked Agamemnon to exert his political authority and ensure that Polymestor paid 
the penalty (803, 844, 853), but in exacting vengeance herself Hecuba has reassumed the role 
of queen: she determines Polymestor‘s punishment but orders her former slaves to execute 
it.
177
 By reassuming her regal authority she can devise penalties unsavory to the Greeks 
within the play (i.e. Agamemnon), and that were likely unsavory to the Athenians in the 
audience.  
 But unlike the despots mentioned above, Hecuba cannot exert her will openly and 
without repercussion. Though she summons Polymestor as the former queen of Troy (891), 
she depends on deception (δόλῳ, 884) rather than on authority to enact her plan once he 
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 Though characters within the Histories often condemn mutilation as a barbaric and impious practice (9.77-
9.78), Herodotus also depicts Greek rulers, such as Pheretime (4.202) and Xanthippus (9.120), engaged in such 
behavior. The disfigurement of insubordinates by an authority can also be found in Homer; Odysseus‘ 
mutilation of the treacherous goatherd Melanthius, who had previously abused his disguised master (17.212-
253), is an important part of the restoration of order in Ithaca (22.437-445, 22.474-477).  
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 While it is true that the adjective ὑπερφυής need not necessarily be negative (e.g. a messenger uses the same 
term to praise Pausanias‘ victory at Plataea in 9.78), it always indicates something excessive or extraordinary 
(LSJ A.2).  In this example, Herodotus uses it to illustrate the excessive gruesomeness of the punishment. Cf. 
Macan (1908) ad 8.116. Aelian confirms the barbaric nature of this act, condemning it as ―not Greek‖ (μὴ 
ποιήσας Ἑλληνικά, VH 5.11). 
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 Pace Meridor (1978) 30-31, who contends that Hecuba‘s delegation of the actual slaughter to her fellow 
slaves recalls the Athenian law that prevented a convicted murderer from being handed over to the victim‘s 
family (Dem. 23.69). Hecuba has already tried (and failed) to convince Agamemnon to assume responsibility 
for upholding νόμος, and her independent pursuit of vengeance is clearly antithetical to the philosophy behind 
the Athenian law.  
132 
 
arrives.
178
 Polymestor only enters the tent because of the false promise of gold, and he is 
disarmed not by force but by the slaves‘ feigned admiration for his clothing and weapons 
(1152-1154). Furthermore, her vengeance does not reaffirm her authority as queen and 
master: she does not directly confront her victim in triumph, as despots who mutilate their 
victims frequently do, but gloats only while Polymestor is indoors and unable to reach her 
(1044-1046).
179
 She and her compatriots flee the enraged Thracian, acting more like political 
exiles (φυγάδες, 1172) than regal authorities.180  Thus while Hecuba‘s mutilation of 
Polymestor evokes the familiar trope of a foreign despot reaffirming authority over an 
insubordinate subject, this act of retribution leaves her more vulnerable than she was before 
the attack.  That she views the gruesome act as an end in itself, without concern for future 
suffering (οὐδὲν μέλει μοι, σοῦ γέ μοι δόντος δίκην, 1274) or shame at slavery (τοὺς κακοὺς δὲ 
τιμωρουμένη / αἰ῵να τὸν σύμπαντα δουλεύειν θέλω, 756-757), makes the grim determination of a 
queen in slave‘s clothing unsettling.  
 The mutilation of Polymestor also highlights Hecuba‘s contradiction of traditional 
distinctions involving gender. Before her revenge, Agamemnon and Polymestor voice doubts 
concerning women‘s ability to inflict violence on males; Euripides, moreover, misleads the 
audience into accepting their assumptions by consistently portraying Hecuba as physically 
weak during the first part of the play. Any act of violence against Polymestor would have 
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 This is not to say that despots do not deceive their victims. For example, Astyages punishes the disloyal 
Harpagus by offering him a feast, concealing the fact that the food is actually Harpagus‘ dismembered and 
cooked son (Hdt. 1.118-119). But despots typically undertake such acts of deception in order to amplify the 
severity of the punishment, not to ensure the success of their attempt nor to protect their own safety – Harpagus, 
after discovering the foul nature of the meal, can only pick up the remains of his child and quietly return home 
until he discovers some way of displacing the king.  
 
179
 This separation is in part owed to tragic convention. But, as I argue on pages 135-136 below, Hecuba‘s 
behavior after the slaughter is significantly different than that of other female killers in tragedy such as 
Clytemnestra and Medea. 
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 Euripides uses φυγάς in almost every case to refer to exiles from a community, such as Medea (Med. 706), 
Polynices (Ph.76), and Orestes (IT 929).  
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served as a striking corrective to these notions, but Hecuba‘s decision to blind her victim 
adds a sexual dimension to her vengeance. In Greek mythology, blinding was frequently a 
punishment inflicted against sexual deviants.
181
 The most famous instance of blinding in 
tragedy is, of course, Oedipus‘ act of self-mutilation after discovering the nature of his 
crimes, including incest. Psychoanalysts have speculated that this and other instances of 
blinding serve as symbolic acts of castration.
182
 Though this is by no means the only 
connotation of Hecuba‘s blinding of Polymestor,183 Euripides‘ particular emphasis on 
Hecuba‘s gender in the development of her plot invites reading this act as a form of 
emasculation. The women blind Polymestor not with conventional masculine weapons, like 
the swords they used against his children (1161), but with their dress pins (πόρπας, 1170), the 
same feminine decorative items used by Oedipus (OT 1268-1270, Phoen.61-62) to blind 
himself.
184
 The mutilation can thus be seen as an even greater threat to the gender 
delineations expressed by male characters in the play. Hecuba proves that women can not 
only kill male adversaries but also deprive them of their masculinity.
 185
 
 It is interesting, then, that Polymestor calls the Trojan women ―man slayers‖ 
(ἀνδροφόνους, 1061). This martial epithet, which Homer applies to the greatest warriors of the 
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 Devereux (1973). Cf. Goldhill (1997) 340-43for a brief account of psychoanalytic approaches to Oedipus 
and other tragedies. 
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 Cf. Buxton (1980) for a rebuttal to Devereux. He contends that while Oedipus‘ self-blinding may have been 
―appropriate‖ punishment given his sexual crimes (25), the nature of blindness has a stronger affiliation with 
knowledge and prophecy in Greek thought and in Oedipus Tyrannus. Euripides, too, capitalizes on the 
association of blindness and prophecy by presenting the blind Polymestor as a mouthpiece for Dionysus, the 
―Thracian seer‖ (ὁ Θρῃξὶ μάντις, 1259-1281). 
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 Cf. Jenkins (1983) for more examples of the dress pin used as a weapon by women. He concludes that such 
stories provide little historical truth, but confirm male anxieties concerning potential female violence  and ―the 
unconscious desire to disarm women of their secret weapon‖ (32). 
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 Segal (1990) 122 n. 41 observes that the murder of Polymestor‘s children further suggests that Hecuba is 
committing emasculation, since she deprives him of living children and the potential to sire future ones. Cf. also 
Zeitlin (1991) 65-66 on the relationship between light, vision, and children in the play. 
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Greek and Trojan sides,
186
 is an unexpected description for Hecuba and her women, who 
have defeated their victim through the use of deception and seclusion rather than openly on 
the field of battle. Gregory argues that the incongruous description expresses Polymestor‘s 
astonishment at being defeated by a group he had previously thought incapable of 
committing the same violence as men.
187
  But Hecuba has already shown in her earlier 
discussion with Agamemnon that she considers her band of Trojan women to be her soldiers: 
within the space of fifteen lines, the Greek army and the Trojan women are called an ὄχλος 
(868, 880), and both are said to provide assistance to their benefactors (ἐπικουρία, 872, 878).  
 Polymestor‘s choice of adjective is also problematic at face value: the Trojan women 
have not killed (φόνος) any man (ἀνήρ), but rather have wounded one and killed his children. 
The term perhaps is a subtle reference to their emasculation of Polymestor, who serves as the 
male antagonist in the battle of the sexes described by Agamemnon and Hecuba (880-887). 
Before the revenge, Polymestor is called an ἀνήρ nine times by other characters, three times 
more than any other character;
188
 in defeating the male adversary, Hecuba destroys his 
masculinity (he is no longer called ἀνήρ after emerging mutilated onstage) and reduces him to 
a state of incredulous shame: 
  γυναῖκες ὤλεσάν με,  
    γυναῖκες αἰχμαλωτίδες· 
    δεινὰ δεινὰ πεπόνθαμεν. 
   ὤμοι ἐμᾶς λώβας. 
 
      Women destroyed me! Women, captives of war! We have suffered terrible,  
  terrible things. Woe is me for this insult against me. (1095-1098) 
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 It is a common epithet of Hector (Il. 1.242, 6.498, 9.351, et al.) and is also used to describe Achilles‘ hands 
(18.317, 24.479).  
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 Gregory (1999) ad 1061. 
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 Polymestor (19, 682, 716, 771, 790, 858, 873, 1004, 1036). The term is used three times each to describe 
Polydorus (733, 1230, 1244) and Achilles (304, 307, 310), and once for Agamemnon (844) and Priam (953). 
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Polymestor‘s application of the heroic epithet ἀνδροφόνος to the Trojan women, therefore, may 
not only reflect the women‘s adoption of masculine warrior roles but also connote the 
disgrace (λώβας) of Polymestor‘s emasculation.   
 Though Hecuba proves that women can be just as formidable as Homeric warriors, 
she still displays signs of weakness. Since her mutilation of Polymestor has not completely 
disabled him or his ―seething, most hostile Thracian anger‖ (θυμῶ ζέοντι Θρηικὶ δυσμαχωτάτῳ, 
1055), she must avoid contact with her victim by standing away from him and perhaps 
moving quietly around the stage in flight (κρυπτὰν βάσιν αἰσθάνομαι / τάνδε γυναικ῵ν, 1069-
1070). Moreover, though she taunts Polymestor while he is offstage, Hecuba does not openly 
boast after her enemy returns onstage to confront her, as other female killers in tragedy tend 
to do: Clytemnestra, for example, confronts the hostile Argive chorus after slaying 
Agamememnon (Ag. 1372-1576), while Medea taunts the enraged Jason after slaughtering 
their children (Med.1317-1414). While those two characters are powerful and resourceful 
enough to avoid immediate retribution from those offended by their violence, Hecuba is still 
vulnerable after her revenge has been completed. She does not openly confront Polymestor 
until Agamemnon‘s verdict confirms that the Thracian cannot harm her. Hecuba can thus 
prove the dangers in underestimating women‘s capacity for violence, but her lingering 
vulnerability to male force demonstrates that she is no superhuman sorceress or axe-wielding 
warrior. Her character seems more plausible and in some ways more disturbing than these 
murderous women. While Clytemnestra‘s deceit and brutal attack were no doubt shocking to 
the original audience of the Agamemnon, her anomalous status as both masculine and 
feminine is established early in the play (ἀνδρόβουλον…κέαρ, 11).189 Hecuba, however, is 
revealed as anomalous only when the social structures on which she depends (i.e. νόμος and 
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φιλία) disintegrate. The extremity of her circumstances and her continued vulnerability align 
her more closely than other female killers in tragedy with what the audience might have 
considered a ―real woman.‖ The notion that any woman under similar duress might commit 
such aberrant behavior is particularly unsettling, as it suggests that communities are unable to 
identify and prevent such violence.
190
   
 Hecuba‘s revenge also involves a subversion of traditional conceptions of 
motherhood.  In the first part of the play her status as a (former) mother is treated as a critical 
part of her identity.
191
 She uses the term to describe herself ten times throughout the play, 
nine of which occur before she first mentions her plan for revenge.
192
 During the first portion 
of the play, Hecuba also refers to her children affectionately as τέκνα, particularly in 
moments of great distress: she addresses the recently condemned Polyxena as τέκνον τέκνον 
μελέας ματρός (186); when she discovers Polydorus‘ corpse she laments over him ὦ τέκνον 
τέκνον ταλαίνας ματρός (694). τέκνον is a more intimate term than παῖς that in tragedy is used 
predominantly by parents to refer to young children, often in direct address.
193
  Though 
Hecuba does use both terms to refer to her children in the first part of the play,
194
 she tends to 
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 Cf. Tarkow (1984) for a fuller discussion of motherhood as a defining characteristic of Hecuba during the 
first half of the play. 
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 Before mentioning revenge: 172, 174, 186, 336, 427, 439, 513, 621, 694; after revenge: 897, a reference to 
the burial of both children.  
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 Golden (1990) 12-13. He argues against a strict formulation here since παῖς can also be used with affection, 
though he does not cite any examples of τέκνον that lack intimacy. Thury (1988) 302-303 and 305 n. 9 argues 
that the similarities in their frequency in the plays of Euripides (i.e. for every appearance of τέκνον there is, on 
average, a corresponding instance of παῖς) show that the tragedian‘s preference depends solely on variatio and 
not on any distinction in meaning. This broad statistical approach cannot account for the specific passages in 
which the words are used (i.e. Hecuba can refer to her child formally as παῖς in one line, while intimately calling 
her τέκνον in the next).  
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 E.g. Hecuba‘s first address to Polyxena is ὦ τέκνον, ὦ παῖ (171). Golden (1990) 13 uses this example as 
evidence against pressing the distinction between τέκνον and παίς without considering context. In this case, 
however, I think it is telling that Hecuba‘s addresses to Polyxena in this scene seem to develop into an 
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use παῖς when making an unmarked reference to her child and τέκνον when evoking pathos. 
For example,  she refers to Polydorus as her παῖς when she first identifies the corpse (681), 
but then repeatly cries τέκνον as she begins to lament his death (684).   
 Once she formulates her revenge, however, she no longer uses the term τέκνον in 
reference to her own children. Instead, she calls the slain children of Aegyptus τέκνα (886), 
an odd label for men who were old enough to wed. And unlike her previous uses of the term, 
Hecuba does not apply the word to these victims to generate sympathy but rather to ally 
herself with the women who killed them. While Hecuba may use τέκνα here instead of παῖδας 
for the sake of variety,  I would contend that this term foreshadows another important group 
of τέκνα in this play, the children of Polymestor. Hecuba calls the Thracian‘s sons both terms 
shortly after the reference to the Danaids (καὶ παῖδας, ὡς δεῖ καὶ τέκν’ εἰδέναι λόγους, 893), and 
does not use the word τέκνον for the remainder of the play.195 Hecuba‘s previous appeals have 
failed to secure the safety and dignity of her children; thus she transforms from one 
sympathetic to the suffering of innocent youths to an agent of violence against another set of 
children. 
  It is true that Hecuba‘s desire to avenge her child by killing the children of her 
enemy does not per se involve a contradiction of traditional maternal behavior. As Kovacs 
notes, in such situations Greek popular morality not only permitted but even encouraged acts 
of vengeance on behalf of one‘s family.196 But regardless of moral justification, the execution 
of Hecuba‘s vengeance involves a number of horrific distortions involving motherhood. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
emotional crescendo: first ὦ τέκνον, ὦ παῖ (171), then οἴμοι τέκνον (180), finally τέκνον τέκνον μελέας ματρός 
(186).  
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  She does, however, use the related verb τίκτω  in 992. I shall discuss the significance of this below. 
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 Kovacs (1987) 99. Cf. 143 n. 48 for literary evidence of this belief. It should be noted, however, that the 
obligation to avenge one‘s kin belonged exclusively to men in Athenian society. Cf. Gould (1980) 43-44. 
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most obvious example can be found in the murder of Polymestor‘s children. In his account 
before Agamemnon, the Thracian king notes that the women separated the children from 
their father by feigning the desire to nurture them: 
  ὅσαι δὲ τοκάδες ἦσαν, ἐκπαγλούμεναι 
    τέκν’ ἐν χεροῖν ἔπαλλον, ὡς πρόσω πατρὸς 
    γένοιντο, διαδοχαῖσ’ ἀμείβουσαι χερ῵ν. 
 
  But all who were mothers, began to fondle my children in their hands with  
  great admiration, exchanging them from hand to hand so that they might be  
  far from their father. (1157-1159) 
 
The Trojan women exploit their status as women who have delivered children by treating 
Polymestor‘s sons as babies. They ―dandle in their hands‖ (ἐν χεροῖν ἔπαλλον) the Thracian 
children, just as Hector dandles (πῆλέ τε χερσίν) his infant son who has become frightened by 
his father‘s helmet (Il. 6.474). Like that scene in the Iliad, the women‘s behavior 
simultaneously conveys their own (feigned) tenderness and the children‘s genuine 
vulnerability.  The same hands that fondle Polymestor‘s sons also exchange them from one 
woman to another (διαδοχαῖσ’ ἀμείβουσαι χερ῵ν), an act designed to convey their mutual 
adoration (ἐκπαγλούμεναι) of the children but given sinister significance by Polymestor‘s 
proleptic explanation. The reversal of these women from mother figures to child-slayers 
happens suddenly (εὐθύς) and Polymestor‘s description of his children‘s end is similarly blunt 
and unornamented (κεντοῦσι παῖδας, 1160-1162). The Thracian also worries that the Trojan 
women will mutilate his children‘s bodies (διαμοιρᾶσαι, 1076). This is the same term Hecuba 
used to describe Polymestor‘s mutilation of Polydorus‘ corpse (διεμοιράσω, 716), and the 
repetition of this uncommon verb invites a comparison between the acts of child murder.
 197 
The roles have reversed: while Polymestor adopts the role of distraught parent, Hecuba has 
become the child-killer. Although her justification for the murder is stronger than 
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Polymestor‘s, her simulation of traditional maternal behavior in this act generates an 
uncomfortable tension between maternal affection and the slaughter of children. 
 The same tension between nurturing mother and merciless killer underscores 
Hecuba‘s manipulation of her own son‘s corpse to attain vengeance on his behalf. As I noted 
above, Polydorus‘ body remained onstage throughout the play after its initial introduction.198 
It is covered before Polymestor‘s arrival, 199 and he assumes, as Hecuba did earlier (667-680), 
that the covered body belongs to Polyxena. Mossman notes, however, that Hecuba‘s 
misidentification served as a pathetic prelude to her recognition, while the presence of 
Polymestor‘s slaughtered victim makes his false promises of his safety more reprehensible.200 
But the presence of the corpse also illustrates another disturbing element in the deception 
scene, namely Hecuba‘s willingness to manipulate her child‘s body in her revenge scheme. 
Onstage corpses are a staple of tragedy, but rarely does the misidentification of a corpse lead 
to further violence – the only other example in the extant tragedies can be found in 
Sophocles‘ Electra, where Aegisthus is fooled into thinking that Clytemnestra‘s corpse is 
that of Orestes (1466-1480).  
 The ghost of Polydorus has explained earlier that his only desire is to fall into his 
mother‘s hands and be buried (50). But ultimately Hecuba privileges her revenge – 
something the ghost of Polydorus notably omitted in both his requests and prophecy – over 
the burial of her children. Agamemnon‘s first question to Hecuba during their initial 
encounter is ―why do you delay burying your child?‖ (τί μέλλεις παῖδα σὴν κρύπτειν τάφῳ, 
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 It is unclear when the covering is restored. The corpse is uncovered (γυμνωθέν, 679) by an attendant, remains 
visible during the debate between Hecuba and Agamemnon (726-864), and is covered when Polydorus sees it at 
955. Gregory (1999) ad 896-897 suggests that Hecuba recloaks the body as she discusses the future burial of 
her children.  
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726). Hecuba does not initially respond, but it becomes clear that she plans to bury her two 
children together (τώδ’ ἀδελφὼ πλησίον μιᾷ φλογί) only after she has completed her plan (896-
897).
 201
  This plan contains a dreadful contradiction: she seeks justice for her slain child but 
to obtain it she must use the child‘s body as a prop to deceive Polymestor. In order to 
generate his pity and spur him to action Hecuba had previously asked Agamemnon to look at 
her son‘s corpse and consider it as that of a relative (κηδεστήν, 834-835).  In cloaking her son, 
she does the opposite: she divorces the corpse from its immediate signification, treating it not 
as the remains of an intimate relation but as an object that will enable her to fool her 
enemy.
202
   
C.3) Aftermath  
 While Hecuba‘s character is marked by contradictions of familiar cultural categories 
and by unpredictable behavior, in one area she remains consistent, namely her commitment 
to reciprocal justice. Hecuba devastates the house of Polymestor in the same way he and the 
Greeks have destroyed her own. Just as she must live as a powerless slave while retaining the 
will of a queen, so her mutilation of her enemy reduces him to the status of a king without 
political power. There is no indication in the text that her violent attack has deposed the 
Thracian from his kingship or severed the Greeks‘ allegiance to him. It is unclear then why 
Agamemnon does not hesitate to banish him to a remote island, given that the political 
obstacles that prevented such punishment earlier in the play should still be operative. Yet  
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 If Gregory‘s conjecture that Hecuba covers the body while discussing her children‘s burial is correct (see 
note 199 above), then the gesture adds a haunting quality to her remark. She will perform appropriate maternal 
duties in giving her children proper funeral rites, but first must use her son‘s corpse as a tool of deception.  
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Polymestor does not immediately invoke his right as king to punish Hecuba.
203
 Instead, he 
submits to a trial before Agamemnon where his claims to φιλία with the Greeks prove as 
fruitless as Hecuba‘s. Similarly, Hecuba‘s vengeance against Polymestor devastates his 
parental status in retribution for the murders of her children: just as she is a mother without 
children (421, 439-440, 495, 514, 621-622, 810), so her punishments ensure that he will 
never again see his children alive (οὐ παῖδας ὄψῃ ζ῵ντας οὓς ἔκτειν’ ἐγώ, 1046).  
 While Hecuba fails to achieve true reciprocity in either the private sphere (her claims 
of φιλία with Odysseus and Agamemon) or the public (her appeals to νόμος), she ultimately 
finds satisfaction in an exchange of pain. When Polymestor laments his misfortune, she 
replies ―Are you in pain? What then? Don‘t you think I feel pain for my child?‖ (ἀλγεῖς; τί δ’; 
ἦ μὲ παιδὸς οὐκ ἀλγεῖν δοκεῖς; 1256).  Her commitment to reciprocation of violence allies her 
with the Hecuba of the Iliad, who wishes to devour the liver of Achilles in order to attain just 
requital for her the death of her son Hector (Il. 24.212-214). Kovacs sees a sharp distinction 
between this Hecuba and the one found in Euripides‘ play; he notes that the tragedian could 
have incorporated the ―extreme savagery‖ of the Iliad‘s Hecuba into his character but instead 
applied it to Polymestor.
204
 But this moral distinction fails to account for the many disturbing 
features of Hecuba‘s vengeance mentioned above. I contend that there is a distinction 
between the two figures but that this distinction depends on the differing circumstances, not 
differing values. Holmes has observed that the Iliad passage is important for understanding 
―the exchange of pains in the Iliad‘s economy of τιμή,‖ noting that Hecuba, as a mother, is 
―shut out of its central exchange‖ and can only make threats of ―bestializing lust‖ in return 
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for her own maternal suffering.
205
 I would argue that Euripides has in this play given Hecuba 
the opportunity to enact the same violent desire she displayed in the Iliad. This Hecuba, 
unlike that of the Iliad, lives in a chaotic world in which people distort or neglect 
fundamental social structures (φιλία and νόμος) in instances where the victims are most in 
need of protection from these structures. She responds by subverting traditional cultural 
distinctions involving political status and gender in order to deprive Polymestor of the same 
things that she has lost (i.e. regal status and children) and thus cause him to suffer identical 
pains.
206
 She abandons helplessness for horror, as her only means of attaining reciprocal 
justice is to exploit cultural distinctions others take for granted. 
Because she has totally committed herself to vengeance, Hecuba can claim triumph 
even when the audience can see the many signs of defeat that she cannot escape. One of these 
signs is slavery, a fate that every Trojan character denounces as abject.
207
 Although 
Agamemnon offers Hecuba freedom, she replies that she would gladly endure slavery if she 
could avenge those who harmed her (756-757). As I discussed above, rather than reject her 
slave status, as Polyxena does, Hecuba exploits it to deceive her victim into believing that 
she is harmless. She is not, therefore, offended when Polymestor complains that he was 
defeated by a slave (ἡσσώμενος δούλης), but rather takes pride in the justice (δικαίως) of her 
punishment (1252-1254). Similarly, Polymestor‘s prophecy concerning her death and 
metamorposis into a dog fails to upset her (1259-1274). She reacts to the revelation of her 
fate with the same commitment she showed before her vengeance: ―It matters not at all to 
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 Michelini (1987) 170: ―The perfect revenge demands reciprocity between the wronged and the wronger, so 
that exactly comparable wounds are suffered by each, and each becomes the image of the other.‖ 
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 Polyxena, in particular, considers slavery shameful and unendurable (357-368, 551-552), but similar 
assessments are delivered by Polydorus‘ ghost (55-58), the chorus (100-103, 332-333, 475-483), and Hecuba 
herself (157-158). 
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me, since you at any rate have paid the penalty to me‖ (οὐδὲν μέλει μοι, σοῦ γέ μοι δόντος δίκην, 
1274).  
But while slavery is a definite source of shame and suffering in the play, it is not 
altogether clear how the audience should interpret the prediction of Hecuba‘s metamorphosis. 
Metamorphoses in Greek literature are a ―widely applicable motif‖ that can serve, for 
example, as punishment from an angry god or as relief from mortal suffering.
208
 Critics of the 
Hecuba are divided on the implications of this transformation: some interpret it as the 
punishment for and culmination of Hecuba‘s bestial degradation, while others suggest that 
Polymestor‘s condemnatory tone does not reflect any fault or savagery on her part.209 Neither 
interpretation by itself, however, adequately accounts for the deliberate ambiguity that 
Euripides creates in this scene. Mossman notes several of these ambiguities:
210
 Hecuba will 
become a dog, a creature often considered base and repulsive by ancient Greeks,
211
 but she 
will have ―blazing eyes‖ (πύρσ’ ἔχουσα δέργματα, 1265), a trait possessed by supernatural 
figures;
212
 Hecuba will die by drowning, a particularly horrible death in the ancient world, 
but unlike most who drown, she will not die anonymously and will have a famous tomb 
(1273). This prophecy is not delivered by a god, who might clarify for the audience whether  
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the metamorphosis is punishment or relief, but by an enemy whose aim is to upset her.
213
 
This transformation itself admittedly does not seem very pleasant; the closest tragic parallel 
is Dionysus‘ prediction of Cadmus‘ unwelcome metamorphosis into a powerful serpent at the 
end of the Bacchae (1330-1351). But the Hecuba lacks the clear articulations of divine 
punishment and human misery found in that play. Here, Euripides resists providing his 
audience with clear indications of praise or blame, reward or punishment.  
 Mossman‘s reading admirably avoids the moralistic approaches that have plagued 
scholarly interpretations of this play. She does not, however, completely dismiss its ethical 
implications but contends that these ambiguities are part of ―a most complex moral problem‖ 
that the audience must consider: ―[Euripides] offers us no easy answers; indeed he creates a 
world where easy answers are a thing of the past; and the state of flux he represents is 
reflected in the structure and expression of the play.‖214 While I agree with this assessment, I 
believe we can press Mossman‘s claim even further. Euripides‘ grim depiction of the 
unstable and violent world of the Hecuba does more than invite ethical speculation: it 
encourages viewers to question their most fundamental assumptions about the social and 
political structure of the world. We have seen in this chapter that contradictions of familiar 
cultural categories pervade the Hecuba and that the fragility of these categories underscores 
human vulnerability. The character of Hecuba in particular not only defies the moral 
distinctions that other scholars have tried to find in the play but also challenges basic 
distinctions between male and female, slave and queen. It is because of these contradictions 
that she is a monstrous aberration that commits disturbing violence. But since she is also a 
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sympathetic victim who exacts vengeance from a vicious adversary, we are left with a 
complex figure whose actions cannot be neatly labeled as heroic or villainous.     
C.4) Hecuba and The Final Girl   
 Though we cannot detemine precisely how ancient audiences reacted to violent and 
contradictory features of the Hecuba‘s protagonist, we may gain some insight from an 
analogus example found in modern horror fiction. Hecuba‘s ambiguous nature and grisly 
behavior closely resemble the Final Girl in horror films of the slasher genre. In slasher films, 
a deranged, frequently monstrous, killer dispatches his teenage victims one by one until the 
protagonist, almost always a female, turns the tables on him. Clover defines the Final Girl as 
follows:  
The one character of stature who does live to tell the tale is in fact the Final 
Girl. She is introduced at the beginning and is the only character to be 
developed in any psychological detail. We understand immediately from the 
attention paid it that hers is the main story line. She is intelligent, watchful, 
levelheaded; the first character to sense something amiss and the only one to 
deduce from accumulating evidence the pattern and extent of the threat …. 
We register her horror as she stumbles on the corpses of her friends. Her 
momentary paralysis in the face of death duplicates those moments of the 
universal nightmare experience – in which she is the undisputed ―I‖ – on 
which horror frankly trades. When she downs the killer, we are triumphant. 
She is by any measure the slasher film‘s hero. This is not to say that our 
attachment to her is exclusive and unremitting, only that it adds up, and that in 
the closing sequence (which can be quite prolonged) it is very close to 
absolute.
215
    
 
On the surface, this description could be applied to Hecuba: she is the focal character for 
most of the play; her terrified and frantic reactions to the death of Polyxena and the discovery 
of Polydorus‘ corpse help the audience to register the horror in those situations; and though 
initially she is extremely distraught at her children‘s gruesome fates, she eventually triumphs 
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over Polymestor by her cunning and grim resolve. While there are some obvious distinctions 
between the Final Girl in horror and Hecuba (e.g., Polymestor is not a serial killer; Hecuba‘s 
own safety is not initially at risk), the similarities between the two reveal significant 
considerations concerning the original audience‘s reaction to her revenge. Hecuba, like the 
Final Girl, is formally the hero of the play, but her disturbing triumph invites confusion as 
well as satisfaction from audience members. 
The Final Girl‘s triumph typically involves single-handedly defeating the killer of the 
slasher film. Her independence does not stem from her stubbornness or solitary nature. On 
the contrary, she frequently tries to find allies who might help her defeat the villain. But these 
allies ultimately fail her, especially authority figures (e.g., parents, police officers) who 
refuse to believe her, are unwilling admit publicly that such a monster exists, or are in some 
way powerless to combat it.
216
 In Wes Craven‘s Nightmare on Elm Street (1984), for 
example, Nancy tries to persuade her father, a police lieutenant, that Freddy Krueger, a 
former child-murderer burned alive by parents and now haunting children‘s dreams from 
beyond the grave, is threatening her and her friends. The father does not initially believe her, 
and even when she provides proof (a hat snatched from a dream with Krueger‘s name sewn 
inside) his response is unhelpful at best. He attempts to alleviate her fears by placing 
protective bars on her bedroom windows, paradoxically locking her in the room where she is 
most vulnerable. In the Hecuba Agamemnon, like Nancy‘s father, is well-intentioned, but his 
inability or unwillingness to extricate himself from the political sphere renders his passive 
offers of support insufficient. The Hecuba thus presents its audience with a world very 
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similar to the one found in many slasher films: the social structures designed to protect the 
innocent and vulnerable (e.g. φίλοι, laws, political authority) cannot accommodate the 
monstrous evil that threatens the central character. Consequently, the protagonist must act 
outside these social structures to achieve her aims; for the Final Girl this is survival, while 
Hecuba seeks retribution. But by defying these structures the heroine simultaneously 
confronts the threats that the social framework fails to resolve and challenges the framework 
itself by exposing its vulnerabilities. Hecuba‘s shocking vengeance ends the reign of one 
killer while signaling her own ability to deceive, kill, and mutilate.
217
 
 The emergence of Hecuba as the play‘s triumphant killer illustrates another similarity 
between her character and the Final Girl: the capacity to adapt and transform herself in order 
to defeat the villain.
218
 In slasher films this transformation is provoked by the killer and the 
extraordinary situation into which he forces the Final Girl. As I have argued above, Hecuba 
undergoes a similar transformation during the play: in order to achieve her vengeance, she 
successfully negotiates her former regal authority with her current limitations as 
Agamemnon‘s slave. Like the Final Girl, Hecuba displays cleverness and ingenuity as she 
adapts her plan to accommodate Agamemnon‘s abstention. She not only exploits 
Polymestor‘s weaknesses (i.e., greed, arrogance) in order to draw her villain into the tent, she 
also adapts her arguments during the final debate (i.e., by concentrating on Polymestor‘s 
failure to uphold his political alliance with the Greeks) in order to secure Agamemnon‘s 
favorable judgment. These dynamic qualities allow her to find agency in a world that has 
denied her everything, even the survival of her children. The audience thus can find some 
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pleasure in Hecuba‘s hard-fought triumph over a villain whose inner (and now outer) 
monstrousness contravenes essential beliefs of Greek society.
219
    
 While Hecuba‘s adaptability are part of her dynamic heroism, they also serve as 
indications of her ambiguous nature. The Final Girl model is useful for investigating the 
implications of this ambiguity. Clover contends that the Final Girl demonstrates 
contradictory gender associations: she is manifestly female, but her ―unfemininity‖ can be 
found in her lack of erotic interest and appeal, her willingness to confront the killer violently 
on his own terms, her adoption of male phallic weapons that penetrate the villain, and her 
metaphorical emasculation of the killer as a result of this penetration (i.e. by penetrating him 
she prevents him from penetrating his victims).
220
 Other females in slasher films frequently 
act as objects of sexual and violent desire. Their boyfriends lust after them, the audience 
ogles their bare bodies, and the killer gratifies himself by violently dispatching them 
(frequently while they are in a place of erotic vulnerability, such as in bed or in the 
shower).
221
 The Final Girl serves as a dramatic contrast to these female victims by her refusal 
to succumb to either the sexual lust of the male characters or the killer‘s sadistic desires. 
Laurie, the protagonist of Halloween (1978), is the most sexually reserved of her friends, but 
as the film‘s director John Carpenter notes, ―the one girl who is the most sexually uptight just 
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 Not only does Polymestor violate ξενία, his savagery following the mutilation prevents reasonable legal 
discourse (1129). In defeating him, Hecuba resembles also the hero of the Odyssey, whose resourcefulness 
enables him to defeat to the lawless Cyclops. Cf. note 169 above. 
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 Clover (1992) 48-49. 
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 In Halloween, for example, the killer Michael Myers disguises himself with a sheet before finding one 
female victim nude in bed. She assumes that Myers is her boyfriend playing a prank, thus allowing the killer to 
play his own (more deadly) game with her. 
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keeps stabbing this guy with a long knife …. She uses all those phallic symbols on the 
guy.‖222  
A similar gender pattern can be found in the Hecuba. Talthybius represents Polyxena 
as the ideal submissive female who not only offers herself freely to her male killer but also 
bares her torso, thus inviting an erotic comparison to a beautiful statue. Ultimately her body, 
like a slasher victim‘s, ends covered in blood (558-561, 568-570). Hecuba, in contrast, adopts 
the submissive female persona when tricking Polymestor. Her revenge, as I have argued, 
depends on her ability to confront the villain on his own terms: she assumes the role of killer, 
mutilator, and, through the symbolic castration of her victim, the heroic victor and ―man-
slayer‖ (1061). Hecuba‘s unexpected triumph against a cruel villain may delight audience 
members, but her replication of the villain‘s brutality also creates an unsettling alignment 
between her and the play‘s obvious monster.223 The ancient audience was thus challenged to 
reconcile their sympathetic feelings towards Hecuba‘s plight with the unease generated by 
her contradictory nature and brutality.     
    The similarities between Hecuba and the Final Girl can help us to understand how 
ancient audiences reacted to one of Euripides‘ most shocking plays. I have argued against 
moralistic readings, and I contend that consideration of the play‘s horrific material provides 
several possibilities for its appeal to ancient audiences. First, by creating situations and 
characters that defy normal classification, Euripides arouses his audience‘s curiosity. Carroll 
argues that although the emotion of horror is per se unpleasant, the monsters found within the 
horror genre are ―classificatory misfits‖ that elicit fascination: ―The very fact that they are 
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 Carpenter (1980) 23-24. 
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 The resemblance between the Final Girl and the killer is another common feature of horror films. Hills 
(1999) 46, for example notes the similarities between Ripley and the vicious monster in Alien (1979).  
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anomalies fascinates us. Their deviation from the paradigms of our classificatory scheme 
captures our attention immediately …. One wants to gaze upon the unusual, even when it is 
simultaneously repelling.‖224 The concomitance of fascination and horror is also suggested 
by Aristotle: he claims that humans enjoy seeing artistic representations of things normally 
deemed repulsive in the real world (e.g. corpses) because we can learn (μανθάνειν) from these 
depictions (Poet. 1448b15-1448b17).  
 Hecuba‘s anomolous qualities perhaps also made the grotesque and repulsive 
violence she commits more palatable. Clover contends that the Final Girl‘s ambiguous 
gender provides an ideal ―identificatory buffer‖ for the primarily male audience of slasher 
films who, according to Clover, do not mind, in fact like, the repellent violence found in 
these films, but only when they can ―explore taboo subjects in the relative safety of 
vicariousness.‖225 The Final Girl can suffer and display fear during the first part of the horror 
film without challenging the audience‘s notion of masculinity, but at the end her assumption 
of the masculine heroic role allows male viewers to take pleasure in her triumph. The 
primarily male audience of Euripides‘ Hecuba might have found similar comfort in the 
aesthetic distance created by Hecuba‘s liminality.226 The suffering she experiences in the first 
half of the play is extraordinary, as is her abasement when she grovels before Odysseus and 
Agamemnon.
227
 There are, of course, other distancing mechanisms present in the Hecuba, 
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 Carroll (1990) 188, 191. Though he calls this conclusion ―confessedly pedestrian,‖ he argues that it counters 
a common critique made against horror fans – i.e. that their enjoyment of horror fiction is actually a sadistic 
pleasure derived from watching others in pain. 
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Clover (1992) 51. 
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 Whether women were present during the original performance does not significantly affect my argument, as 
I am assuming that the audience was either fully or predominantly male. Cf. Podlecki (1990), Henderson 
(1991), and Goldhill (1997a) on the presence of women in the Greek theater.  
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 The importance of aesthetic distance was noted by ancient writers, as well: Aristotle claims in the Rhetoric 
that audiences will be overcome with panic if the orator provides examples of suffering that are too immediate 
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including the mythological setting, the exotic Thracian locale, and the non-Greek ethnicity of 
Hecuba‘s victim. But the contradictory elements of her character allow her to behave in ways 
typically unavailable to males,
228
 and so the audience might have thrilled at her triumph 
without feeling overwhelming discomfort at her suffering.  
But ultimately I do not think we can completely discount the potential unease caused 
by Hecuba‘s contradictory nature. The constant pattern of contradiction in the Hecuba 
suggests that the original audience felt not merely fascination (Carroll) and detached 
enjoyment (Clover), but also discomfort as the familiar codes of social interaction, codes that 
served as sources of protection for the vulnerable, disintegrated amidst the play‘s brutal 
violence. Therefore I think Holland-Toll‘s distinction between affirmative and disaffirmative 
horror is most useful here.
229
 As I noted at the end of my first chapter, affirmative fictions 
present the restoration of social structures after a horrific disruption, while disaffirmative 
fictions depict disruptions that leave social structures irreparably destroyed.
230
Many slasher 
films offer an affirmative, albeit perverse, attitude toward the cultural associations of their 
audience. The killer often ―punishes‖ the teens who use drugs or have promiscuous sex, thus 
validating social taboos; when the chaste Final Girl defeats him the community ―returns to 
normal‖ without any significant change.231 But other films, like Halloween, suggest that 
cultural distinctions and institutions are insufficient. Neither psychiatrists nor the police can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1385b29-33), and the reaction to Phrynicus‘ Sack of Miletus demonstrates that tragic audiences required some 
distance from the material (Hdt. 6.21).   
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 Foley (2001) and Zeitlin (1996) have made similar observations about female characters in Greek tragedy. 
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 Holland-Toll (2001) 14-25. 
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 Cf. pages 46-47 above. 
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 The fact that these films often suggest that the threat may return does not contradict their affirmative nature, 
as the killer does not destroy the social fabric but rather enforces the repressive aspects of the society‘s values 
(Trencansky 2001, 68-71). 
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restrain Michael Myers or adequately explain his behavior; Myers is depicted as a force of 
evil that resists human compassion and that defies the institutions that protect civilization 
from chaos.
232
  
There are no such ―bogey-men‖ in the Hecuba, but there is a similar breakdown of 
social conventions: φιλία and νόμος are distorted and abandoned in the first half of the play, 
and Hecuba defies political and gender-based distinctions in its second half. Agamemnon‘s 
final judgment against Polymestor fails to resolve these disruptions. In fact it confirms the 
disintegration of the social fabric that preceded it: he learns no new information from the 
debate between Polymestor and Hecuba, and the only significant change in situation since his 
earlier refusal to help Hecuba is the gruesome violence she perpetrates. His decision thus 
continues the pattern of horrific violence that pervades the play: victims (Polyxena, 
Polydorus, and Polymestor) receive no benefit from appeals to φιλία and νόμος, but those who 
manipulate conventional distinctions (Odysseus, Hecuba in the second half) can achieve their 
desires. The rest of the play‘s finale is similarly grim: Hecuba will transform and die, 
Agamemnon will be murdered along with Hecuba‘s daughter Cassandra, Polymestor will be 
exiled, and his children‘s corpses presumably will remain unburied. While the play ends with 
the resolution of the play‘s original crisis (i.e. the unburied Polydorus will receive burial), it 
also presents an amplification of the social disorder behind that crisis (i.e. there are two 
unburied corpses instead of one, Polydorus‘ burial is delayed for the sake of revenge). The 
original audience of the Hecuba may have been deeply disturbed in a way similar to that of 
an audience watching a disaffirmative horror film. 
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 Dr. Loomis, the killer‘s doctor, refers to Myers as ―it.‖ When the sheriff expresses his shock at the doctor‘s 
lack of compassion, Loomis answers: ―I met him, fifteen years ago. I was told there was nothing left. No reason, 
no conscience, no understanding, even the most rudimentary sense of life or death, good or evil, right or 
wrong…. I realized what was living behind that boy‘s eyes was purely and simply evil.‖  
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Reading the Hecuba as an example of disaffirmative horror allows us to appreciate its 
unsettling contradictions of cultural categories. While the play does not offer ethical 
instruction, it serves an intellectual function. Holland-Toll observes that disaffirmative fiction 
presents its audience with a ―true image‖ of their society: ―all of the qualities on which we 
pride ourselves…are as subject to alienation and subversion as they are to validation and 
reaffirmation.‖233 This image may not be pleasant but it encourages us to think critically 
about the values and distinctions we take for granted. Euripides seems to have had a similar 
agenda in the Hecuba. It was not uncommon for fifth-century Athenians to encounter 
conflicts similar to (albeit less extreme than) the ones faced by the characters in the Hecuba. 
Pericles, for example, was compelled to prove that his political allegiance to Athens trumped 
his personal friendship with the Spartan general Aristarchus.
234
 It was beneficial for the 
audience to think about the cultural distinctions and structures that Euripides subverts in this 
play, especially in the tumultuous social and political climate of the late fifth century.
235
 The 
ability to think critically about these distinctions and structures not only allowed them to deal 
with the moral complexity discussed by Mossman but also encouraged them to reflect on 
their society in a more general sense.
 236
 The horrific violence in the Hecuba serves as a vivid 
representation of human vulnerability in an unstable world.
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   III. HORROR IN EURIPIDES‘ HERACLES  
  
 The Heracles contains clear relevance for this investigation of Euripidean horror. Its 
macabre nature is obvious from even superficial readings: its virtuous hero is driven mad by 
pitiless gods, then forced to slaughter his innocent family, and finally restored to sanity in 
order to confront the mayhem he has committed unwillingly. The play is shocking by both 
ancient and modern standards. According to the precepts of Aristotle‘s Poetics this plot is 
―foul‖ (μιαρόν), for Heracles is morally blameless (ἐπιεικής) and his punishment is utterly 
unwarranted (1452b34-1452b36).
1
 The vivid depiction of the hero‘s madness was so 
shocking that the politician Cleon reportedly charged Euripides with profaning the Dionysian 
festival; though the story is almost certainly spurious, it suggests ―an ancient discomfort with 
this bloody and bewildering drama.‖2 Modern critics have had similar difficulties interpreting 
the play‘s ―overwhelming horror and despair.‖3 Recent scholarship has focused on several 
questions: why do the gods act so cruelly towards Heracles? How does the protagonist‘s 
heroic identity relate to his deranged attack? What lesson can the audience glean from this 
grim drama?  
 Though critical responses to these interrelated questions are many and diverse, there 
are two common interpretive approaches. The first sees a relatively optimistic tone following 
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 Lucas (1968) ad loc. notes the problematic nature of Aristotle‘s judgment as it concerns tragedy (―…we might 
do worse than define tragedy as the passage of  ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας, admirable men, from prosperity to adversity‖). 
Cf. my comments on the term in chapter 1 page 20 n. 25. 
 
2 Papadopoulou (2005) 71, who cites The Oxyrhynchus Papyri 2400 (vol. 24: 107-109, lines 10-14), a list of 
rhetorical exercises in which this tale can be found. 
 
3
 Yunis (1988) 139. 
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the carnage. Though these critics acknowledge the irrational nature of the play‘s deities, they 
judge the hero triumphant in the end because he has adapted (as far as one can) to extreme 
adversity by refusing suicide and following his friend Theseus to Athens. Wilamowitz, for 
example, sees a movement in the play from a traditional, violent model of Doric heroism 
towards a more advanced model based on cooperation and friendship.
4
 These commentators 
conclude that Euripides reveals how ―human virtues, especially friendship, could enhance life 
in a world ruled by capricious divinities.‖5 In this view Euripides presents Heracles as a 
tragic and vulnerable mortal so that the audience can more fully identify with his suffering 
and admire his steadfast resignation amidst dreadful circumstances.
6
  
The second approach includes more pessimistic interpretations of the Heracles. These 
critics see little hope at the end of the play since ―any mortal pretension to autonomy, 
knowledge, and grandeur that is exclusive of the gods has been destroyed.‖7 There is no 
triumph of human virtue or friendship in these readings; Heracles‘ submission to Theseus‘ 
request highlights his inability to participate in traditional familial relationships.
8
 While such 
interpretations see many of the same conflicts and contradictions mentioned in optimistic 
readings, these commentators see no resolution of them in the play‘s conclusion. They 
propose that the audience did not see Heracles as a model of humanity‘s ability to withstand 
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 Wilamowitz -Moellendorff (1895) ii.127-128. 
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 Hartigan (1987) 132. Cf. Chalk (1962), Conacher (1955) 148-152, Papadopoulou (2004) 267-268 for similar 
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 E.g. Ruck (1976), Gregory (1977), and Silk (1985). 
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 Burnett (1971) 179, though she admits the play reveals ―a kind of restoration for humanity‖ involving 
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sorrows but rather as a tragic anomaly condemned to destroy those whom he most desires to 
join. 
 A close examination of the contradictions underscoring the Heracles‘ shocking 
depictions violence may resolve some of these interpretive difficulties. I have noted in earlier 
chapters Holland-Toll‘s distinction between affirmative horror (fictions where an anomalous 
figure or event threatens the social fabric but is defeated; social structures are thus restored 
and reaffirmed) and disaffirmative horror (fiction in which the anomalous figure or event 
irreparably destroys these social structures and/or reveals their inadequacy). I argued in the 
previous chapter that the horrific violence in the Hecuba performed a disaffirmative function: 
in a world where social conventions fail to protect those most in need of their protection 
Hecuba can triumph only by exploiting her ability to subvert familiar cultural categories. I 
will argue in this chapter that the Heracles contains a similarly disaffirmative portrayal of a 
horrific world in which conventions and structures familiar to the audience are unraveled. I 
will examine three distinct yet interrelated aspects of the central massacre and their relevance 
to the play: the gods, the family, and the household. In each of these Euripides elicits horror 
from his audience through unsettling juxtapositions that challenge their preconceptions about 
the structure of their world. Instead of reaffirming the protective value commonly attributed 
to each of these institutions, the tragedian highlights their fragility and the lurking dangers 
for those who take them for granted.   
Although my reading of the play is consistent with the pessimistic interpretations 
noted above, it contains a more comprehensive account of the play‘s subversion of cultural 
categories. The complete disruption of order in both divine and domestic arenas precludes 
any hope of peaceful resolution not only for Heracles but for ordinary people as well. 
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Whereas much of the horror in the Hecuba depended on human agency, the Heracles 
presents contradictions in divine realm that result in brutal violence and a subversion of 
mortal distinctions. Stephen King divides horror stories into two types: ―those in which the 
horror results from an act of free and conscious will … and those in which the horror is 
predestinate, coming from the outside like a stroke of lightning.‖9 According to this 
distinction Heracles belongs to the latter category: the play provides no reasonable 
explanation for the divine wrath behind his punishment. But the monstrous Iris and Lyssa not 
only destroy their victims but transform familiar sources of comfort into horrific distortions. 
After Lyssa enters the body of the family‘s patriarch and their home neither can be restored 
to their former role in protecting the family. My examination thus moves from the flagrant 
cosmic disruption caused by Iris and Lyssa to contradictions of the more intimate categories 
of family and home.  
A) θεοὶ οὐδαμοῦ: Divine Savagery and Mortal Confusion   
 
The portrait of the vicious divine realm in the Heracles represents the bleakest view 
of the gods in extant Greek tragedy. Unlike other cruel deities, such as Aphrodite in 
Hippolytus and Dionysus in Bacchae, Hera does not appear onstage to voice her anger, but 
instead employs Iris to explain her obscure grievances. Consequently, the play‘s human 
characters, as well as the audience, are forced to confront an obvious divine animosity that 
cannot be explained away as simple jealousy. Euripides representats the gods as monstrous 
contradictions of traditional Greek beliefs, and their inexplicable brutality invites confusion 
from human characters. The effect is so jarring that some scholars have suggested that the 
tragedian is here denouncing traditional accounts of the gods as unbelievable.
10
 I shall argue 
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against such readings in this section: the shocking intrusion of Iris and Lyssa is an upsetting 
reflection of the irrational brutality of the world and the insufficiency of human piety as 
protection against it. The mortal characters within the play express various sentiments 
concerning the gods, including both traditional and rational professions of faith, but all 
mortal beliefs are shattered by the revelation that the gods act as forces of violent disorder.  
A.1) Doubts and Revisions 
 The human characters in the Heracles do not hesitate to speculate concerning the 
gods. Amphitryon, Theseus, Heracles, and the chorus often comment on the nature of the 
divine at each stage of the play‘s action: Heracles‘ initial absence, timely return, and 
deranged rampage are all attributed to the intervention or abstention of a god. These 
speculations are not mere tangents but essential to the movement of the plot: debates 
concerning Heracles‘ divinity and the will of the gods generate much of the play‘s dramatic 
conflict. These mortal evaluations, however, prove consistently unreliable. New events 
contradict previously stated beliefs, and the characters frequently revise their opinions.
11
 The 
play‘s structure emphasizes these revisions and contradictions.12 While many scholars have 
proposed a two or three-part structure for the play,
13
 there are at least five sections marked by 
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 Greenwood (1953) 67, for example, suggests that ―Euripides says to us, in effect: ‗What you see in my play 
could not have occurred; but if the received story were true, what would have occurred is just what you see in 
my play.‖ Conacher (1955) 150-152 claims that the audience, unlike the play‘s characters, recognized the 
impossibility of such gods and thus appreciated the tragedian‘s endorsement of rational faith that fit the fifth-
century intellectual mileu. 
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 Cf. Yunis (1988) 139-171 for a detailed discussion of these revisions. 
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 The organization of the play and its lack of unity have generated much scholarly discussion. Cf. Barlow 
(1982) 115-116 for a brief survey of critical approaches. I agree with Conacher (1955) and Michelini (1987) 
232 that the absence of causal connections within the Heracles is not a literary defect but a deliberate 
representation of the play‘s chaotic world.  
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 Those dividing the play into three parts include the suppliant drama culminating in Heracles‘ victory over 
Lycus (1-814), the appearance of Iris and Lyssa (815-1041), and Heracles‘ struggle to recover from the 
massacre (1042-1428). Cf. Kamerbeek (1966) 1-4 for a representative treatment. Michelini (1987) 231 n. 1. 
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reversals in human beliefs: the family‘s doubts concerning the gods prior to Heracles‘ arrival, 
their subsequent joy and pious celebration following his return, the chorus‘ shock at the 
appearance of Iris and Lyssa, Heracles‘ despair after the massacre, and his revised view of 
the gods and pollution after he discusses these topics with Theseus.  
I shall argue in this section that mortal confusion concerning the gods is a pervasive 
feature of the Heracles and that, contrary to the assessments of several scholars, Euripides 
does not offer ultimate clarification or reassurance to his audience. The fictional characters‘ 
confusion was also likely shared by the audience, who shared at least some of the 
contradicted sentiments and could not anticipate the play‘s shocking reversals. The dangers 
of misguided assumption are most evident in the dreadful appearance of Iris and Lyssa. Their 
attack is made particularly horrific by the juxtaposition of humans‘ stated faith in divine 
reciprocity with the subsequent revelation of the gods‘ irrational anger. Euripides offers little 
hope that mortals can understand anything beyond that the gods heed nothing but their own 
inscrutable desires. 
The most pressing source of confusion concerning the divine involves the relationship 
between Zeus and his son Heracles.
14
 Though the dual origin of the hero is a familiar element 
of myth,
15
 Euripides utilizes this origin as a matter of doubt and dissent, particularly in the 
scenes before the hero‘s arrival. In his prologue, Amphitryon repeatedly claims to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
claims that the Iris-Lyssa scene serves as a ―quasi prologue‖ for the second half and thus argues that the drama 
has a bipartite structure. While the precise number of sections has little significance for my discussion, 
discussions of the play‘s divided structure are useful for two reasons: first, as I mention in the note above, the 
strong narrative disjunctions within the play highlight its chaotic atmosphere; second, references to distinct 
parts are convenient for discussion of the dramatic movement. 
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 Ruck (1976), Gregory (1977), Silk (1985), and Papadopoulou (2005) 47-48 have emphasized the ambivalence 
of divine and human in Heracles‘ character as a central conflict in the play. I shall discuss this question in more 
detail on pages 201-210 below. 
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Heracles‘ father (πατέρα τόνδ’ Ἡρακλέους, 3; παῖς ἐμός, 14; τοὐμοῦ γὰρ ὄντος παιδὸς, 37; παῖς 
ἐμὸς, 46; οὑμὸς εὐγενὴς τόκος, 50); his first statement, however, is an acknowledgement of 
Zeus‘ part in the birth of Heracles (Διὸς σύλλεκτρον, 1). Lycus mocks references to kinship 
with Zeus as ―empty boasts‖ (κόμπους κενούς, 148), while the chorus expresses doubt 
concerning the hero‘s paternity (εἴτε Διός νιν εἴπω / εἴτ’ Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἶνιν, 353-354). The 
stakes of this speculative question are critical for Heracles‘ family: Lycus will either burn 
them alive together at the altar where they supplicate (240-246) or have his soldiers dispatch 
them one by one as the others watch (320-326). Their only hope of salvation depends on the 
return of the head of their household from the world of the dead, an unlikely feat for someone 
who is merely mortal. Only the optimistic Amphitryon, who at first endorses waiting for his 
son, makes a genuine appeal to Heracles‘ divine parentage before the hero‘s return. Even in 
his defense of this heritage he delegates the responsibility of confirmation to Zeus: τῶ τοῦ 
Διὸς μὲν Ζεὺς ἀμυνέτω μέρει / παιδός (170-171); in his later renunciation it is clear that 
Amphitryon believes Zeus has failed to answer (340-347).  
When Heracles does return, his arrival is interpreted as confirmation of his divine 
parentage: Megara‘s first reaction upon seeing her husband is to compare him to Zeus (ἐπεὶ 
Διὸς / σωτῆρος ὑμῖν οὐδέν ἐσθ’ ὅδ’ ὕστερος 521-522); the chorus confidently assert ―He is Zeus‘ 
son‖ (Διὸς ὁ παῖς, 696) and renounce their former disbelief (802-804). Amphitryon‘s 
deceptive assurance to Lycus that Heracles has not returned ―unless one of the gods should 
restore him‖ (εἴ γε μή τις θε῵ν ἀναστήσειέ νιν, 719) carries ironic resonance: Heracles‘ return 
answers Amphitryon‘s prayers for divine assistance (170-171, 498-502) and fulfills his 
prediction of Lycus‘ ruin from ―the wind of a god‖ (θεοῦ πνεῦμα , 216). For Amphitryon and 
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the others, Heracles‘ return gives proof not only of his divine parentage but also of Zeus‘ 
active interest in preserving his son‘s family. 
This change of heart – from doubts about the gods‘ interest in protecting deserving 
mortals to renewed faith in divine beneficence – initially seems unproblematic within the 
context of the play‘s structure: the hero‘s return resolves the dramatic conflict and removes 
the characters‘ doubts  concerning the gods. Scholars have, in fact, condemned the first part 
of the play (i.e., the material before Iris and Lyssa appear) as lacking in suspense: ―It is the 
first part of the play which has been criticised most adversely. The charges are that it is 
melodramatic, and that it is flat and largely irrelevant.‖16 For these critics the mortal 
speculations about the will of the gods are mere distractions that lull the audience into a false 
sense of security before they are devastated by ―the great surprise‖ of the play, namely the 
shocking appearance of Iris and Lyssa.
17
 While I agree that Euripides uses the first part of the 
play to manipulate his audience‘s expectations before the startling reversal, this section is not 
merely ―a mechanical progression of incidents involving mechanical characters.‖18 On the 
contrary, this part of the drama introduces pressing questions about the nature of the gods and 
the ability of mortals to understand it. The sudden divine disruption does not simply negate 
these questions but forces the characters and audience to reevaluate their previous 
assumptions.  
Burnett is therefore correct in condemning interpretations that see the first half of the 
Heracles as Euripides‘ attempt to lull his audience into ―stupefied complacency‖ before 
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smiting them ―with the whiplash of truth‖ in the second half.19 Her attempt to restore the 
importance of the play‘s beginning suffers, however, from extreme moralism. She contends 
that the family‘s despair, culminating in their decision to leave the altar where they 
supplicate so that their death may be honorable, marks them as impious aberrations: ―[The 
suppliant drama‘s] outrages upon the settled canons of tragic suppliancy are indeed so 
flagrant that we are forced to recognize a major intention of the poet in this marked deviation 
from the norm.‖20 While this reading acknowledges the unsettling features of the family‘s 
crisis in faith, its simplistic condemnation fails to acknowledge the tensions between faith 
and doubt and, moreover, nullifies the pathos of the family‘s dreadful fate.21 I shall argue that 
the play‘s first half neither lulls or outrages its audience. Rather, its conflicting accounts of 
divine will reveal signs of mortal confusion that prefigure the flagrant disruption caused by 
Iris and Lyssa. Euripides manipulates his audience by presenting them with familiar religious 
beliefs that prove inadequate in the context of the play.  
The play‘s first section contains several signs of confusion and fallibility in the 
human characters‘ assessments of divine behavior. Amphitryon, the chorus, and Heracles 
show themselves to be unreliable judges of divine actions and motives. The chorus 
confidently proclaim that only a fool could accuse the gods of lawlessness and weakness: 
τίς ὁ θεοὺς ἀνομίᾳ χραίνων, θνατὸς ὤν, 
   ἄφρονα λόγον 
    †οὐρανίων μακάρων† κατέβαλ’ ὡς ἄρ’ οὐ 
    σθένουσιν θεοί;  
  Who is the one, though mortal, who ascribes lawlessness to the gods  
 and hurls this foolish account against the heavenly gods, that the gods in fact  
                                                          
19
 Burnett (1971) 157-158. 
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 Ibid. 158. 
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 She acknowledges that their fate is ―horrible‖ but mitigates the horror by claiming that it was ―freely chosen 
by those who have suffered it‖ (172). 
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have no strength? (757-759) 
It is not clear who this τις represents,22 but the chorus here and throughout the third stasimon 
(772-773, 811-814) adamantly insist that Lycus‘ death proves that the gods are capable and 
eager enforcers of justice. But though Lycus‘ willingness to murder suppliants is obviously 
impious, he never makes any claim concerning divine behavior. On the contrary, it is 
Amphitryon, the most pious character prior to Heracles‘ arrival, who comes closest to 
uttering the ―foolish account‖ (ἄφρονα λόγον) condemned by the chorus:23  
σὺ δ’ ἦσθ’ ἄρ’ ἧσσον ἢ ’δόκεις εἶναι φίλος. 
ἀρετῇ σε νικ῵ θνητὸς ὢν θεὸν μέγαν· 
παῖδας γὰρ οὐ προύδωκα τοὺς Ἡρακλέους. 
σὺ δ’ ἐς μὲν εὐνὰς κρύφιος ἠπίστω μολεῖν, 
τἀλλότρια λέκτρα δόντος οὐδενὸς λαβών,  
σῴζειν δὲ τοὺς σοὺς οὐκ ἐπίστασαι φίλους. 
   ἀμαθής τις εἶ θεὸς ἢ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔφυς. 
 But you [Zeus] were, as it turns out, less dear than you seemed to be. 
 I trump you in courage, though I am a mortal and you a great god. For I did  
not betray Heracles‘ children. And you knew how to seduce surreptitiously  
 and snatch another‘s wife though he did not grant permission, but you don‘t  
know how to protect your dear ones. You are a foolish
24
 god or are not by  
nature just. (341-347) 
 
Amphitryon‘s reproach against Zeus indeed marks a sudden and dramatic change of heart. As 
Yunis notes, he subverts his former faith by applying formulae commonly found in prayers to 
deliver a stunning renunciation of the god.
25
 The language of this passage also strongly 
resembles that of the account condemned by the chorus: both the chorus‘ unnamed critic and 
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 Cf. Stinton (1976) 73 on a similar passage involving an indefinite τις (Ag. 369): ―Aeschylus is not inviting us 
to speculate on the identity of τις … it is simply an emphatic way of saying that the gods are concerned with 
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 Cf. Bond (1981) ad 347 on ἀμαθής. He notes that its distinction from injustice suggests that it denotes a 
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 Yunis (1988) 142. 
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Amphitryon accuse the gods of injustice (δίκαιος οὐκ ἔφυς, 347; ἀνομίᾳ, 757) and (intellectual) 
weakness (ἀμαθής, 347; οὐ σθένουσιν, 759), and both assume knowledge of the divine though 
being mortal (θνητὸς ὢν, 342; θνατὸς ὤν, 757). It is tempting then to read the chorus‘ rejection 
of this opinion from an unnamed sceptic as a correction of Amphitryon‘s reproach, much as 
they correct their previous doubt concerning the hero‘s paternity. Thus even the pious 
Amphitryon, the only member of the household who has faith in Heracles‘ return and who 
continues to pray to Zeus even after this reproof (498-502), apparently misjudges divine 
behavior.  
But the chorus‘ corrections are similarly unreliable, as they also condemn the gods 
(for intellectual weakness) and apply human standards to divine behavior. While lamenting 
their old age and feeble strength, they complain that the gods should grant a second youth as 
a reward for virtue (ἀρετᾶς); since the gods do not grant this reward, they lack intelligence 
(ξύνεσις) and human wisdom (σοφία κατ’ ἄνδρας, 655-672). Their presumption here matches 
that of the ―foolish account‖ they later condemn, as their desire for youth is similarly based 
on the assumption that gods should adhere to mortal wisdom.
26
 It is likely that the chorus‘ 
wish is inspired by Heracles‘ return from the dead; the old men are presumably wondering 
―why all good people (like themselves) should not receive the distinction of a second life.‖27 
Yet Heracles‘ own evaluation of his extraordinary return exposes the naivety of their desire: 
he does not cite the completion of the twelfth labor and his timely return as proofs of his 
ἀρετή, but he condemns the labors generally as useless (μάτην) distractions (χαιρόντων πόνοι· / 
μάτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς τ῵νδε μᾶλλον ἤνυσα, 575-576). After the massacre, he describes his life as 
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the continuation of an endless series of toils culminating in the ―final labor‖ of killing his 
own family (τὸν λοίσθιον δὲ τόνδ’ ἔτλην τάλας πόνον, 1279).28  
Heracles‘ final summation of his toils also illustrates his inability to assess the will of 
the gods. After arriving, he informs Amphitryon that he recognized from a bird omen that 
―some toil had befallen the house‖ (ἔγνων πόνον τιν’ ἐς δόμους πεπτωκότα, 597). Bond 
condemns this remark for its unconvincing attempt at ―realistic plotting‖ for Heracles‘ 
surreptitious arrival.
29
 While I admit that the account seems improbable, its function is not 
limited to narrative convenience. Rather, it reveals that Heracles suffers from the same 
confusion as the other characters in the play. Though the hero apparently can read divine 
omens, his father‘s immediate response suggests that Heracles lacks some understanding: 
Amphitryon must remind his son to worship the domestic gods before commencing with the 
slaughter of his enemies, and the hero acknowledges his father‘s wisdom and his own 
impetuousness (599-609).
30
 But it is after the massacre that Heracles‘ inability to understand 
the will of the gods is most evident. The hero correctly recognized that a labor (πόνος) awaits 
him at home, but he did not fully grasp its nature until it is too late (1279). Like Amphitryon 
and the chorus he presumes that he understands divine intentions, but in reality they all fail to 
comprehend the true purpose the gods have for his arrival.  
Heracles‘ initial misunderstanding concerning this particular labor is related to a 
larger source of confusion that also affects the audience of this play: the ambiguous 
motivation behind the twelve labors. In traditional accounts, Heracles‘ labors serve as 
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 Cf. Willink (1988) 86-87 on the significance πόνος in this play and in the myth of Heracles generally. 
Euripides frequently exploits the underlying tension between the term‘s heroic connotation (i.e. the twelve 
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 Bond (1981) ad 595-598. 
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 Pace Foley (1985) 188, who claims that the hero ―immediately thinks of his duty to the gods….‖  
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divinely distributed punishment for killing his family.
31
 Euripides reverses the accepted order 
by presenting the labors as prior to the murders. As a result, the audience members‘ 
expectations have been challenged, and they cannot be entirely sure why Heracles must 
fulfill these toils. Rather than provide a single mythological variant, Euripides deliberately 
exploits the ambiguity of the labors to highlight the human characters‘ inability to 
comprehend divine motivations. Human confusion is evident from the outset, as Amphitryon 
provides three possible motives for the hero‘s labors: his son‘s wish to provide compensation 
to Eurystheus and thus to restore the family to Argos (πάτραν οἰκεῖν θέλων /καθόδου δίδωσι 
μισθὸν Εὐρυσθεῖ μέγαν); compulsion from Hera (εἴθ’ Ἥρας ὕπο /κέντροις δαμασθείς, 20-21); or 
simple necessity (εἴτε τοῦ χρεὼν μέτα, 17-21).These three explanations – human interest, 
divine will, and impersonal fate – recur throughout the play as the human characters and the 
audience vainly attempt to comprehend Heracles‘ previous labors and the drama‘s central 
massacre that constitutes the hero‘s ―final labor.‖ By confronting his audience with these 
contradictory accounts,
32
 Euripides denies viewers easy answers that might clarify the hero‘s 
suffering and the repulsive violence he commits.  
Amphitryon and the chorus glorify the hero‘s accomplishments in ridding the world 
of savagery. Heracles has ―tamed the land‖ (ἐξημερ῵σαι γαῖαν, 20), made the sea accessible to 
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 Apollodorus notes that the Pythia assigned the labors to Heracles and implies that they serve as punishments 
for the murders (2.4.12). Gantz (1993) 382 and Bond (1981) xxviii-xxx note that most evidence for this is post-
Euripidean, but the consistency of the murders preceding the labors in these accounts suggests an independent 
tradition that predated Euripides.  
 
32
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sailors by removing monsters (400-402), and punished those who violated sacred law (391). 
The goddess Lyssa confirms the civilizing nature of his efforts: 
ἄβατον δὲ χώραν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀγρίαν 
ἐξημερώσας θε῵ν ἀνέστησεν μόνος 
   τιμὰς πιτνούσας ἀνοσίων ἀνδρ῵ν ὕπο.  
But he tamed unapproachable land and savage sea, and alone (of men) he 
restored honors belonging to the gods, honors that were being ruined by  
impious men. (851-853) 
 
While Lyssa‘s assessment of the civilizing nature of the labors cannot be disputed, within the 
context of this play her claim that Heracles has benefited the gods is more problematic. Like 
Lyssa, the human characters in the play assume that the gods welcome these civilizing 
missions.
33
 But the chorus‘ detailed report of the twelve labors concentrates on the benefits 
Heracles confers on mankind rather than on the honors he bestows upon the gods (359-
435).
34
 In fact they mention the gods explicitly in only three of the labors: the killing of the 
Nemean Lion, the slaughter of the hind of Artemis, and the meeting with Atlas. Moreover, I 
shall argue that the choral descriptions of these exploits undercut their assumption that the 
gods find them pleasing. Ultimately their confusion serves as critical background for the 
play‘s central horror: mortals may assume that they can contain the monstrous elements that 
plague their world, but the invasion of Iris and Lyssa reveals how little control mortals have 
in protecting themselves against savage violence.   
Though the chorus‘ description of Heracles‘ first labor, the defeat of the Nemean  
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 The chorus members are not as explicit as Lyssa in describing the labors as pleasing to the gods, but they 
consistently associate Heracles‘ triumphant return from Hades with divine favor (e.g. 694-700, 735-739, 769-
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Lion, is not problematic,
35
 their treatment of the myths of the hind of Artemis and Heracles‘ 
meeting with Atlas are provocative and potentially unsettling. Euripides‘ account of Heracles 
defeating the hind deviates significantly from other sources (375-379). In his version the hind 
is a menace to farmers (συλήτειραν ἀγρωστᾶν) and Heracles glorifies Artemis by killing it 
(κτείνας). Neither of these aspects is found in other literary accounts and artistic depictions of 
the labor.
36
 Euripides‘ ―uniquely malevolent‖ version defines the act as a civilizing labor 
benefitting humans,
 37
 but at the same time its violence undercuts the chorus‘ assumption that 
it pleased Artemis. While the traditional versions of the myth implicitly or explicitly 
indicated the goddess‘ acceptance of the labor, the suggestion that the act honored her is 
problematic. The destruction of an animal commonly considered sacred to her was thus 
potentially unsettling to audience members familiar with the original myth.
38
  
The account of Heracles‘ meeting with Atlas presents similarly problematic views of 
divine will. In the version of the myth likely most familiar to Euripides‘ audience, Heracles 
holds up the sky for Atlas so that the latter can claim the golden apples of the Hesperides.
39
 
Euripides, however, has the hero visit Atlas and uphold the heavens without cause, since 
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 The chorus explains that the hero ―cleared the grove of Zeus of its lion‖ (Διὸς ἄλσος / ἠρήμωσε λέοντος, 359-
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 In Pindar‘s version of the tale Heracles is sent by Eurystheus to capture (ἄξονθ’) the deer, which has already 
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 This was Pherecydes‘ account, which is referenced in the scholia to Apollonius‘ Argonautica 4.1396. 
Apollodorus corroborates the basic elements of the story (Bibl. 2.5.120). Cf. Gantz  (1993) 410-412. 
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Heracles has personally obtained the apples himself prior to visiting the giant (394-399). This 
element of the story is retained, as Bond argues, in order to stress the hero‘s εὐανορία: ―and he 
held fast the starry homes of the gods by means of his manly strength‖ (ἀστρωπούς τε 
κατέσχεν οἴ- / κους εὐανορίᾳ θε῵ν, 406-407).40 The juxtaposition of εὐανορίᾳ with θε῵ν in this 
passage is striking. Not only do the gods depend on Heracles to protect them from the 
ruinous collapse of the heavens, they rely specifically on his exceptional humanity (εὐανορία) 
rather than on strength from his divine heritage.
41
 It is not then an act of piety from which the 
gods receive direct benefit but rather a display of humanity‘s strength and the gods‘ 
dependence on it.  
The emphasis on human achievement in this ode does not reveal impious behavior on 
the part of the chorus,
42
 but it does introduce some disturbing signs of confusion concerning 
divine will. Arnott doubts that the ―unoriginal‖ and ―unimaginative‖ audience familiar with 
contemporary depictions of pious Heracles saw anything unconventional in Euripides‘ 
account.
43
  But the affinity Arnott suggests between the choral ode of the Heracles and 
contemporary depictions of a pious hero is subverted by Euripides‘ manipulation of the myth. 
The play‘s original viewers were predisposed to see the hero‘s achievements as pious acts: 
Pindar had presented the civilizing labors as part of the hero‘s ascendance to divine status 
(Nem. 1.60-72); the labors also adorned several temples, most famously on metopes of the 
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 εὐανορία and related terms in Greek literature typically denote nobility in civic and martial contexts. In 
praising the kindness of  Electra‘s husband  Orestes notes the difficulty in discerning nobility (εὐανδρίαν) by 
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 Pace Burnett (1971) 178-179. As Barlow (1982) 119 notes, the chorus‘ song demonstrates their continued 
faith in the piety of the hero after Lycus has dismissed this aspect of the labors (τί δὴ τὸ σεμνὸν σῶ κατείργασται 
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43
 Arnott (1978) 9-10. 
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temple of Zeus at Olympia, which contained depictions of divine figures assisting the hero.
44
 
The ode of the Heracles significantly differs not only in its focus on the hero‘s humanity but 
also in its bleak tone. The ode ends not in triumphant apotheosis, as in Pindar, but in mortal 
despair: the hero will not return to save his family, and they will travel the ―god-forsaken 
way‖ (κέλευθον ἄθεον) of the underworld (425-435). While we cannot be certain what the 
audience did or did not detect, the contrast between the chorus‘ blind faith in the labors as 
pleasing to the gods and the deviation of their account from traditional myth establishes an 
unsettling tone of confusion within their hymn.  
The chorus‘ beliefs regarding the labors are further examples of mortal confusion 
concerning divine motivation that recurs throughout the play. The doubts, 
misunderstandings, and contradictory claims in human assessments of divine behavior cause 
feelings of unease and discomfort from the audience, who, like the characters within the play, 
cannot fully disentangle the complicated and obscure schemes of the gods. Stephen King has 
compared the writing of horror to the composition of music: ―one off-key note, then two, 
then a ripple, then a run of them. Finally the jagged discordant music of horror overwhelms 
the melody entirely.‖45 This, I contend, is the function of the play‘s first part. The audience 
did not, as Arnott claims, have ―their senses dulled by so much of the play‘s first 700 
lines,‖46 nor did they condemn the mortal characters for their impiety and expect due 
punishment from the gods, as Burnett suggests.
47
 The signs of confusion serve as essential 
components in the development of the play‘s horrific centerpiece, the appearance of Iris and 
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Lyssa and the ensuing slaughter. While the human characters and audience vainly attempt to 
comprehend the cosmic forces behind the family‘s suffering, Euripides unveils a shocking 
spectacle that simultaneously demolishes the audience‘s assumptions about divine justice and 
their familiarity with dramatic plot construction and theatrical devices.   
A.2) Divine Disruption   
The appearance of Iris and Lyssa in Heracles serves as a horrifying culmination to the 
characters‘ misguided speculations about the gods. Many scholars have noted the starkness 
of the Iris-Lyssa episode and its bleak implications for the play; Michelini aptly remarks that 
their interference ―presents us with a part of reality usually left out of drama, a sequence of 
events that, like many sequences in life, is arbitrary, senseless, and contradictory.‖48 The 
most comprehensive discussion of the scene‘s many contradictions has been that of Lee, who 
offers a compelling assessment of their function in the play.
49
 But even his treatment does not 
account fully for the extent and complexity of these contradictions as they unfold. Euripides 
reveals instability on many levels: these goddesses do not act like (traditional conceptions of) 
themselves, the supposed harmony between divine and mortal values is dissolved, and 
familiar dramatic conventions are broken. I shall look at each of these features and identify 
elements that would contradict cultural categories familiar to the audience. I shall then 
conclude by discussing how Euripides uses horrific imagery to challenge the traditional 
conceptions of theodicy and of divine civility. 
Euripides contravenes familiar tragic practice by having Iris and Lyssa appear in the 
middle of the play to disrupt the narrative. While the tragedian is fond of using the deus ex 
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machina device in his work,
50
 he nearly always positions these divine appearances in the 
opening or closing moments of his plays. These scenes typically act as framing devices 
introducing or resolving the narrative conflicts with clear demarcations.
51
 The gods are 
therefore frequently involved in establishing initial conflicts (e.g. Aphrodite in Hippolytus) or 
resolving them (e.g. Apollo in Orestes), but do not typically interfere directly with tragic 
plots while they are in progress.
52
 The sudden appearance of Iris and Lyssa thus presents a 
shocking formal deviation involving a complete reconfiguration of the play‘s narrative.  
In many ways it acts as a second prologue:
53
 the first part of the drama contains no 
mention of these gods nor provides any reason why they (as opposed to Hera or Zeus) should 
be interested in Heracles‘ plight; 54 like the gods in prologues they must introduce 
themselves; their dialogue explains the new terms of the dramatic conflict. At the same time, 
however, their appearance appropriates and distorts the narrative forms that precede it. 
Euripides uses familiar tragic exposition to develop Heracles‘ triumphant defeat over the 
obvious villain Lycus, including the formulation of the scheme (601-606), initial deception of 
the victim (701-725), the victim‘s screams as he dies offstage (750-761), and a celebratory 
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previous action: it has no causal antecedents in the action, and it has no kind of moral justification.‖ 
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song from the chorus (763-814).
55
 Iris and Lyssa interrupt this progression and immediately 
begin a new, unprecedented cycle of violence:  Lyssa outlines her scheme (861-871), the 
audience hears offstage cries from the new victims (886-909), and a messenger provides 
explicit details about this unexpected slaughter (922-1012).  The striking juxtaposition of 
similarly-structured violent episodes illustrates the strange and unsettling disruption of tragic 
form. The audience must confront a new drama in which the signals of the family‘s glorious 
triumph now denote their hideous defeat. 
Euripides generates maximum shock from this divine revelation by using the chorus 
as the focal point for the reversal. In addition to the peculiarity of a divine appearance in the 
middle of the tragedy, the tragedian provides an unusual internal audience for Iris and Lyssa. 
The tragic chorus does not typically serve as the only onstage witness for a deus ex machina.  
Gods who appear in tragic prologues speak directly to the audience with no other human 
characters onstage; those who reveal themselves at the end typically address only the main 
characters, since they are the most invested in the dramatic conflict. The revelation of the 
Heracles falls somewhere between these patterns: since the central characters of the Heracles 
are inside the house when Iris and Lyssa suddenly appear, the juxtaposition between the 
chorus‘ celebration and their reaction to the gods‘ appearance serves as the only onstage cue 
for the reaction of the play‘s audience.  
Iris and Lyssa do not comment on the immediate dramatic action (i.e. the defeat of 
Lycus), but their dialogue serves as a counterpoint to the tone and theme of the choral song 
they have interrupted. The preceding choral ode celebrates Heracles‘ victory and proclaims 
the gods‘ active role in rewarding just men and punishing the unjust. Their song culminates 
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with an assertion of theodicy (εἰ τὸ δίκαιον / θεοῖς ἔτ’ ἀρέσκει, 813-814).56 In the lines 
immediately following, they express extreme confusion and fear at the sudden spectacle: ἔα 
ἔα· /ἆρ’ ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν πίτυλον ἥκομεν φόβου  (815-816). While the chorus‘ repetition of ἔα 
conveys their utter surprise,
57
 the announcement of their descent into ―the very pulse of fear‖ 
likely cues a frantic physical reaction, such as spastic convulsions or falling violently.
58
 The 
audience sees the chorus‘ drastic transformation – from complete confidence to utter fear, 
from stable postures to uncontrollable spasms – within a few lines. Moreover, Iris confirms 
the gods‘ interest in pursuing justice (δόντος δίκην, 842), but this execution of divine justice 
contradicts completely the chorus‘ conception of it: Iris puts Heracles in the same category in 
which the chorus has placed the vile Lycus (διδούς … δίκην, 756). I shall discuss the 
significance of this contrast between divine and mortal justice more fully below, but it is 
clear that the chorus‘s reaction highlights the extremities of this reversal. The audience thus 
sees and hears how quickly the gods can destroy humans‘ beliefs and devastate their 
confidence.  
Euripides renders this reversal even more surprising by manipulating appearance and 
reality in this scene. The tragedian defies the audience‘s preconceptions of the two goddesses 
by presenting a bloodthirsty Iris and a reluctant Lyssa. The chorus‘ initial reaction to the 
goddesses suggests that their sudden emergence was conspicuous, likely accompanied by a 
startling musical disruption and a visual shock from the characters‘ frightening clothing. 
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Neither goddess can be found in any other extant tragedy, and it is therefore difficult to 
determine how each appeared.
59
 It is likely, however, that Lyssa‘s costume was the more 
terrifying of the pair. Representations of Iris in ancient art and literature are not uncommon 
and consistently depict the goddess as a winged messenger without aggressive tendencies.
60
 
It is unlikely that her costuming in the Heracles significantly deviated from these traditional 
depictions, especially since Iris is the first goddess to speak and provides only a modest 
introduction for herself as ―the servant of the gods‖ (τὴν θε῵ν λάτριν, 823).  
Lyssa was not as popular in literary or artistic representations, but in her few 
appearances outside of the Heracles she is frightening and repulsive. Vase-paintings depict 
her wielding snakes and bearing wings and a dog‘s head attached to her own.61 Iris‘ opening 
statement to the chorus seems to confirm that Lyssa‘s appearance in the Heracles was 
similarly horrific. She assumes a reassuring role in telling the chorus not to feel fear looking 
upon Lyssa, whom she calls ―child of Night‖ (Νυκτὸς τήνδ’ ὁρ῵ντες ἔκγονον, 822). By 
repeating and elaborating this ominous description (Νυκτὸς κελαινῆς ἀνυμέναιε παρθένε, 834) 
Iris presents Lyssa as a pitiless monster (ἄτεγκτον συλλαβοῦσα καρδίαν, 833), allied with dark 
forces rather than with the Olympian gods. The chorus echoes these sentiments in calling 
Lyssa a ―Gorgon of Night‖ who possesses a monstrous head full of snakes and a gaze that 
can turn men to stone (Νυκτὸς Γοργὼν ἑκατογκεφάλοις ὄφεων ἰαχήμασι Λύσσα μαρμαρωπός, 
883). This description of a Gorgon-like monster suggests that Lyssa may be costumed like 
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 Riley (2008) 31 n. 64 provides a brief overview of dramatic precedents. Iris appears in Aristophanes‘ Birds 
1199-1268, where her wings and flying ability become an appropriate source for mockery. Cf. Lee (1982) 46 n. 
9 on Iris‘ costuming. Lyssa appeared in Aeschylus‘ Xantriae and perhaps in the Toxotides of the same author. 
Duchemin (1967) provides a fuller examination of mythological and dramatic precedents for Lyssa in the 
Heracles. 
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 Cf. Gantz (1993) 17-18 for a brief account of her role in epic poetry and vase paintings. 
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 Padel (1992) 163. Cf. also Trendall and Webster (1971) 62, III.1.28, and III.1.15. 
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the terrifying Erinyes in Aeschylus‘ Eumenides.62 Euripides seems to have presented the 
chorus and audience with familiar depictions of a neutral messenger goddess and a 
destructive figure of horror.    
But Euripides distorts and perverts these familiar images by endowing the goddesses 
with behavior that contradicts their respective costuming and reputations. As the goddesses 
begin to express their own feelings it becomes clear that Iris, not Lyssa, craves destruction 
and that Lyssa, in turn, attempts to mediate the conflict between divine and mortal. Lee 
claims that Iris‘ anger ―is only part of her characterization as λάτριϛ τ῵ν θε῵ν,‖63 but her 
dialogue suggests otherwise: though she honors Hera, her wish for the doom of Heracles is 
startlingly personal. She inserts a reference to herself whenever mentioning Hera: Hera 
―wishes‖ for Heracles to slay his family, Iris ―co-wishes‖ it (Ἥρα ... θέλει / ... συνθέλω δ’ 
ἐγώ, 831-832); Heracles will discover the χόλος of both goddesses (840-841); Hera‘s plots 
also belong to Iris (τά θ’ Ἥρας κἀμὰ μηχανήματα, 855). Iris‘ first reference to Hera is 
perhaps most telling: 
πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ἄθλους ἐκτελευτῆσαι πικρούς, 
   τὸ χρή νιν ἐξέσῳζεν οὐδ’ εἴα πατὴρ  
Ζεύς νιν κακ῵ς δρᾶν οὔτ’ ἔμ’ οὔθ’ Ἥραν ποτέ· 
 
For until (Heracles) completed his bitter labors Necessity protected him, and 
  his father Zeus would not allow either me or Hera to harm him. (827-829)   
 
Iris presents herself here not as an obedient servant but rather as an irritated victim of Zeus‘ 
command who, like Hera, has a personal desire to harm Heracles. Moreover, she emphasizes 
that she wants Heracles‘ destruction for herself, and not just for her mistress Hera, by her  
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 Duchemin (1967) 132. 
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 Lee (1982) 52. 
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privileged place in the word order.
64
 Her wrath here is surprising, as the goddess typically 
delivers messages between gods and mortals without personal intrusions. In the Iliad she is 
often sympathetic to humans; she answers Achilles‘ prayer to the winds on her own accord 
(23.192-211) and consoles the anxious Priam by speaking gently (τυτθὸν φθεγξαμένη, 
24.170).
65
  It is unclear then why Iris should share Hera‘s cruel determination to see Heracles 
suffer since she, unlike Hera, has no obvious reason for despising the hero. Scholars have 
tried to mitigate this difficulty by claiming that she serves as a dramatic substitute for Hera.
 66
 
But these attempts to dismiss Iris‘ disturbing cruelty are unwarranted, especially since we can 
see similar contradictions in the depiction of Lyssa.
67
  
 While the Heracles presents Iris as uncharacteristically brutal, it also depicts Lyssa as 
an unexpected source of calm rationality. In her first speech Lyssa acknowledges that her 
lineage derives from Night, but she immediately qualifies this origin by mentioning her 
―noble‖ father Ouranos (ἐξ εὐγενοῦς μὲν πατρὸς ἔκ τε μητέρος / πέφυκα, Νυκτὸς Οὐρανοῦ, 843-
844). She further complicates her affiliation with Night by calling upon the Sun as witness 
before driving Heracles mad (858). Lyssa thus paradoxically aligns herself with both light 
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 Pace Bond (1981) ad 832 who sees Iris‘ repeated self-references as a sign of ―total obedience to her 
mistress‘s wishes.‖ 
 
65
 Her opening lines in the Heracles may allude to her speech to Priam in Il. 24.171-187.  In both passages the 
goddess first commands the addressee(s) to take heart (θαρσεῖτε; θάρσει), then identifies her role as servant of the 
gods (λάτριϛ τ῵ν θε῵ν; Διὸς ἄγγελος), reassures that she means no harm to the addressee(s), and finally explains 
her purpose. In the Iliad, however, Iris explains that Zeus cares and pities for the mortal Priam, whereas in 
Heracles there is no sign of divine pity for humans. As Konstan (2001) 107-110 notes, the gods found in Greek 
tragedy are often pitiless, but it is nonetheless odd that the usually disinterested Iris should harbor such rage 
here.  
 
66 Wilamowitz -Moellendorff (1895) ii.122 argues that Euripides depicts Iris as a surrogate for Hera in order to 
avoid controversy that would be caused by blaspheming openly the ―Kultus die Himmelskönigin.‖ Lee (1982) 
46-47 contends that Hera‘s presence would negate the dramatic tension in the argument between two gods of 
equal standing. Neither claim is supported by the text. 
 
67
 Wilamowitz -Moellendorf (1895) ii.124 acknowledges that Lyssa is essentially ―eine Contradictio in adjecto 
und eine Blasphemie so gut wie die Frivolität Heras und die Verworfenheit der Iris.‖ 
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and dark forces, defying the simple categorizations that Iris and the chorus provide for her 
(833-834, 883).
68
 Similarly confusing is Lyssa‘s defense of Heracles, in which she claims 
that the hero is her φίλος and that by ridding the world of monsters and impious men he has 
honored all the gods (846, 851-853).  Lyssa does not specify what honors Heracles has 
established, nor does she identify the impious men whom he has slain;
 69
 as I have argued 
above, the chorus describe Heracles‘ labors as primarily beneficial to mankind rather than to 
the gods.  
Lyssa‘s motivations, like those of Iris, are obscure, and her call for mercy is 
surprising given that she is the goddess of madness. Iris commands her to unleash μανίας and 
violent mayhem (835-837), but Lyssa would rather provide sensible advice: she counters the 
joint wishes of Hera and Iris (θέλει, συνθέλω) for Heracles to spill blood (831-832) with her 
own wish to persuade them against such violence (παραινέσαι ... θέλω, 847-848). It is again 
paradoxical and contradictory for the goddess of madness to promote its opposite, σωφροσύνη, 
but this is precisely what Iris accuses her of doing (οὐχὶ σωφρονεῖν γ’ ἔπεμψε δεῦρό σ’ ἡ Διὸς 
δάμαρ, 857).70 Lyssa eventually proves that she is quite capable of generating μανία, as she 
reveals in her final monologue her plan to unleash cataclysmic havoc that trumps any natural 
disaster (861-863) and to promote her namesake (ἐμὰς λύσσας, 866) rather than rationality (οὐ 
σωφρονίζει, 869). But though she fulfills the role Iris and Hera demand, Lyssa emerges as a 
contradictory character that represents both rationality and madness, salvation and doom.
71
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 Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1895) iii.ad 858, Bond (1981) ad 858, and Barlow (1996) 8. 
 
69
 I agree with Bond (1981) ad 853 that the impious men cannot refer to the Giants, and so must refer to the 
savage villains Heracles killed during the twelve labors, who were ―more notorious for the harm they did to 
men.‖  
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 For μανία and σωφροσύνη as opposites, cf. Xen. Mem. 1.1.16, Plat. Phdr. 240e8-245c4 and Prot. 323b3-323b5. 
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 Lee (1982) 47-48. 
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 The most unsettling contradiction of all, however, is the ambiguous explanation for 
Heracles‘ punishment. Though Lyssa speaks in defense of Heracles‘ nobility and his service 
to the gods, Iris ignores these arguments and ridicules the notion of Λύσσα σωφρονοῦσα (846-
857). The audience is left then with Iris‘ initial explanation for punishing Heracles: 
ἢ θεοὶ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ, 
    τὰ θνητὰ δ’ ἔσται μεγάλα, μὴ δόντος δίκην. 
  Or else the gods will be of no account, and mortal affairs will be great, unless  
he pays the penalty. (841-842) 
 
This brief comment provides the only clue why Hera and Iris have such animosity towards 
the play‘s protagonist. Hera‘s personal vendetta and jealousy at her husband‘s bastard son are 
not mentioned here;
72
 instead, we have a more general, albeit vague, expression of divine 
νέμεσις at the success of a mortal who has transgressed the will of the gods. The need for 
retributive punishment (δόντος δίκην) is peculiar because Heracles has not, as far as human 
characters and audience know, committed any offense against the gods that would warrant 
penalty. Griffiths notes the phrase δίκην δοῦναι has specific dramatic relevance: ―In every case 
when Euripides uses the term the reference is to paying a penalty for an action which has 
occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, within the scope of the drama.‖73  
Many scholars have thus sought signs of ἁμαρτία or ὕβρις in Heracles in the events 
prior to this revelation.
74
 Wilamowitz, for example, contends that Heracles is being punished 
for his previous accomplishments, which in their violence display the outdated ideals of 
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 This is the traditional source of her anger in most versions of the myth. Yunis (1988)151 n. 21 sees no reason 
to seek further explanation: ―Hera‘s anger needs no accounting for: it is a datum of the myth retained by the 
poet.‖ Bond (1981) xxiv-xxvi similarly champions the ―mythological apparatus‖ of Hera‘s jealousy as the 
operative force. But this cause is surprisingly absent in this play: only Heracles cites this as the specific cause 
(1309), though other characters, who consistently blame Hera for the attack, may have this reason for her anger 
in mind (1127, 1189, 1311-1312).  
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 Griffiths (2002) 644-645. 
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 Cf. Yunis (1988) 151 n. 21 for comprehensive list of such interpretations. 
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Doric heroism.
75
 Burnett and Griffiths similarly maintain that the divine anger stems from 
Heracles‘ labors, but they contend that his crime is found not in violence but in his defiance 
of human mortality by returning from Hades with Cerberus.
76
 Although the chorus‘ 
description of the labors contains many unsettling assumptions about the gods, neither 
explanation can fully account for the gods‘ anger here. Wilamowitz‘s moralistic approach 
does not fit with the tone of the first part of the play: Euripides presents Heracles as a 
virtuous figure who renounces his labors before the madness occurs.
77
 Griffiths and Burnett 
are correct in noting the problematic elements in Heracles‘ return from the underworld,78 but 
Iris‘ account of the labors does not suggest that they were the immediate cause: while she has 
disdain for these feats (ἄθλους… πικρούς), she considers them obstacles (πρὶν…ἐκτελευτῆσαι) 
against Hera‘s and her long-standing desire to harm the hero (827-828).79  
   I contend that Euripides deliberately presented the gods‘ explanation for Heracles‘ 
punishment as ambiguous in order to emphasize their failure to conform to human standards 
of justice. The appearance of the goddesses after Lycus‘ murder contradicts the chorus‘ 
stated belief in theodicy (739, 772-780, 813-814); the divine explanation for Heracles‘ 
punishment is juxtaposed with the mortal account of Lycus‘ punishment (διδούς … δίκην, 756). 
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 Burnett (1971) 177-179, Griffiths (2002) passim. The two interpretations differ concerning the precise role of 
the labors: Burnett interprets them as a threat to the gods, while Griffiths considers the Cerberus labor as ― an 
excuse, a supposed crime of Herakles that (Hera) could respond to, and thus unleash her wrath under the guise 
of  δίκη‖ (645). 
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 Cf. Kroeker (1938) 114-124 for a more thorough rebuttal of Wilamowitz.  
 
78
 Burnett‘s (1971) 179 comparison to Asclepius is interesting, though she goes too far in treating Heracles‘ 
labor as a totally impious act. 
 
79
 Other scholars have designated the hero‘s ambiguous nature as the source of divine rage. Silk (1985) 17 
offers the following explanation: ―the cosmic order will be upset, Heracles is a threat to it, not because he is a 
man, nor indeed because he is a god, but because he is anomalous and neither.‖ While this interpretation reflects 
the tension between mortal and divine in Iris‘ remark, there is no evidence in the text that this is her justification 
for Heracles‘ punishment. 
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The latter example fits traditional standards of Greek justice; as Amphitryon observes, one 
who acts wrongly should expect to suffer wrong in return (προσδόκα δὲ δρ῵ν κακ῵ς / κακόν τι 
πράξειν, 727-728). Iris‘ conception of just retribution (δίκην δοῦναι) is not only unjust (Heracles 
has committed no crime) but also without aspects of retribution: it is precisely because the 
phrase normally signifies a retributive reaction to a specific act that Iris‘ atypical usage is so 
striking and yet so fitting. The goddesses appropriate and pervert terms typically found in 
human celebration to describe the destruction of Heracles‘ family (καλλίπαιδα στέφανον 
αὐθέντῃ φόνῳ, 839; χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβῳ, 871). They use δίκη, a term humans use to 
denote proper compensation for a (typically unrighteous) deed, to refer to an act of cruelty 
lacking specific cause.
80
 Iris‘ elusive justification suggests that divine and human worlds are 
incompatible since the gods do not follow mortal conceptions of justice.
81
 This shocking 
proposition not only contradicts the chorus‘ assertion of theodicy that precedes the Iris-Lyssa 
scene but also taints their earlier celebration of the hero‘s labors: how can humans find joy in 
the defeat of monsters and savages if the gods themselves are savage? Even Zeus, the god 
who should have the most interest in preserving Heracles, does not intercede; though Iris 
notes that he initially prevented attack against his son (οὐδ’ εἴα πατὴρ / Ζεύς), his pairing with 
τὸ χρή in this sentence aligns him with impersonal and irrational force.82 The striking silence 
from the god whom Amphitryon and the chorus have championed as a god of justice 
suggests that callous savagery pervades the divine realm.  
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 Lee (1982) 49-50. He limits his claim of divine savagery, however, to Hera alone; Iris‘ unwarranted wrath 
against Heracles and her broad reference to the gods in explaining his punishment suggest that more than one 
goddess is to blame. 
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 Chalk (1962) 15. 
 
82
 Bond (1981) ad 828 f.  Homer presents a far more intimate description of Zeus in Il. 16.431-461; there the 
god is not a solemn partner to fate but one who reluctantly and tearfully submits to it after his wife admonishes 
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 The bizarre and confusing role of Athena in Heracles‘ madness further illustrates the 
unpredictable and irrational nature of the gods in this play. If Iris is a representative of 
Hera,
83
 then Athena can reasonably be called a representative of Zeus.
84
 Not only is the 
goddess his daughter, her affiliation with civilization and reason fits with roles of Zeus to 
which the human characters have made appeals. Furthermore, her direct interference ends the 
hero‘s rampage and thus might seem to confirm her interest in restoring due order. Burnett 
claims her interference adds a note of optimism to the massacre: ―Evidently more than one 
deity has the ear of Zeus, for Athena expresses in action the same quality of mercy that 
Lyssa‘s words had betrayed.‖85  
But the goddess of wisdom, whatever her intentions, generates primarily confusion in 
the human characters and the audience. Athena‘s offstage appearance, like the onstage 
appearance of Iris and Lyssa, shocks and upsets the human characters who witness it, as is 
evident when they react to the earthquake that shakes the house following Heracles‘ 
slaughter (θύελλα σείει δ῵μα, συμπίπτει στέγη, 905). While the audience and chorus have 
heard Lyssa‘s plans to shatter the household (καταρρήξω μέλαθρα, 864) and unleash the 
―Dooms of Hell‖ (Κῆρας ἀνακαλ῵ τὰς Σαρτάρου, 870), Amphitryon assumes that it is Athena, 
not Lyssa, who is causing the ―hellish disturbance‖ to the house (τάραγμα ταρτάρειον, 907). 
The messenger similarly seems to associate the earthquake with Athena. He mentions the 
broken column as the result of the fallen roof (πεσήμασι στέγης, 1007), and his brevity 
suggests that he associates this damage with his preceding description of Athena‘s violent 
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 Her frequent presence on the Heraclean metopes in the Temple of Zeus seems to corroborate that her alliance 
with Heracles was in service to their mutual father. Cf. Cohen (1994) 711: ―At Olympia the hero's only helpers 
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hurling of a rock at Heracles (1002-1004).
86
 The audience, despite having privileged 
knowledge concerning Lyssa, has not been prepared for Athena and thus can only understand 
her actions within the context of these confused reports. Athena does not speak, and so no 
one can know why she arrives so late, why she saves only Amphitryon, and how she relates 
to the chaotic maelstrom that destroys the house after Heracles‘ slaughter. She is not a 
correction to the brutal and irrational divine realm: she is another inexplicable part of it.  
 The contradictory and unintelligible nature of the divine is a significant source of 
horror for this episode and for the play as a whole. The audience was familiar with the 
conception of Zeus as an enforcer of justice; Homer, Hesiod, and Solon, among others, had 
portrayed the god as having a particular interest in rewarding the good and punishing the 
wicked.
87
 While these accounts of theodicy were not without complications,
88
 the withdrawn 
and unsympathetic Zeus of the Heracles provides a radical departure from these traditional 
accounts.
89
 Moreover, the gods of the play are not only unjust but fail to conform to human 
belief in reasonable reciprocity. Yunis notes that one of the fundamental Greek religious 
beliefs was the notion that gods in some way reciprocated human offerings; even if the 
Greeks acknowledged that the gods may lack virtue, they nonetheless felt that the gods were 
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 E.g. Od. 1.31-43, WD 213-285, Solon fr. 13.  
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influenced by ritual activity, prayer, and sacrifice.
90
 The conspicuous lack of divine 
reciprocity in the Heracles was thus unsettling: Iris‘ reference to reciprocal punishment not 
only defies the standards of human justice but also any rational conception of reciprocity, as 
no specific cause for this punishment is evident.
91
 Finally, the gods in the play fail to 
conform to the categories humans have assigned for them. Greek divinities possessed 
particular roles and provinces (e.g. Hermes was the god of travelers, Demeter the goddess of 
the harvest). The gods in the Heracles are categorical contradictions: the usually diplomatic 
Iris acts with unprovoked hostility; the goddess of madness Lyssa demonstrates σωφροσύνη; 
the goddess of wisdom and traditional benefactor of Heracles, Athena, assaults the hero and 
causes even more confusion. While Euripides was not the first poet to note the inscrutable 
nature of divine will,
92
 his stark depiction of pitiless gods who defy traditional mortal 
distinctions fully exploits the horrific potential of this inscrutability.     
A.3) Permanent Stains 
The play‘s final section portrays the difficulties faced by Heracles and others in 
coping with the cosmic horrors discussed above. The ending, in which Heracles chooses to 
follow Theseus to Athens rather than to commit suicide, has been seen largely as an 
endorsement of human virtue within a chaotic world.
93
 In this section I will argue against 
such readings by demonstrating the play‘s continued focus on mortal confusion and 
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contradictory beliefs. Heracles‘ recovery from madness involves two related processes: first, 
he tries to understand what has occurred and why he was punished; second, he decides 
whether he should refuse to live in such a terrible world or continue facing it despite his 
experience. I will address each feature separately and show that the hero‘s recovery is 
frustrated by mortal confusion and unreliable assumptions, respectively. While the audience 
can sympathize with Theseus‘ rational explanations and well-intentioned consolations, 
Euripides highlights the inadequacy of such reactions amidst such bloodshed. The play‘s 
ending thus maintains the bleak theological outlook of the Iris-Lyssa episode and confirms 
the drama‘s horrors as disaffirmative:94 mortal distinctions cannot recover from divine 
violence.     
Heracles‘ family and friends try to offer the confused hero a consistent account of his 
suffering. Though all acknowledge his role in slaughtering his family, they also unanimously 
attribute the hero‘s madness to divine origin. The recurrence of Hera‘s name in their accounts 
suggests that they are confident about the cause of the divine rage. Theseus concludes their 
consensus succinctly: Ἥρας ὅδ’ ἁγών (1189). Amphitryon shares this assessment with an 
additional charge against Zeus for his passive acceptance of her rage (ὦ Ζεῦ, παρ’ Ἥρας ἆρ’ 
ὁρᾷς θρόνων τάδε; 1127). Heracles asserts Hera‘s jealousy over her husband‘s infidelity as the 
cause of the punishment (1303-1310). The chorus concurs with this assessment and echoes 
Theseus in saying that ―this trial was the work of none of the gods other than the wife of 
Zeus‖ (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλου δαιμόνων ἀγὼν ὅδε / ἢ τῆς Διὸς δάμαρτος, 1311-1312). When faced with 
overwhelming sorrow these characters seem to embrace the mythological framework familiar 
to the play‘s audience.    
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 Their reliance on the traditional account is complicated, however, by signs of doubt 
and confusion. Though Amphitryon calls on Zeus and Hera to witness his son‘s plight 
(1127), immediately afterward he warns Heracles not to fixate upon the divine source of his 
punishment (τὴν θεὸν ἐάσας, 1129). Similarly, when Heracles asks his father about the 
damage to the house, Amphitryon, who witnessed the destruction and attributed it earlier to 
Athena (906-908), responds: ―I do not know anything except the following: your affairs are 
entirely ill-fated‖ (οὐκ οἶδα πλὴν ἕν· πάντα δυστυχεῖ τὰ σά, 1143). Bond argues that the 
audience is ―adequately informed‖ and thus would not share Amphitryon‘s confusion.95 But, 
as I argued above, the audience was not prepared for Athena‘s appearance and can rely only 
on ambiguous accounts from confused witnesses. Amphitryon notably invokes Zeus and 
Hera only once each; after advising his son against blaming ―the goddess‖ he hesitates to 
name specific deities (θε῵ν ὃς αἴτιος, 1135), and Theseus only infers Hera‘s agency from 
Amphitryon‘s generic reference (πρὸς θε῵ν, 1180).  
While Amphitryon‘s doubts highlight the tenuousness of the mythological 
explanation, the chorus‘ confidence in this explanation similarly exposes their confusion. 
Theseus‘ assessment of the hero‘s ἀγών (1189) similarly suggests the inadequacy of 
assigning all blame to Hera. Theseus, unlike Amphitryon and the chorus, was not present for 
the massacre and so makes his evaluation of the divine cause after hearing only a brief 
summary of Heracles‘ madness (1180-1187). His inference concerning Hera‘s responsibility 
is reasonable given his background knowledge, and the Athenian‘s concise three-word 
judgment does not belabor the point. The chorus, however, are the best witnesses of the gods‘ 
role in the affair, as they are the only characters who have heard Iris proclaim her personal 
desire to destroy Heracles and who have seen the monstrous Lyssa enter the house. It is 
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surprising and unsettling, then, that they not only echo Theseus‘ claim but also elaborate it 
with restrictions (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλου δαιμόνων, 1311).96 The audience, like the chorus, has seen 
multiple deities at work and has heard Iris explain that the hero‘s punishment depended not 
on the jealousy of one goddess but on general divine resentment against mortals. The chorus 
may be simplifying a complicated affair into a coherent narrative (i.e., Hera sent Iris and 
Lyssa and is thus ultimately responsible), but if it is a simplification it differs significantly 
from the manifest incoherence of divine cruelty that Euripides has presented to the audience. 
At any rate the chorus seems unable or unwilling to acknowledge the complex and disturbing 
implications of what they have witnessed. Their reiteration of Theseus‘ assessment is a 
testament to the continued presence of mortal confusion concerning the inscrutable gods. 
The clearest example of human confusion, however, can be found in Heracles‘ 
remarks on the nature of the gods. Theseus consoles the hero by comparing his sorrows to 
those of the gods who, according to the poets, suffer as a result of their transgressions, 
including adultery and binding each other (1314-1321). Heracles responds: 
ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε λέκτρ’ ἃ μὴ θέμις 
στέργειν νομίζω δεσμά τ’ ἐξάπτειν χεροῖν 
οὔτ’ ἠξίωσα πώποτ’ οὔτε πείσομαι 
οὐδ’ ἄλλον ἄλλου δεσπότην πεφυκέναι. 
δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ’ ὀρθ῵ς θεός,  
οὐδενός· ἀοιδ῵ν οἵδε δύστηνοι λόγοι.  
 
  But neither do I believe the gods have unlawful affairs and attach chains 
  to the arms (of other gods), nor have I ever judged it right nor will I believe 
 that one god has been lord over another. For the god, if in fact he truly is a  
god, lacks nothing. These are the wretched stories of poets. (1341-1346) 
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 Pace Foley (1985) 187 n. 67, who attributes these lines to Theseus to support her position concerning choral 
silence following Heracles‘ awakening. I follow Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1895) and Bond (1981) ad loc. in 
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The meaning of these lines and their function in this part of the play have been the subject of 
intense critical debate.
97
 How can Heracles claim both that Hera‘s sexual jealousy motivated 
her attack (1308-1310) and that no god commits adultery? The contradiction is obvious, and 
several scholars have claimed that Euripides is here inserting his own rational viewpoint 
outside of the ―dramatic scaffolding.‖98 Bond similarly advises against taking these lines as 
the hero‘s own ―considered view‖ since the hero is not ―an academic philosopher who has 
thought out the implications of everything that he says.‖99 Although Heracles is no 
philosopher himself, his remarks here bear a striking similarity to those of Xenophanes;
100
 
even if many members of the original audience did not recognize the reference, they would 
likely detect a philosophical strain in the claim concerning divine self-sufficiency, which was 
a popular motif in contemporary sophistic thought.
101
 We should not discount the hero‘s 
words, however, as extra-dramatic commentary that does not bear relevance to the plot.
102
 As 
Yunis rightly observes, readers ―must not shy away when philosophy surfaces in Euripidean 
drama; it is integrated into the drama, and is not a sideshow or display.‖103 Heracles has 
shown throughout the play that he is just as interested in making speculations about the 
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nature of the gods and their motivations as Amphitryon and the chorus are (e.g. 1243, 1262-
1265, 1362-1363).  
Yunis presses the point too far, however, in claiming a resolution for the 
contradiction in the hero‘s ―new creed‖ based on the standards of morally sound 
reciprocation. He contends that although Heracles must endure his extreme punishment, the 
hero can deny that an immoral god such as Hera is truly a god (ὀρθ῵ς θεός).104 The hero‘s 
final mention of Hera (πάντες ἐξολώλαμεν / Ἥρας μιᾷ πληγέντες ἄθλιοι τύχῃ, 1392-93) is, 
according to Yunis, a sign of victory against her: ―Hera‘s behavior is…no more rational, no 
less prone to moral obscenity, hence no more dignified, than τύχη. Having denied to Hera the 
status of god in his distinctive sense, he refuses to observe the validity of the stigma which 
she has imposed.‖ 105  
While I agree that Heracles‘ association of Hera with impersonal and irrational τύχη 
is fitting, there is little evidence that Heracles has considerably changed his worldview or that 
his previous statement on divine immorality constitutes an adequate philosophical response 
to the horrors in the play.  On the contrary, Heracles‘ comments in 1340-1346 reveal his 
failure to reconcile his previous assumptions about the gods with the grim reality of their 
brutality. The philosophical tone of the speech only highlights the inadequacy of such 
rational approaches: Heracles claims that he does not derive any benefit from Theseus‘ 
―pointless‖ (πάρεργα) mythical exempla about immoral gods (1340), but his rejection of 
divine immorality and weakness neither clarifies how such an ὀρθ῵ς θεός might exist nor 
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indicates how such an idealized deity might improve his situation.
106
 Iris has clearly stated 
that the gods care little for mortal conceptions of justice (841-842, 857), and it is unlikely 
that mere change in nomenclature based on moral evaluation might harm the gods. Heracles‘ 
denial is merely a slightly revised version of the false assumption of theodicy held by 
Amphitryon and the chorus; the hero‘s version is phrased as rational philosophy, while his 
father and the chorus express conventional piety. In both cases, however, human inability to 
comprehend  cosmic forces is apparent: the hero denies the divine cruelty that the audience 
has witnessed directly; the chorus proclaims that the gods reward just behavior before the 
gods fundamentally distort the term δίκη.      
Human fallibility is also evident in the second process of Heracles‘ recovery, namely 
his decision to continue living rather than to commit suicide. While the hero‘s choice 
involves several considerations (e.g. his friendship with Theseus, his glorious reputation), the 
most relevant issue for this discussion is his preoccupation with pollution following the 
slaughter. Greek conceptions of pollution involved not only social alienation for the defiled 
but also supernatural dangers; victims of murder could send up avenging spirits to punish the 
one stained with their blood as well as anyone who contacted or associated with the killer.
107
 
In the Heracles, however, Theseus dismisses the risk of contamination and confidently 
embraces the killer before he has been purified.  Scholars have praised the Athenian for his  
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 Yunis (1988) 163-164 admits the lack of clarity in Heracles‘ conception. 
 
107
 The fears of supernatural punishment against the polluted are most evident in Antiphon‘s Tetralogies and 
Aeschylus‘ Eumenides.  Parker (1983) 108 concedes that these texts perhaps exaggerate the threat posed by 
such supernatural avengers, but he counters that such exaggerations would not have appealed to their audience 
unless they reflected ―the fundamental structure of popular belief.‖  
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lack of superstition and his rational virtue in embracing a friend in need.
108
  Foley, for  
example, contends that the Athenian‘s offer to bring the hero to Athens resolves the 
contradictory violence that pervades the previous action: ―The play finally recreates heroism 
through catastrophe, praise through blame, and disrupts ultimately to restore the reciprocity 
of past and present.‖109 I contend that the play‘s ending does not balance or resolve the 
tensions involving purification and guilt but rather continues to illustrate the uncertainty of 
human belief.  The play demonstrates no strong preference for the traditional conceptions of 
pollution espoused by Heracles or the intellectual revisions offered by Theseus; rather, it 
highlights how both fail to resolve the contradictions found in the hero‘s horrific slaughter. 
The Athenian‘s offer does not, as many scholars have claimed, completely absolve his friend 
of guilt or reintegrate him into human society.
110
 The play ends with Heracles still 
contaminated with blood, and there is little hope that he will overcome the contradictions 
underscoring his vulnerability and isolation.    
 While Greek attitudes toward pollution were complex and diverse, Parker observes 
several consistent features of defilement related to blood-guilt that relate to the Heracles: 
pollution follows an act of unjustified killing; the polluted agent need not have killed 
deliberately, but he must be causally responsible for the victim‘s death; polluted individuals 
could be targeted by supernatural forces, including vengeful spirits associated with victims, 
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 Foley (1985) 193. Papadopoulou (2005) 55 disputes Foley‘s contention that the play‘s ending resolves the 
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 I should clarify here that my argument does not depend on a condemnation of Theseus. His beneficent 
intentions are admirable. But as I have argued throughout this dissertation, horror does not require moral 
evaluation. The central question is whether Theseus‘ good-natured attempts can adequately address the horrific 
disruptions found in the play; I contend that they cannot.  
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and these supernatural threats could extend to the killer‘s community; thus the public 
response to those polluted frequently involved some sort of shunning, including prohibition 
from sacred areas or exile from the community; acts of violence against family members 
were most subject to concerns of pollution since, as Parker contends, religious customs are 
most potent in cases where legal recourses are limited.
 111
  
Pollution appears to operate on two levels for the Greeks. The first level is its 
practical function as a marker of disorder. Douglas argues that taboos relating to pollution 
primarily serve as reinforcements of cultural codes and categories.
112
 Parker similarly defines 
pollution by its functional role in Greek society as a ―vehicle through which social disruption 
is expressed.‖113 Those who kill unjustly, and particularly those who kill family members, 
disrupt the social order and invite chaos into the community; by shunning those who defy 
social structures other citizens can restore social order.  
The second level involves the underlying beliefs associated with pollution and 
purification. This aspect is for obvious reasons more difficult to examine, but nonetheless 
scholars frequently have dismissed the possibility that fifth-century Athenians felt genuine 
fear towards pollution per se. Adkins suggests that the dread of supernatural punishment was 
not particularly potent during the age of Euripides.
114
 Parker adds that pollution, absent all 
other considerations, lacked ―coercive force‖ for Athenians; prosecutors targeting others on 
the basis of pollution alone in order to please the gods, such as the eponymous prosecutor in 
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Plato‘s Euthyphro, were considered fanatical.115 He nevertheless concedes that because of the 
―intense emotions‖ associated with pollution we cannot rule out the possibility that Athenians 
may have felt ―imaginative terror‖ at the prospect of supernatural punishment such as the 
plague in Oedipus Tyrannus.
116
 The frequent appearance of such divine retribution in Greek 
literary sources, particularly tragedy, confirms that Athenians continued to be unsettled by 
this feature of pollution even though there is little indication, outside of Antiphon, that it 
influenced their behavior outside of the theater.
117
 Moreover, as Carroll notes, an audience‘s 
emotional reaction to a fictional representation does not depend on a commitment to its 
(potential) veracity: viewers do not need to believe that Dracula is real in order to be 
frightened because the mere thought of the character can invoke feelings of horror.
118
 
Euripides‘ incorporation of traditional taboos regarding pollution serves a similar function: it 
evokes the audience‘s potential fear of supernatural punishment as well as marking Heracles 
as a monstrous outsider.  
Euripides establishes Heracles‘ pollution immediately after the messenger‘s report of 
the massacre. The staging of the hero‘s return demonstrates the frightening and repulsive 
qualities of defilement: the hero is rolled onstage via the ekkyklema, still sleeping and bound 
to the broken column mentioned by the messenger (1010-1012); he is surrounded by the 
corpses of his family, and the other characters stand far off from him (1047). The tableau 
confirms the messenger‘s report and provides a visual illustration of Heracles‘ situation: he is 
a dangerous killer who is still polluted by the blood of his victims and, like other defiled 
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murderers, shunned as a result. Initially the other characters seem motivated by simple fear of 
violence: Amphitryon worries that, if awakened, the hero will destroy the city as well as what 
remains of the household (1055-1056). But as he tries in vain to silence the frantic chorus, he 
introduces pollution as another significant consideration: 
  … ἀλλ’ εἴ με κανεῖ πατέρ’ ὄντα, 
    πρὸς δὲ κακοῖς κακὰ μήσεται πρὸς Ἐρινύσι θ’ αἷμα 
    σύγγονον ἕξει. 
     
  … but if he slays me, his father, then he will plot evils on top of evils  
  and will add [more] familial blood to the Erinyes [he has already incurred].
 119
  
(1075-1076)   
 
Amphitryon‘s mention of the Erinyes reminds the audience that Heracles must still account 
for the pollution he incurred as a result of killing his family. The Erinyes are, of course, 
relentless when pursuing those who have spilled familial blood, as seen in the Oresteia.
120
  
The father‘s fear, however, is complicated by the grim situation. Heracles can incur 
additional pollution from killing Amphitryon; once the madness subsides, he is still polluted 
and remains a danger to himself and to those around him until he is purified.
121
 Heracles 
himself realizes this soon after he regains full consciousness, and his anxiety concerning 
pollution dominates his interaction with Theseus. He hides himself so that his ―child-killing 
infection‖ (τεκνοκτόνον μύσος) cannot be seen by Theseus (1155-1156); he refuses to speak in 
fear of polluting his friend, as Theseus‘ question suggests (ὡς μὴ μύσος με σ῵ν βάλῃ 
προσφθεγμάτων; 1219); Heracles shrinks from being touched for fear of spreading the polluted 
blood on Theseus‘ clothing (ἀλλ’ αἷμα μὴ σοῖς ἐξομόρξωμαι πέπλοις, 1399). Heracles‘ shame 
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and anxiety are not unwarranted; all of these avenues – sight, hearing, touch – can transmit 
pollution, and the intentions of the polluted agent are irrelevant.
122
 
 Theseus, however, does not treat Heracles as a repulsive or threatening figure but 
challenges traditional conceptions of pollution. When Heracles mentions the potential 
damage such pollution can cause, Theseus is dismissive: 
  Ηρ. τί δῆτά μου κρᾶτ’ ἀνεκάλυψας ἡλίῳ; 
Θη. τί δ’; οὐ μιαίνεις θνητὸς ὢν τὰ τ῵ν θε῵ν. 
Ηρ. φεῦγ’, ὦ ταλαίπωρ’, ἀνόσιον μίασμ’ ἐμόν. 
Θη. οὐδεὶς ἀλάστωρ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκ τ῵ν φίλων.  
  Her.: Why then did you uncover my head before the sun? 
  Thes.: Why? As a mortal you cannot defile what belongs to the gods. 
  Her.: You poor soul, avoid my unholy pollution! 
  Thes.: No avenging spirit can come to friends from their friends. (1231-1234) 
 
Theseus here presents two viewpoints contrary to traditional views on pollution: first, he 
suggests that that the gods are not offended by human defilement;
123
 second, he proposes that 
friendship can overcome the threat (ἀλάστωρ) of pollution. Bond sees these emendations as 
reflective of a ―new rationalistic spirit‖ that treats divine elements, such as the sun, as 
existing for mankind‘s benefit and promotes sensible human conduct over superstition.124 It 
is possible that the original audience approved of Theseus‘ conduct; Amphitryon‘s claim that 
Theseus is the product of Athenian virtue (1404-1405) suggests that his behavior here 
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conforms to other positive depictions of Theseus in tragedy as a representative of Athens‘ 
tolerance and prudence.
125
  
But Theseus‘ dismissive attitude towards pollution remains problematic within the 
context of the play. As several interpreters have noted, his benevolence does not remove the 
unorthodox nature of his comments before a fifth-century audience that continued to shun 
people and objects deemed polluted.
126
 Anxieties concerning blood-guilt were not easily 
shaken, and the continued references to pollution in the play reveal the tenuousness of 
Theseus‘ position. Although he convinces his friend to set aside his fears of communicating 
his defilement (1231-1235),
127
 Heracles does not seem to accept that φιλία removes this 
danger. Soon after uncovering himself he reaffirms his own pollution and claims that he 
inherited it from his father (προστρόπαιος, 1258-1261).128 The traditional belief that blood-guilt 
is transmitted from generation to generation is familiar in tragedies concerning the houses of 
Atreus and Laius, but it also affected historical figures such as Pericles and Alcibiades.
129
 
Heracles‘ conventional remark is therefore not provocative in and of itself, but it undercuts 
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his earlier acceptance of Theseus‘ claim that pollution cannot be communicated between 
φίλοι.     
 Euripides in fact presents a close relationship between pollution and φιλία for 
Heracles: despite his best intentions to honor his φίλοι Heracles harms them and defiles 
himself. This contradiction is particularly stark in the juxtaposition of Heracles‘ mention of 
Amphitryon‘s blood-guilt with his following declaration of allegiance to him over Zeus 
(1264-1265). The tragedian‘s manipulation of myth has established this tension between filial 
piety and the dangers that accompany it. As has been noted, Euripides rearranges traditional 
chronology so that the twelve labors no longer serve as acts of expiation for killing his family 
but rather are heroic feats that precede Heracles‘ downfall. In this play the hero undertook the 
labors in order to compensate for his father‘s pollution and restore him to the land from 
which he had been exiled (14-20).  His completion of these tasks, however, does not purify 
his father but instead invites slaughter and additional pollution to his family; the gods delay 
their attack until the labors are finished (827), and there is no indication that Amphitryon will 
be restored to Argos at the play‘s end.  The massacre itself serves as another example of 
frustrated purification resulting in further contamination. Heracles becomes deranged during 
a ritual purification of the house following the slaughter of Lycus (ἱερά… καθάρσι’ οἴκων, 922-
923).
130
 As Foley notes, the timing of the gods‘ punishment suggests their total rejection of 
Heracles‘ attempt to restore himself within his household.131 Theseus‘ claim that φιλία cannot 
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be affected by pollution is thus undercut by the close connection between filial piety and 
pollution in this play.
132
 
   Heracles‘ assessment of his weapons confirms that he will remain tainted by his 
crime despite Theseus‘ rational outlook and kindness. The Athenian offers a brief assurance 
that he will receive purification in Athens (1324) before detailing the honors the city will 
bestow on him and the glory (εὐκλείας) it will obtain by helping a brave man (ἐσθλόν) who has 
completed extraordinary heroic feats (1325-1335).
133
 Foley claims the audience saw the 
positive implications for these appeals to such honors and feats: the Athenians, unlike the 
Thebans, can offer Heracles an appropriate context for his heroic valor.
134
 But the weapons 
with which Heracles completed these achievements are permanently tainted by pollution.  
His famous bow and club served as the instruments of slaughter in the corrupted purificatory 
sacrifice; the horrific shift from peaceful ritual to polluted sacrifice was marked by an 
exchange of equipment: 
  ἐκχεῖτε πηγάς, ῥίπτετ’ ἐκ χειρ῵ν κανᾶ. 
    τίς μοι δίδωσι τόξα; τίς <δ’> ὅπλον χερός; 
 
  Pour out the (cleansing) water, toss the sacrificial baskets from your hands. 
  Who can give me my bow? Who can give me my club? (941-942) 
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The striking contrast between the ritual accoutrements and violent weapons designated the 
latter as essential components of Heracles‘ ―paradoxical coexistence‖ as hero and 
murderer.
135
  
In his final monologue the hero further develops the weapons‘ association with his 
polluted state by comparing them to their victims: Heracles holds the weapons ―embraced 
against his side‖ (πλευρὰ τἀμὰ προσπίτνοντ’, 1379) as one might hold a child;136 he draws a 
parallel between the bitter pleasure of bearing his weapons and the same feeling from kissing 
his family (ὦ λυγραὶ φιλημάτων / τέρψεις, λυγραὶ δὲ τ῵νδ’ ὅπλων κοινωνίαι, 1376-1377).  These 
weapons are, moreover, personified with voices that serve as a constant reminder of the 
pollution they share with their owner:
 137
 they call themselves παιδοκτόνοι (1381), the same 
term Lyssa uses to describe Heracles‘ delusions (835).138 Though he decides to keep them 
partly because of their role in previous heroic exploits (1383), these weapons remain 
permanently contaminated and like their owner retain the monstrous potential to destroy the 
innocent as well as the villainous.  
The Heracles presents a chaotic world in which mortals are subject to the cruel and 
inscrutable will of the gods. Human assumptions concerning the gods, including traditional 
beliefs and intellectual revisions, are unreliable. The Iris and Lyssa scene presents a shocking 
disruption that not only confirms the futility of human speculation but also demonstrates the 
horrific potential of unreliable speculation when irrational divine forces attack: since the gods 
do not conform to mortal conceptions of justice or reciprocity, there is little hope that humans 
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can avoid their wrath. The Heracles’ depiction of the gods and religion is ultimately 
disaffirmative because it offers little hope that mortals can understand or influence the gods 
and because it challenges the notion that Heracles can be purified fully. In the following 
section I will explore further evidence for the play‘s horrific nature in the contradiction 
between the hero‘s role as a father and his reputation as a heroic fighter. Euripides similarly 
presents the family as an unstable institution that fails to protect the innocent and that 
remains inaccessible to Heracles despite his intense desire to belong.  
B) Fathers and Monsters: A Family Dissolved  
 In the previous section I discussed how human attempts to understand divine will in 
the Heracles prove unreliable in the face of unpredictable savagery from the gods. The 
human characters and audience are left with feelings of fear and confusion as they attempt to 
cope with extreme violence and suffering. The gods are the driving force of the play‘s horror; 
like the most horrific monsters, they defy simple categorization or explanation and they 
render moot the efforts of their victims to establish civil institutions as a form of protection. 
But the gods not only threaten to destroy the innocent, they also cause men like Heracles to 
become polluted monsters themselves. As I have noted above, many scholars have suggested 
that this play concludes with an affirmation of human relationships in the face of cosmic 
malevolence. Chalk contends that Heracles has by the end of the play gained a complex ―new 
ἀρετή‖ that recognizes the place of both φιλία and βία in a dangerous world.139 Foley adds 
that the hero‘s violent and contradictory nature is resolved by Theseus‘ offer to admit him 
into Athens, where he can apply this virtue to the benefit of the city.
140
 In this section, I will 
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explore how the play‘s depiction of the relationship between Heracles and his family 
undermines any hope of social reintegration.   
Euripides presents the massacre as a shocking perversion of familiar experience: the 
family members witness their beloved patriarch become a mad killer who denies the ties of 
intimacy and kinship that should compel him to protect rather than slaughter them. While this 
reversal provides the clearest illustration of the contradiction between father and killer, 
Euripides prepares the audience for it with paradoxical depictions of fatherhood that add to 
the unsettling depiction of family in this play. I will first examine the role of fathers within 
the play by comparing Amphitryon, Zeus, and Heracles as models of fatherhood. I will then 
analyze how these models influence Euripides‘ treatment of the family as a whole, with 
particular attention to the messenger speech that details their final moments.    
B.1) Models of Fatherhood 
The nature of fatherhood in this play poses many difficulties. As I noted above, 
Heracles‘ dual parentage serves as an important matter of speculation in the first half of the 
play.
141
 While scholars have discussed this duality as a source of tension between divine and 
human nature in Heracles,
142
 they have glossed over the tension between the parental roles of 
the hero‘s two fathers. While Zeus is noticeably absent from the dramatic action, Euripides 
presents the feeble Amphitryon as a devoted guardian of his son‘s family. Heracles‘ 
relationship to his own children and wife reflects this tension: in some places the hero seems 
remote and more interested in aggressive action; in others he appears vulnerable and 
affectionate. Euripides thus presents Heracles as a contradictory father-figure whose unstable 
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identity culminates in horrific disruption. As I shall argue in the next section the massacre 
generates horror through frightening contradictions of these paternal models of behavior.    
     In the beginning of the Heracles Amphitryon and his son seem to have radically 
different roles within the family. Amphitryon repeatedly laments his weakness and inability 
to defend his grandchildren against Lycus. He refuses even to be called a man because of his 
old age and lack of fighting strength (εἴ τι δὴ χρὴ κἄμ’ ἐν ἀνδράσιν λέγειν, / γέροντ’ ἀχρεῖον, 41-
42). His explicit denial of virility fits with his description of his function within the family. 
He identifies his role as that of nurse (τροφόν) and ward (οἰκουρόν) in Heracles‘ absence (44-
45), terms typically applied to women.
143
 Megara wants him to assume an aggressive stance 
in ensuring the family‘s safety (80-81), and she attributes his passivity to cowardice (φιλεῖς 
οὕτω φάος; 90). Her stated willingness to ―play the role of the man‖ (ἐμοί τε μίμημ’ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ 
ἀπωστέον, 294) casts negative light on Amphitryon‘s lack of masculine vigor. The effect of 
Amphitryon‘s physical limitations on his role as father is most evident in his unorthodox 
conception of virtue. He defines an ἀνὴρ ἄριστος as a man who ―always trusts in hope‖ 
(ἐλπίσιν / πέποιθεν αἰεί ) as opposed to the ἀνὴρ κακός who is utterly without resources (τὸ δ’ 
ἀπορεῖν ἀνδρὸς κακοῦ, 105-106). But here Amphitryon poses a false dichotomy, since the 
traditional ἀνὴρ ἄριστος can provide active resistance against his enemies – one who relies on 
hope is, practically speaking, on par with the ἀνὴρ κακός in that neither has adequate 
resources to defend himself.
144
 Amphitryon‘s novel conception of ἀρετή thus expresses an 
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 Bond (1981) ad 45. Cf. Barrett (1964) on Hippolytus 786f., who observes that οἰκουρός most commonly refers 
to ―the wife who is in charge of the house when her husband is…away.‖ 
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 Adkins (1966) 213. 
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overall outlook or attitude (i.e. hope over despair) rather than an external manifestation of 
courage or strength.
145
  
 Heracles‘ physical strength and courage serve as a bold contrast to Amphitryon‘s 
passivity and weakness. Amphitryon in fact offers a remarkably different account of the ἀνὴρ 
ἄριστος in defending his son against Lycus‘ accusations of cowardice. Less than 100 lines 
after defining ἀρετή as a hopeful attitude, he invokes his son‘s victory over the vicious 
centaurs, among other martial triumphs, as proof of his status as ἀνὴρ ἄριστος (181-183).146 
Lycus‘ cheap attempts to belittle the hero‘s labors (151-164) are unconvincing;147 all agree 
that the hero‘s return would signal the end of the despot‘s reign (97, 145-146, 434-435, 717-
718). Heracles‘ exceptional courage offers his children the opportunity to become similarly 
strong and capable in the future. Amphitryon acknowledges that Lycus has good reason to 
fear that the sons of the brave will become brave themselves (207-208). Megara notes that 
the hero allowed his children to handle his prized weapons (465-473) and took pride in their 
potential to demonstrate the same exceptional strength (εὐανδρίᾳ, 475) that their father 
demonstrated in his labors (407).
148
 The family thus praises Heracles for his physical 
strength, and they recognize the immediate need for his presence against the threat of Lycus. 
It is no surprise that when the hero finally appears, Megara immediately exhorts her children 
to cling to him, since his martial prowess makes him ―not at all inferior to Zeus Savior.‖ 
Heracles thus initially resembles his powerful divine father rather than his weak mortal one.  
                                                          
145
 Bond (1981) ad 105f., Adkins (1966) 212-214. 
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 Bond (1981) ad 183 notes that ―Heracles was the acknowledged ἀνὴρ ἄριστος‖ in Greek literature.  
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 Lycus mocks Heracles‘ use of the bow and his battles against monsters. Cf. Michelini (1987) 242-246 and 
Foley (1985) 169-172 on the social and literary context underlying Lycus‘ endorsement of hoplite warfare.   
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 See my discussion on pages 168-169 above concerning this term. 
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But the comparison to Zeus also invites a more troubling association. Like his divine 
father, Heracles is absent during the first part of the play. Megara contrasts the closeness of 
her children with the remoteness of her husband: she can offer kisses and embraces to her 
offspring (485-489), but she can conceive of Heracles only as a shade (σκιά) or dream (ὄναρ, 
494-495).
149
 She witnesses his returning in the flesh soon after these comments, but she 
retains this hazy conception of her husband and has to correct herself after calling him a 
dream (... εἰ μή γ’ ὄνειρον ἐν φάει τι λεύσσομεν. / τί φημί; ποῖ’ ὄνειρα κηραίνουσ’ ὁρ῵; 517-518).  
The alienation from his wife and children ironically seems tied to the defining quality that his 
family consistently praises. The hero‘s might allows him to defeat savage monsters and 
rescue afflicted communities, but it also seems to prevent him from remaining in one place. 
The hero‘s family currently resides in Thebes, where Heracles defeated the Minyans and 
gave the citizens freedom (220-221). He is not content, however, with his newly-freed 
community, so he undertakes the twelve labors in order to restore Amphitryon (and himself) 
to his father‘s native home in Argos (πάτραν οἰκεῖν θέλων, 18). The labors themselves are 
examples of the hero‘s wanderlust: the chorus‘ report details trips to the fringes of the known 
world (Amazons in the East; Hesperides and Geryon in the West; Diomedes‘ mares in the 
North) as well as exploits that test the boundaries of the earth (Atlas and the sky; the descent 
into Hades).
150
 The chorus concludes its account of the labors with a striking contrast that 
highlights the separation between the hero and his home. Though they indicate that the 
doomed family is headed to Hades, the very place where they presume Heracles remains, 
they do not mention a bittersweet reunion; instead they conclude their account of the labors 
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 Burnett‘s (1971) 161 contention that Megara ―calls like a necromancer for a revenant from hell‖ is 
unwarranted. The invocation of the dead was a familiar tragic trope, and Megara‘s pathetic appeal lacks 
malevolence.  
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 Bond (1981) ad 359 ff., Barlow (1982) 18, Burnett (1971) 178-179. 
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by focusing on the father‘s absence: ―the house looks to your hands though you are not 
present‖ (ἐς δὲ σὰς χέρας βλέπει / δώματ’ οὐ παρόντος, 434-435).  
The Heracles that appears onstage, however, is quite different from the character 
described by his family and the chorus. He comes to the realization that his endless battles 
come at the expense of his family‘s well-being: 
 τῶ γάρ μ’ ἀμύνειν μᾶλλον ἢ δάμαρτι χρὴ 
καὶ παισὶ καὶ γέροντι; χαιρόντων πόνοι·  
μάτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς τ῵νδε μᾶλλον ἤνυσα. 
καὶ δεῖ μ’ ὑπὲρ τ῵νδ’, εἴπερ οἵδ’ ὑπὲρ πατρός, 
θνῄσκειν ἀμύνοντ’· ἢ τί φήσομεν καλὸν 
ὕδρᾳ μὲν ἐλθεῖν ἐς μάχην λέοντί τε 
Εὐρυσθέως πομπαῖσι, τ῵ν δ’ ἐμ῵ν τέκνων  
οὐκ ἐκπονήσω θάνατον; οὐκ ἄρ’ Ἡρακλῆς 
ὁ καλλίνικος ὡς πάροιθε λέξομαι. 
   
For whom should I protect more than my wife, children, and aged father? 
Forget my labors! For in vain did I achieve those feats rather than the labors 
here (at home). And I ought to die on behalf of these members of my family in 
defending them, since in fact they were to die for their father. Or how shall I 
call it noble to come into battle with a hydra and a lion on Eurystheus‘ 
dispatch, while I will not labor over my own children‘s death?151 Then I shall 
not be called ―Heracles the glorious victor‖ as I once was. (574-582) 
 
Heracles‘ might can benefit his family only if he is present to protect them. His absence not 
only leaves these family members vulnerable to harm but also causes the ties of intimacy 
binding them to disintegrate. Foley has noted that Heracles‘ rejection of the labors was likely 
very surprising for ancient audiences. They were no doubt familiar with the ―the epinician 
hero‖ described by the chorus, since Heracles was often depicted as a victorious conqueror 
found in epic and lyric poetry; it is unlikely, however, that they had seen the ―domestic 
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 Cf. Bremer (1972) 238-240 on ἐκπονήσω. He observes that while the context demands that this mean 
something like ―work hard to prevent,‖ such a reading does not fit with any other instance of the verb in the 
Euripidean corpus. He posits that the audience would initially recoil at the most likely literal meaning (―I will 
fully accomplish my children‘s death‖) before reconciling the verb with the context and Heracles‘ obvious 
intention (i.e. as synonymous with, e.g., κωλύσω). I agree with Bremer that this unorthodox usage introduces 
shocking ambiguity to speech otherwise filled with simple sincerity, and I will below discuss how the 
contradictory and confusing elements in Heracles‘ role as father prepare the audience for the horrific violence 
he executes.   
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Heracles,‖ a ―very human‖ character who willingly abandons his labors in service of his 
family.
152
 The tension between these two versions of Heracles reflects his dual parentage: the 
epinician hero is like Zeus invincible but alienated from his family, while the domestic figure 
seems to resemble Amphitryon in prioritizing close care for the family over heroic 
accomplishments.  Heracles longs to apply the best features from each of his fathers (i.e. 
Zeus‘ power, Amphitryon‘s devotion), but ultimately he cannot reconcile these two models 
of fatherhood.  The contradiction between these models creates an unsettling tone for his 
behavior before the massacre. Though his return seems to promise safety for the family, there 
are signs that his contradictory nature will prevent him from fully integrating himself into the 
household as a stable father.  
  The contradiction between the two models of fatherhood is evident in Heracles‘ 
presentation of himself as a domestic figure. He announces his willingness to become, like 
Amphitryon, a devoted caretaker for his children:     
οὐ γὰρ πτερωτὸς οὐδὲ φευξείω φίλους. 
.... 
ἄξω λαβών γε τούσδ’ ἐφολκίδας χεροῖν, 
ναῦς δ’ ὣς ἐφέλξω· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀναίνομαι 
θεράπευμα τέκνων. πάντα τἀνθρώπων ἴσα· 
φιλοῦσι παῖδας οἵ τ’ ἀμείνονες βροτ῵ν 
οἵ τ’ οὐδὲν ὄντες· χρήμασιν δὲ διάφοροι·  
ἔχουσιν, οἱ δ’ οὔ· πᾶν δὲ φιλότεκνον γένος. 
 
  (Don‘t fear) for I have no wings nor shall I desert those I love. 
  …. 
I will take hold and lead these little boat-followers in my arms, and like a 
tugboat I shall bring them in tow; for truly I do not refuse the care of my 
children. In this regard the affairs of men are equal. Both distinguished men 
and those of no account love their children – they differ only in means: some 
have money, some don‘t. The human race universally loves its children. (628, 
631-636) 
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 Foley (1985) 175-190. Her discussion of this tension focuses on a ―poetic crisis‖ involving competing 
literary traditions (e.g. epic, lyric, and hymnic poetry). Though I adopt her phrasing, my examination does not 
concentrate on the literary tradition, and I do not agree with her conclusion that there is a resolution of this 
tension between epinician hero and domestic figure following the massacre.   
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In tending to his children, Heracles assumes that he belongs to a community of mortals in 
which parental affection joins all as equals. But this assumption, however touching and 
sincere, does not fit with the Heracles the audience has encountered throughout the play. For 
one, Heracles‘ attempt to reduce human distinctions to matters of wealth does not sufficiently 
account for the hero‘s true source of distinction, courage and strength. He is an ἀνὴρ ἄριστος, 
surpassing all other men in courage (181-183) and deservedly praised as a superlative 
individual (150, 493). Moreover, Heracles attains this distinction as a solitary fighter without 
close ties to other humans: he defeats the Minyans by himself (εἷς, 220), he undertakes his 
labors alone (μόνος, 852),153 and he has no friends in his own homeland (οὕτω δ’ ἀπόντες 
ἐσπανίζομεν φίλων; 557). The hero‘s use of the bow serves as an illustration of his distance 
from the community. Lycus‘ attack against the bow presents no reasonable proof for 
Heracles‘ cowardice (157-164), but it is true in at least one regard: he would rather avoid 
standing in rank with other soldiers (τάξιν ἐμβεβώς, 164), an observation confirmed by 
Amphitryon (190-194). 
 Heracles‘ initial reaction to his family‘s suffering further illustrates his isolation. 
Though he renounces his previous labors as distractions from his paternal duties (574-582), 
he prefaces this renunciation with violent threats and epic boasts against the community of 
Thebans: he vows to leave immediately so that he may destroy Lycus‘ palace, mutilate the 
king‘s body, and fill the local rivers with the bloody corpses of his enemies (566-573). The 
gruesome details – Lycus‘ head will be ―dog food‖ (κυν῵ν ἕλκημα), the hero will 
―dismember‖ the Thebans with arrows (διαφορ῵ν τοξεύμασιν) – have led some scholars to 
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 The chorus notes that Heracles defeated the Amazons with the help of friends (φίλων, 411-412), but these 
friends are not named, perhaps because, as Bond (1981) ad 412 claims, ―no other individual may share 
Heracles‘ glory in this ode.‖ 
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condemn these threats as irrational and excessively brutal.
154
 But there is no sign of moral or 
mental failing in these colorful and unsettling remarks. They are consistent with the play‘s 
depictions of the hero as one who resolves conflict through sheer might.
155
  They do reveal, 
however, his inability to assume the role of nurturing caretaker. Not only do Heracles‘ 
violent impulses conflict with domestic duties,
156
 but his strict adherence to solitary fighting 
draws him away from them. His first instinct is to leave the home (εἶμι, 566) and fight the 
forces of Lycus on their own grounds. The staging of the scene further illustrates the 
contradiction between the hero‘s martial instincts and his wish to become a supportive father; 
he declares his plan to leave after his wife has instructed their children to cling to him and 
most likely while these children still hold onto their father.
157
 It is only after Amphitryon 
advises him that Heracles decides to go into the home (εὖ γὰρ εἶπας· εἶμ’ ἔσω δόμων, 606) and 
to reintegrate himself into domestic life by praying to Hestia, the goddess of the hearth (609). 
 One final complication found in Heracles‘ attempt to join the community of loving 
parents is his identification with the race of mortals. As I have noted in my first section, 
Heracles‘ paternity is a source of speculation throughout the play. Several scholars have 
posited that this ambivalence between divine and mortal in his nature serves as the play‘s 
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 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1895) iii: ad 566 claims it is a ―wilder Ubertreibung‖ indicating madness; 
Burnett (1971) 165 does not specifically associate this speech with the later madness, but she sees similar 
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 Bond (1981) ad 562-582, Foley (1985) 189. 
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 Burnett (1971) 163-165 notes the unsettling contrast between the hero‘s vow to fill Dirce and Ismene with 
bloody corpses (572-573) and the chorus‘ hymn to these same rivers (781-789).  
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 Megara instructs the children to cling to their father and to continue holding him at 520-522; at 627 Heracles 
notes that family continues to hold his clothing. Kaimio (1988) 41-42 argues convincingly that the children 
likely remained by their father throughout 520-636 since other interpretations (i.e. the children do not heed their 
mother‘s command to embrace their father until 629; the children initiate contact at 520, disengage without 
remark, and then resume contact at 627) seem awkward. Bain (1981) 28 n. 7 notes that staging the revenge 
speech in the immediate presence of children would be unsettling, but his dismissal of such staging in order to 
avoid this contrast is unnecessary.  
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fundamental conflict.
158
 Silk applies Douglas‘ anthropological investigations in identifying 
the hero as an interstitial and anomalous figure; such figures defy cultural categories and thus 
seem to possesses ―dangerous, uncontrollable powers‖ within their society.159 Silk concludes 
that the interstitial Heracles presents audiences with a paradoxical mixture of vulnerability 
and danger: ―an ideal to dream of and a horror story to shrink from.‖160 Like Silk, I see this 
ambivalence between mortal and divine as a source of horror for this play. Heracles 
considers himself one of οἱ ἄνθρωποι, but in many ways he acts more like the gods: he is 
remote from everyday human life, he possesses supernatural might, and he uses violent 
methods to resolve problems.
161
 This irreconcilable tension reaches its most horrific pitch 
during the hero‘s delusional rampage, which I shall discuss more fully below.  
The contradictions found in Heracles‘ role as father resemble the contradictions that 
define monsters in horror fiction. Carroll, like Silk, adopts Douglas‘ approach in defining 
horrific monsters as interstitial figures that defy normative social categories.
162
 Heracles in 
this play is such a monster, a Jekyll and Hyde-type character who vacillates between extreme 
affection and extreme violence. This is not to say that he is evil: the tragedian takes great 
pains to show the hero‘s innocence in the face of cosmic brutality.163 Carroll‘s definition of 
horrific monsters, however, does not depend on moral evaluation: monsters are, regardless of 
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 Silk (1985), Gregory (1977), Ruck (1976).  Cf. Michelini (1987) 254-258 and Foley (1985) 157-162 for 
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 Scholars have noted further parallels between Heracles and the gods. Padilla (1992) 3 sees allusions to 
Apollo in Amphitryon‘s praise of his son‘s ability to strike from afar without being seen, and Silk (1985) 13 
compares the hero‘s threats against the Thebans with Poseidon‘s threats in Trojan Women 88-91. 
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 Carroll (1990) 12-58. Cf. my discussion of Carroll in chapter 1 pages 37-40. 
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intent, entities that defy categorical distinctions and threaten to bring immediate harm to 
others.
164
 Sympathetic monsters are commonly found in horror fiction: Frankenstein‘s 
monster saves lives in addition to destroying them; Regan, the possessed girl of the Exorcist, 
is not responsible for the repulsive words and actions committed by the demon in control of 
her body. Similarly, Heracles‘ abnormality results, through no fault of his own, in an act of 
savage brutality that destroys innocent victims and brings contamination upon himself. The 
gods who cause his madness reject his triumphs as examples of mortal arrogance, but their 
punishment forces the hero to alienate himself from his family and, as I shall argue below, 
the entire human race. The horrific massacre thus destroys an innocent family and prevents 
its unwilling agent from fully belonging to either divine or mortal communities.      
B.2) The Massacre 
 Just as the Iris and Lyssa episode serves as a horrific culmination of the confusing 
and unsettling presentation of the divine in the play‘s first half, so the messenger‘s report of 
the massacre presents the gruesome manifestation of previously developed contradictions in 
Heracles‘ role as father. The hero previously struggled with competing notions of fatherhood, 
but his divinely-inspired madness causes him to employ distortions of these models in 
murdering his family. The messenger‘s account presents the hero as a man of unstable 
identity and unrelenting aggression against whom his victims cannot contend.  
Scholars have concentrated on the ―almost continuous insight we are given in this 
messenger-speech into Heracles‘ deranged mind,‖165 and treat the massacre as the impetus 
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 De Jong (1991) 171. Most interpreters concentrate on Heracles‘ suffering during the final parts of the play – 
e.g. Foley (1985) 199-200, Conacher (1955) 147-152, and particularly those who dismiss the first part of the 
play as insignificant, such as Michelini (1987) 240-266 and Arnott (1978). 
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for the hero‘s bittersweet movement towards humanity.166  But the messenger pays 
considerable attention also to the family members who suffer the consequences of his 
derangement. The audience experiences the horror of gruesome slaughter through the 
members of the household, whose speech and actions reflect the dreadful contradictions of 
their fate. Their developing fear and confusion in the face of their patriarch‘s monstrous 
behavior makes their plight more identifiable and unsettling for the audience. Moreover, the 
continuous presence of their corpses onstage after the massacre is a testament to their 
suffering; this reminder of their hideous fate should prevent us from concluding that the 
contradictions of family structures found in the massacre have been adequately resolved by 
the end of the play.
167
  
 The description of Heracles‘ madness entails a process of complete transformation. 
His affliction is evident from its symptoms: initial pause, rolling and bloodshot eyes, foaming 
mouth, and manic laughter.
168
 The hero‘s bizarre behavior and repulsive physical symptoms 
signal a break from his ―true self‖ and his emergence as an alien being: ―he was not longer 
the same man‖ (ὁ δ’ οὐκέθ’ αὑτὸς ἦν, 931).169 This dramatic breakdown of the hero‘s personal 
identity is ominous. Neither the human characters nor the audience can predict how Heracles 
will behave once he has abandoned the self familiar to others (though Iris and Lyssa have 
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 Silk (1985) and Foley (1985), for example, both contend that the massacre allows Heracles to reconcile 
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readings below.  
 
168
 Cf. Bond (1981) ad 930-1009 and Holmes (2008) on the similarity between these symptoms and ancient 
descriptions of those suffering from epileptic fits. The image perhaps then carried some immediate resonance 
for members of the original audience who had experienced or witnessed such episodes. 
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 As Riley (2008) 14 notes, the familiar English idiom ―he wasn‘t himself‖ unfortunately dulls the 
―extraordinary impact‖ of the Greek. 
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prepared the audience for the ultimate consequences, if not the specific means, of his 
madness).  
But the ―new‖ Heracles is not merely a random and unpredictable madman. On the 
contrary, the divinely-inspired madness causes him to adopt a perverted version of his earlier 
behavior.
170
 That is, the gods incite the mad hero to complete grotesque elaborations of 
previously established contradictions in his role as father. Not only does he ―leave‖ his 
family on a vain quest against a phantom enemy, but his insane determination prevents him 
from recognizing the pathetic appeals to intimacy and kinship before his own eyes. Through 
the messenger‘s report we see how Heracles‘ trademark heroic virtues have been corrupted 
into a monstrous frenzy and how this corruption destroys the fundamental notions of family 
that his victims take for granted.   
I shall discuss the disturbing contradictions in the hero‘s behavior, but first I would 
like to note how Euripides‘ attention to the victims in this speech clarifies the horrific nature 
of the massacre. The messenger‘s account of the slaughter includes direct speech from five 
different speakers, the most in any Euripidean messenger speech.
171
 Irene De Jong has noted 
the diversity of voices here, but her discussion presents them merely as indicators of 
Heracles‘ madness.172 It is true that the speeches serve this function, but they also allow the 
audience to register more fully the horror of the situation. The family‘s frightened and 
confused reactions provide the audience with ample opportunity to assimilate the view of the 
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 Only Helen 1526-1618 has an equal number of direct quotations. Cf. the index of direct and indirect speech 
in De Jong (1991) 199-201.   
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characters and sympathize with their dreadful experience.
173
 Every party involved is given a 
voice: Heracles, his father, his wife, his children, and the household slaves.
174
 The 
comprehensive depiction here is important because the audience has already been thoroughly 
prepared for the messenger‘s dread report: they have seen Iris and Lyssa explain in detail the 
gods‘ awful plan for Heracles, including his madness and kin-slaying (822-874), and they 
have heard the shouts from Amphitryon within the house (875-909). By including speeches 
from the family members Euripides draws the audience away from their preconceptions and 
back to the victims‘ unexpected suffering and their feelings of horror.    
The victims respond with fear and confusion as they attempt to decipher the 
confusing behavior of their patriarch. The slaves‘ initial reaction provides the audience with 
their first glimpse of the horror caused by Heracles‘ madness. The hero imagines that he must 
undertake another journey in order to kill Eurystheus (πρὸς τὰς Μυκήνας εἶμι, 943). This 
announcement of departure echoes his previous threat against his Theban enemies (566), and 
his demand for his bow and club in place of ritual accoutrements (941-942) suggests that the 
epinician hero has replaced the domestic figure. But his actions are deranged simulations of 
heroic behavior; he enters an imaginary chariot and pretends to drive it with his hand as if he 
were using a goad (946-949). The slaves respond to this derangement with a blend of fear 
and laughter (διπλοῦς δ’ ὀπαδοῖς ἦν γέλως φόβος θ’ ὁμοῦ, 950). As Bond notes, the term διπλοῦς 
here denotes not only the simultaneity of these responses (as does ὁμοῦ) but also the 
―dubious‖ nature of the emotional combination.175  This emotional ambiguity reflects the 
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contradictory behavior of the hero: he is no longer the domestic figure that the ritual context 
demands but an almost parodic distortion of his heroic persona.
176
  
Similar confusion can be found in the reactions of the other victims as the deranged 
heroism develops into horrific violence. After Heracles imagines traveling to Megara and 
enjoying a banquet there, Amphitryon asks him: ―What is the manner of this foreign 
behavior‖ (τίς ὁ τρόπος ξενώσεως / τῆσδ’; 965-966).  The term ξένωσις is a hapax legomenon in 
tragedy and scholars have suggested various readings, including psychological (―alienatio 
mentis‖) and physical (―foreign travel‖) interpretations.177 Given the confusion and 
conflation established in the slaves‘ reaction, we do not need to seek one fixed meaning for 
the term. Euripides may have chosen this ambiguous word to highlight the contrast between 
the delusionary trip Heracles is taking and the mental derangement recognized by others. At 
any rate, the peculiarity of the word and its ―foreign‖ root (ξεν-) are appropriate given the 
distorted signs of the epinician hero and Amphitryon‘s inability to connect with his son. 
Heracles‘ heroic impulses previously caused him to wander as a stranger (ξένος) throughout 
the Greek world. He is now acting like a stranger in his own home: though Amphitryon 
addresses him as son (παῖ), the hero recoils in horror from his own father (πατέρα προταρβοῦνθ’ 
ἱκέσιον ψαύειν χερός / ὤθει), who he imagines is the father of Eurystheus (965-969).The 
unorthodox term ξένωσις thus highlights the horrifying contradiction in Heracles‘ role as 
deranged hero and alien father. 
 Like Amphitryon, Megara and the children attempt to remind him of the familial 
bonds he shares with his victims. After Heracles prepares his bow and threatens immediate 
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violence, the children scatter as they become ―frightened with terror‖ (ταρβοῦντες φόβῳ, 971, 
a pleonastic expression that vividly describes the intensity of their fear). Before the first 
murder Megara addresses him as τεκών, (975), which as Bond notes is a very uncommon 
address for a wife to apply to her husband.
178
 It is more intimate than the English ―father‖ in 
that the τεκ- root stresses the genetic relationship Heracles has with his children as their 
begetter and their guardian.
179
 She follows this unusually intimate address with a further 
appeal to this close relationship (τέκνα, 975), thus packing two words with the same genetic 
stem (τεκ-) into a short, six-word speech. Similar clustering of τεκ- terms can be found earlier 
in the play: the chorus uses the same terms to remind Heracles about a father‘s obligation to 
help his children (δίκαια τοὺς τεκόντας ὠφελεῖν τέκνα, 583); the hero uses related words in his 
own vow to tend to his children (θεράπευμα τέκνων) and join the ―child-loving race‖ 
(φιλότεκνον γένος) of humans (633-636). Though it recalls the language and values of these 
passages, Megara‘s appeal lacks their confidence and certainty. Her distressed shout has 
transformed the previous assertions into confused questions (τί δρᾷς;) and contradictory 
juxtapositions. Her reference to τέκνα is immediately followed by the verb κτείνεις; the close 
position of these two words and their similarity in sound further highlights the tension 
between parental love and savage violence.   
The same contradiction can be found in the plea from one of the hero‘s sons, the 
second victim of the slaughter. Like Megara, the child tries to appeal to his connection with 
Heracles: the first line of his entreaty displays a chiastic structure that begins and ends with 
vocative appeals to his ―dearest father‖ (φίλτατ’ ... πάτερ), and the next line uses anaphora 
(σός ... σός) to emphasize the familial connection (988-989). The hero ignores these appeals, 
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but his behavior reflects a horrific distortion of the domestic Heracles: he perverts established 
symbols of intimacy into tokens of hideous violence. This perversion begins even before the 
son speaks: while he still crouches by the altar ―like a bird‖ (βωμὸν ὄρνις ὣς ἔπτηξ’ ὕπο, 974), 
Heracles, having killed another son, gloats over ―this one dead chick here‖ (εἷς μὲν νεοσσὸς ὅδε 
θανών, 982).  The unsettling remark misappropriates a term previously established as one of 
nurturing affection. Megara had compared her maternal responsibilities to those of a bird 
tending her chicks (οὓς ὑπὸ πτεροῖς / σῴζω νεοσσοὺς ὄρνις ὣς ὑφειμένους, 71-72); Amphitryon 
similarly chastised the Thebans for not looking after the ―chicks‖ (νεοσσοῖς, 224) he was 
feebly trying to protect. Heracles, however, corrupts this affectionate term into a ―grotesque 
and horrifying‖ boast.180  There is similar corruption in the hero‘s first reaction to his son‘s 
appeal. The act of ―rolling his savage Gorgon eyes‖ (ἀγριωπὸν ὄμμα Γοργόνος στρέφων, 990) 
simultaneously reflects the hero‘s famous ―gorgon-gaze‖ that he shares with his children 
(πατέρος ὡς γοργ῵πες, 131-132) and the monstrous fury unleashed against his family by the 
gorgon-like Lyssa (Νυκτὸς Γοργών, 883-884).181 Finally, Heracles kills the boy with his club 
(ξύλον καθῆκε, 993), the very same one that he had once allowed the child to wield as a 
gesture of affection (ἐς δεξιάν τε σὴν ἀλεξητήριον / ξύλον καθίει δαίδαλον, ψευδῆ δόσιν, 470-471). 
The phrase ξύλον καθίημι initially described a playful gift (ψευδῆ δόσιν) but now has been 
distorted into a description of brutal and sudden carnage (ἔρρηξε δ’ ὀστᾶ, 994).   
While earlier parts of the play signal obliquely the incompatibility of the domestic 
Heracles and the epinician hero, the family‘s detailed responses reveal the disturbing 
consequences of this incompatibility. They find their worst fears realized in the man they had 
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thought would protect them. The mad Heracles ultimately fulfills the threats to his family 
made by his enemy Lycus.
182
  Amphitryon, for example, makes the following pathetic 
request from Lycus: 
κτεῖνόν με καὶ τήνδ’ ἀθλίαν παίδων πάρος, 
ὡς μὴ τέκν’ εἰσίδωμεν, ἀνόσιον θέαν, 
   ψυχορραγοῦντα καὶ καλοῦντα μητέρα 
πατρός τε πατέρα. 
 Kill me and this poor woman before the children, so that we  
may not see the children – unholy sight! – as they breathe their last while 
calling upon their mother and grandfather (322-325). 
 
Amphitryon encounters the very ―unholy sight‖ he wished to avoid during Heracles‘ 
rampage, but the circumstances are even more horrifying than the old man had anticipated: 
the children call upon their father (πάτερ, 988) not in an appeal for assistance but in vain 
attempt to remind their killer of his identity.  
  Despite the messenger‘s attention to the family‘s suffering, many scholars have 
focused exclusively on the hero‘s plight and have treated the travails of the family, 
particularly in the events prior to the massacre, as ―a red herring.‖183 While it is true that 
Heracles is a rich and complex character that deserves critical attention, his family serves an 
indispensible role in the play‘s conflict. It is through their eyes that the audience can fully 
experience the magnitude of the gods‘ punishment, and Euripides does not treat their 
suffering superficially. Moreover, Megara and the children maintain a significant narrative 
presence even in the events following the massacre. Their corpses remain onstage for the 
duration of the play, and Heracles spends the majority of this time lying onstage surrounded 
by their remains. When Theseus arrives, he notices these bodies first and comments on the 
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perversity of this slaughter of innocents (1176-1177). He does not recognize Heracles, who 
has covered himself in shame, and even when Amphitryon explains the situation, Theseus 
considers the hero a stranger amidst the corpses (τίς δ’ ὅδ’ οὑν νεκροῖς, γέρον; 1189). The 
alienation between father and family continues even after the madness has subsided. 
 The destruction of the family and Heracles‘ alienation from it suggest that the end of 
the play should not be read as a triumph of φιλία, as some have claimed.184 Rather, the play 
seems to focus on its fragility in a senselessly violent world. Heracles‘ desire to assume the 
role of domestic father figure is completely frustrated as a result of the massacre, and his 
departure for Athens does not resolve his contradictory status as father and killer. As I noted 
above, the hero‘s decision to retain the weapons stained with his children‘s blood reveals his 
inability to escape his crimes. His bow and club act as surrogate children: he clutches them to 
his breast like infants (πλευρὰ τἀμὰ προσπίτνοντ’, 1379) and feels the same bitter pains from 
them as he does from his slaughtered family (λυγραί…λυγραί, 1376-1377).  The hero‘s 
decision to retain these weapons is reluctant (ἀθλίως δὲ σωστέον, 1385), but it nonetheless 
continues the trend of corrupted affection found in the messenger speech. Since Heracles 
continues to conflate intimacy with violence, the contradiction between epinician hero and 
domestic figure cannot be resolved.  
Theseus‘ offer to bring the hero to Athens serves as proof of his friendship, but it also 
reinforces Heracles‘ alienation from his family. The Athenian rebukes his friend for wishing 
to embrace his father and reminds him of his labors (1410). Despite Foley‘s claim that 
Athens provides a more appropriate context for such heroic feats,
185
 there is no indication in 
the play that Heracles has reconsidered his disdain for the labors (574-582, 1269-1280). The 
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hero asks Theseus to aid him in bringing Cerberus to Argos, but he offers the following 
explanation for this request: ―…so that I may not suffer anything because of grief for my 
children while I am alone‖ (λύπῃ τι παίδων μὴ πάθω μονούμενος, 1387). The labors offer him, 
at best, only temporary distraction from grief, and this relief comes primarily from his 
friend‘s companionship. Yet at the beginning of the play Amphitryon claimed that his son 
undertook these labors in order to restore his family to Argos (17-19). The hero‘s tasks now 
compel him to abandon his father, who must tend to the family‘s burial and live the rest of 
his life miserably in Thebes (οἴκει πόλιν τήνδ’ ἀθλίως, 1365).186 By distinguishing Amphitryon 
and the labors, Theseus confirms that heroic feats and φιλία within the family are, for 
Heracles at least, mutually exclusive.  
The play ends with Theseus leading Heracles helplessly like a boat being towed 
(ἐφολκίδες, 1424); this image recalls an earlier scene in which the hero compared his 
children‘s tenacious embraces to such boats (ἐφολκίδας, 631). The reversal, as many have 
noted, reveals the hero‘s humility and dependence on φίλοι.187 But it also illustrates his 
alienation from the domestic sphere and suggests that he is not the ―fully human‖ figure that 
many scholars have claimed.
188
 In the earlier scene the reference to towed boats is followed 
by Heracles‘ identification with the φιλότεκνον γένος of mortals (636), and he enters the house 
accompanied by his family. In this final scene the towing metaphor similarly precedes a 
speech praising φιλία (1425-1426), but Theseus ―tows‖ his friend away from his father and 
from his home. Heracles will find many honors in Athens, but he will not be fully integrated 
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into a human community. He will have divine precincts (τεμένη) and receive sacrificial 
offerings (θυσίαι) after his death (1324-1335).189  
  The hero‘s ultimate decision to leave his household and his father reveals his inability 
to participate in the domestic sphere. It is not that he has, as Griffiths claims, ―failed to 
grasp…that it is specifically philia within the oikos which is central.‖190 There is little 
indication that Euripides condemns Heracles for moral or intellectual failings; the tragedian 
suggests rather that forces outside of his control (e.g. Iris and Lyssa, Theban νόμος in 1322 
and 1361) prevent the hero from fulfilling his domestic duties. But because of these external 
forces he remains a monstrous contradiction unable to fulfill his earlier wish to abandon the 
labors and serve his family. The horrific disruption that occurs during the massacre is never 
resolved, and thus Euripides leaves his audience with a provocative dissolution of familiar 
domestic structures. I shall argue in the next section that this dissolution is further established 
by the tragedian‘s presentation of the house itself as an unstable setting that is unable to 
protect its occupants.    
C)  ἀπορία σωτηρίας: The House as (Un)safe Space 
 In the previous sections I have argued that Euripides generates horror in the Heracles 
by undermining familiar assumptions about the gods and family. He depicts the gods as 
savage, inexplicable forces that render meaningless humanity‘s attempts to civilize the world. 
He furthermore presents Heracles as a monstrous example of fatherhood, a contradictory 
figure who alienates himself from his family and destroys those most in need of his 
protection. I would like now to discuss one final horrific element in the play, namely the role 
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of the house in the family‘s slaughter. The characters in the play presume that the house is a 
source of safety against brutal violence, much as they assume the gods and Heracles can offer 
them protection. But the house proves to be just as unreliable. I shall begin by examining 
references to the home as a safe space prior to the massacre. Then I shall examine how the 
messenger speech contradicts this characterization by revealing how domestic space fails to 
protect the family in their final moments. I argue that Euripides‘ elaborate descriptions of the 
interior space of the household makes the violence more immediately identifiable and 
chilling for his audience. The familiar and mundane setting becomes horrifically distorted by 
grotesque violence, which compels the desperate victims to manipulate familiar space in 
unfamiliar ways.
191
 This contradiction resembles the disruption of safe spaces in modern 
horror fiction, and I argue that it serves a similar function in this play in challenging the 
audience‘s preconceptions about the security of the house. 
C.1) The House in Heracles 
Before the massacre, Heracles‘ family views the house as a source of safety from 
which they have been displaced. Amphitryon remarks in the prologue: ―For we sit (outside) 
barred from our home without any means of safety‖ (ἐκ γὰρ ἐσφραγισμένοι / δόμων καθήμεθ’ 
ἀπορίᾳ σωτηρίας, 53-54).192 The audience can see the family and the house simultaneously, so 
the staging reinforces this division between the victims and their salvation. Other family 
members similarly treat the house as a source of comfort and familiarity. The children 
interpret the creaking of its doors as a sign of their father‘s return (77-79). Megara notes that 
the house still retains her family‘s name even if others have taken control of it (338). When 
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Heracles returns, his first words are a greeting to the house; like many travelers, he assumes 
that the sight of home signals the end of his troubles (523-524).
193
 Amphitryon soon after 
convinces the enraged hero that he will find safety (ἀσφαλείᾳ) inside the home instead of 
marching against Lycus‘ palace (604). Lycus is thus easily deceived by Amphitryon in 
believing that the family remains inside the home in a vain attempt to prolong their life (712-
716). The chorus signals what they believe is the end of the family‘s suffering by noting that 
―the house is silent‖ (σιγᾷ μέλαθρα) after Lycus‘ death (761). Euripides allows these 
characters, and his audience, to assume that the household is a secure place: once the reunited 
family regains control of the home, it appears that they have averted all danger. 
 The surprising appearance of the Iris and Lyssa, however, contradicts this 
assumption. The goddesses defy the fundamental distinction between domestic space and the 
outside world. Nevett has argued that the architecture and design of ancient houses reveals 
that Greeks considered the separation of inside and outside space as a priority: most homes 
had only a single entrance from the street and high, inaccessible windows; the guest areas 
were clearly marked by distinct decoration and potential isolation from other domestic 
space.
194
 Amphitryon assumes that the house is a securely closed structure from which the 
powerful can bar the weak (53-54) and, conversely, in which the restored patriarch can 
confine a guilty trespasser (κεκλῄσεται, 729). The goddesses not only threaten the house itself 
(ἑνὸς δ’ ἐπ’ ἀνδρὸς δώματα στρατεύομεν, 825; καταρρήξω μέλαθρα, 864) but also reveal the 
building as permeable and vulnerable to intrusion. Lyssa‘s quiet entrance into the house (ἐς 
δόμους δ’ ἡμεῖς ἄφαντοι δυσόμεσθ’ Ἡρακλέους, 873) involved a descent from the skene roof 
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through a trap door or stairway into the house.
195
 The staging disrupts the visual pattern 
established in the first part of the play. The front doors of the skene had served as a 
prominent onstage feature; they represented a symbolic fulcrum of power, as only those in 
control had access to the home. But Lyssa bypasses this entrance entirely, and her 
surreptitious descent demonstrates how easily the home‘s defenses can be penetrated. Her 
eventual destruction of the roof and structural supports confirms that the house can only offer 
its occupants limited protection against invasion from the outside. 
  The messenger-speech further illustrates how Euripides subverts the notion of the 
house as protected space. This speech includes an abundance of architectural detail, including 
descriptions of columns, door panels, orthostates, and altar-bases, among others.
196
 Though 
we might expect the play‘s mythical hero to dwell in an ornate palace, Euripides concentrates 
on common architectural features that would be identifiable to most members of his 
audience. Bond compares the messenger‘s depiction of the house to the fifth-century pastas-
style houses at Olynthus.
197
 These houses contained a central open courtyard bordered on one 
or more sides by a roofed colonnade (pastas); all other interior rooms radiated from these 
central areas.
198
 The descriptions of the hero‘s movement are consistent with such houses: he 
begins at the altar of Zeus, a common feature of central courtyards,
199
 and the action revolves 
around this area as the hero enters connecting rooms such as the ἀνδρών and the inner 
chamber where Megara hides. By including realistic descriptions of familiar domestic space, 
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Euripides made the family‘s horrific experience more immediate and identifiable for the 
audience. The messenger-speech contains two significant areas of contradiction involving the 
house: the first involves the tension between the deranged hero‘s hallucinations and his 
actual location; the second concerns the family‘s misappropriation of household architecture 
in their desperate efforts to survive.   
The messenger juxtaposes Heracles‘ deluded impressions of the space around him 
with descriptions of the actual household geography. Though the messenger lucidly 
differentiates hallucination and actuality, his attention to mundane details and the specific 
contradictions arising from these details illustrate how confusing the domestic space has 
become.  After entering his imaginary chariot, the hero claims that he has arrived in Megara 
though in reality he is within his own house (μέσον δ’ ἐς ἀνδρ῵ν’ ἐσπεσὼν Νίσου πόλιν, 954). 
The messenger generates confusion by introducing the two locations in the same line and 
postponing the clarification of the delusion (ἥκειν ἔφασκε) until the next one (955). The 
ἀνδρών, which was typically used to entertain guests, is a fitting location for the beginning of 
the hero‘s delusional journey, as the room serves as a transitional space between the outside 
world and the private residence of the family. But the contradictions between actual and 
imaginary locations become more exaggerated as Heracles moves into the interior of the 
house. The mundane details within the messenger‘s account illustrate the extent of the hero‘s 
distance from reality: he holds a communal feast (θοίνη) for himself alone, he dines in private 
quarters (δωμάτων τ’ ἔσω βεβὼς) rather than the designated guest space (ἀνδρών), and reclines 
on the floor (κλιθεὶς ἐς οὖδας) instead of on a couch (955-957). The hero‘s delusions challenge 
familiar demarcations of the household, and the audience hears conflicting notions of 
domestic space.  
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The hero‘s family does not share his delusions, but his deranged attacks compel them 
to treat familiar domestic space in unfamiliar ways as they search for refuge. The first child 
victim tries hiding behind a column (ὑπὸ κίονος σκιάν, 973), presumably part of the colonnade 
abutting the courtyard.
200
 The column is a narrow supporting structure and cannot adequately 
hide a human being, no matter how small. Consequently, the child‘s only hope is to use the 
column as an ad hoc barrier as his father chases him in circles (ἐξελίσσων παῖδα κίονος κύκλῳ / 
τόρνευμα δεινόν, 977-978). Euripides‘ attention to the circularity of movement here is striking; 
in less than two lines he employs three words that denote the cyclical nature of this chase 
(ἐξελίσσων, κύκλῳ, τόρνευμα). This emphasis on circularity illustrates the futility of the child‘s 
attempt to flee. While there is continuous motion (ἐξελίσσων), the victim essentially stays in 
the same place and is stopped immediately when the father finally blocks his path (ἐναντίον 
σταθείς, 978). The child‘s final movements demonstrate the inadequacy of the column‘s 
protection. The vertical support remains (for the moment) standing upright and intact, but the 
slaughtered boy sinks downward against it and lies prone (ὕπτιος δὲ λαΐνους / ὀρθοστάτας 
ἔδευσεν, 979-980). 
The second child tries to hide at the base of the courtyard altar (βωμὸν ὄρνις ὣς ἔπτηξ’ 
ὕπο, 974). Altars are traditionally places of refuge, and earlier in the play the family 
supplicated at a public altar outside of the house in the hope that Lycus would not violate the 
sanctity of this edifice (48-50). The courtyard altar, dedicated to the ―Zeus of enclosure‖ 
(Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος),201 was a familiar feature of ancient Greek homes believed to prevent outside  
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threats from entering the home;
202
 for this reason it served as the locus of ritual action 
immediately before the slaughter (922). But the child does not make any appeal to the altar‘s 
sacred protective function in his pleas before his father; the boundaries between the internal 
domestic space and external threats are no longer applicable, as Heracles belongs in both 
categories. The young boy only hopes that he can avoid his father‘s notice by crouching at 
the base of the domestic altar platform (ἀμφὶ βωμίαν / ἔπτηξε κρηπῖδ’ ὡς λεληθέναι δοκ῵ν, 984-
985). The son‘s feeble attempt to use the altar as hiding place thus does not depend on the 
structure‘s symbolic significance, and its prominence in the center of the open courtyard 
renders the effort futile: his killer in fact finds that the child‘s hiding spot has drawn him too 
close. Heracles cannot use his intended weapon, the bow, because of this proximity and so 
strikes the son with a club (991-994). The messenger compares this deadly stroke to the 
hammering of a blacksmith (μυδροκτύπον μίμημ’, 992), a vivid metaphor that simultaneously 
illustrates the brutal force of the blow and emphasizes the mundane horror of violence near a 
traditionally sacred space.
203 
The mother and third son, the final victims, attempt to find safety in the house‘s inner 
chambers (ἀλλὰ φθάνει νιν ἡ τάλαιν’ ἔσω δόμων / μήτηρ ὑπεκλαβοῦσα καὶ κλῄει πύλας, 996-
997). This private section of the house should be the place furthest from dangers; one of the 
speakers in Xenophon‘s Economics, for example, notes that he keeps his most valuable 
property in an inner chamber (θάλαμος, here designating the storeroom) ―since it is in a 
position of security‖ (ἐν ὀχυρῶ ὤν, 9.3). Euripides does not specify the common function for 
the room in which Megara and her child hide, but the tragedian suggests that this chamber 
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will provide greater security through its locked doors (κλῄει πύλας). Megara, unlike the 
previous two victims, seems to be looking for protection in an appropriate place. 
Unfortunately, the locked doors prove to be insubstantial obstacles, ultimately no more 
effective against Heracles than the column or altar. The hero has already announced his plan 
to dismantle the Cyclopean foundations of Mycenae with levers (μοχλούς… Κυκλώπων βάθρα, 
944). By locking themselves into the inner rooms, the mother and son inadvertently allow the 
hero, still believing himself in Mycenae (ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δὴ Κυκλωπίοισιν ὤν, 998), to fulfill his 
vow by dismantling the door posts and door jambs (σκάπτει μοχλεύει θύρετρα κἀκβαλὼν 
σταθμά, 999). The contrast between the Cyclopean masonry of Mycenae and the ordinary 
architecture of the household doors demonstrates the fragility of the home‘s defenses. 
Heracles was prepared to ―shatter with a trident‖ (συντριαιν῵σαι) the artfully constructed 
Mycenaean palace (945-946). As Barlow notes, the rare verb συντριαινόω adds a superhuman 
dimension to the hero‘s boasts since it is found most often in descriptions of Poseidon.204 But 
before the simple door posts and door flaps of the inner rooms in his own house, the hero‘s 
incredible might is overwhelming and terrifyingly abrupt. His boast to dismantle the 
Mycenean palace extends for four lines (943-946), while his destruction of the doors spans is 
limited to one line and opens with asyndeton (σκάπτει μοχλεύει) to emphasize the intensity of 
the action. In an instant the deranged killer renders futile his wife‘s attempts to lock him out, 
and his brutal slaughter of the mother and child confirms the family‘s complete vulnerability 
within the domestic space. 
In addition to highlighting the inadequate protection found in individual areas of the 
house, through the sequence of the murders Euripides also undermines the home in general 
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as a safe space. There is a dramatic crescendo as Heracles penetrates the building and invades 
the safest places in the house: the rampage begins in the courtyard and the ἀνδρών, common 
guest areas that mediate between internal domestic space and the outside world;
205
 it ends in 
the most intimate areas of the house as Heracles dismantles the doors to its innermost 
chambers. But the killer‘s penetration of the house also carries symbolic importance: each 
family member seeks shelter within the ―symbolic cornerstones of Greek domestic life,‖206 
and with each victim the symbolic significance of their hiding place grows. The first child 
hides behind a column, a generic structure that would be found in many types of buildings. 
The next son, however, chooses to crouch at the family altar in the courtyard. As I noted 
above, this domestic altar to Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος contrasts with the public altar that the family had 
previously supplicated. The latter edifice served as an accepted place of refuge for 
community members seeking protection against a political enemy; the domestic altar 
functions as a locus for family worship and protects the house by ―walling it off‖ (ἑρκεῖος) 
from the outside world. Heracles‘ failure to recognize its domestic significance complements 
his inability to accept his son‘s appeal to their kinship. Finally, the remaining child cowers 
under the robe of his mother (ἐς πέπλους…μητρὸς ταλαίνης, 972-973), and she in turn leads him 
into the inner chambers of the house. The final act of violence thus occurs within the most 
intimate areas of the home against a child still being held by his mother (δάμαρτα καὶ παῖδ’ ἑνὶ 
κατέστρωσεν βέλει, 1000). It is essentially an attack on the most basic conception of the house: 
a huddled family in a single room with only a locked door separating them from an external 
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threat.
207
 The audience of the Heracles is thus confronted with a contradiction of the familiar 
intimacy of the household. Though the family and audience expect the house to protect its 
occupants from the dangers of the outside world, in this play it can only lock victims in as 
they vainly attempt to escape the horrors within.  
Euripides provides little assurance that the shattered house can be restored following 
this brutal slaying. Athena‘s interference ends the massacre, but her confusing actions 
confirm that the house is fragile and unsafe. As I noted above,
208
 the coincidence of Lyssa‘s 
earthquake and Athena‘s appearance confuses Amphitryon and the messenger, and they are 
not sure whether the destruction of the house is caused by the hero‘s rampage or the goddess‘ 
interference. Bond speculates that the stone hurled by Athena (πέτρον, 1004) may have come 
from the shattered house.
209
 But even without this tentative proposition, the end of the 
massacre is still marked by the chaotic destruction of the building: after such slaughter there 
is no hope that the home can retain its former promises of security and stability.  
Amphitryon and the other survivors continue to rely on household architecture as a 
source of safety following the massacre. They chain Heracles to a column broken as a result 
of the earthquake (1006-1011). He has already circumvented an intact column (κίονος, 977), 
the raised platform of an altar (βωμίαν…κρηπῖδ’, 984-985), and bolted doors (κλῄει πύλας, 
997). But now the survivors hope that he can be stopped by less secure analogues. This 
column is broken (διχορραγής, 1008), its platform (κρηπίδων ἔπι) does not support a sacred 
edifice that might offer at least symbolic protection, and the ―corded snares‖ (σειραίων βρόχων, 
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1009) that tie him to the column can hardly restrain a man who can dismantle Cyclopean 
masonry as well as a door frame. Amphitryon concedes that Heracles once awakened could 
easily escape such restraints (ἢ δέσμ’ ἀνεγειρόμενος χαλάσας ἀπολεῖ πόλιν, 1055). Moreover, the 
staging of the hero tied to a broken column confirms the bleak depiction of the home found 
in the messenger‘s report. As Rehm notes, iconographic sources frequently incorporate a 
single column as a symbolic representation of the home.
210
 The image of Heracles beside a 
broken column thus succinctly encapsulates the utter dismantling of the household resulting 
from this rampage. The presence of this broken column throughout the rest of the play served 
as a reminder to the original audience of the contradictions underlying the violence found in 
the messenger speech: the unstable boundaries and limited protective features of the home 
leave its occupants vulnerable to unexpected and overwhelming dangers.   
C.2) Horror and the Bad Place 
The violation of spaces traditionally considered safe is a feature of the Heracles that 
is also prominent in the modern horror genre. The monsters and killers in this genre often 
strike when their victims feel safest but are in reality quite vulnerable. The chases in horror 
films often climax with the victim arriving at a presumably safe location that offers refuge 
from the threat lurking outside. Inevitably the security of the location is compromised and the 
victim becomes trapped. In some cases, the killer‘s relentless attacks against the outside 
structure of the building prevent the terrified occupant from leaving and force her to wait 
anxiously until the killer finally enters. In Carpenter‘s Assault on Precinct 13 (1976), for 
example, a murderous gang transforms a police station, a typically secure area, into 
claustrophobic nightmare as the officers and other workers wait in vain for outside support. 
In other cases, the killer is already inside the building and surprises the victim who thought 
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she had escaped. In Clark‘s Black Christmas (1974) sorority members are surprised to find 
that the disturbing phone calls that they continuously receive originate from their own house; 
in the final chase, the protagonist flees to the basement where she bludgeons the man she 
assumes is the killer.
211
  
The trope most effectively generates horror when the safe space is the protagonist‘s 
own home.  Stephen King notes:  
Our homes are the places we allow ourselves the ultimate vulnerability: they 
are the places where we take off our clothes and go to sleep with no guard on 
watch….When we go home and we shoot the bolt on the door, we like to 
think we‘re locking trouble out. The good horror story about the Bad Place 
whispers that we are not locking the world out; we are locking ourselves 
in…with them.212 
  
Since horror fiction essentially deals with the violation of cultural categories and distinctions,  
the house presents an ideal location for horrific violence. Its boundaries seem well-defined 
and within the control of its inhabitant; she can lock the doors, pull down the blinds, and 
remove even the thought of the outside world and its dangers.
213
 The horror villain violates 
these boundaries, often in a slow and agonizing fashion: he can be heard from outside, he is 
visible through a window, he begins to turn the knob of the front door, and finally he shatters 
the door and enters.
214
 The killer‘s invasion undermines the distinction between inside and 
outside, safe and unsafe space. This contradiction also involves a reversal of control, since by 
penetrating the house the villain reveals that he, not the victim, can determine who has access 
to it. This reversal is often prefigured before the killer enters; he may cut off the power 
                                                          
211
 Clark ends the film with the shocking revelation that the true killer remains in the attic tending to the body of 
his first victim, now wrapped in cellophane. 
 
212
 King (1981) 281. 
 
213
 Kawash (2000), Morgan (2002) 183-184. 
 
214
 These tropes are common in slasher films such as John Carpenter‘s Halloween (1978) and Wes Craven‘s 
Scream (1996), but can also be found in supernatural horror films such as M. Night Shyamalan‘s Signs (2002). 
232 
 
supply or sever the phone lines, thus leaving the victim vulnerable and unable to contact 
outside help. He has completely subverted the function of the house: ―…the same walls that 
promise to keep the killer out quickly become, once the killer penetrates them, the walls that 
hold the victim in.‖215  
Violence within the house also horrifies because of the symbolic connection between 
the building and its inhabitant. It is a place of common activity, and for its occupants it is full 
of memories and meaning.
216
 We identify with our homes and arrange them in ways that 
reflect our personalities. The violation of this space is thus particularly disturbing and 
immediate. Anne Siddons, the author of the haunted-house novel The House Next Door, 
notes: 
[The house] is an extension of ourselves; it tolls in answer to one of the most 
basic chords mankind will ever hear. My shelter. My earth. My second skin. 
Mine. So basic is it that the desecration of it, the corruption, as it were, by 
something alien takes on a peculiar and bone-deep horror and disgust. It is 
both frightening and…violating, like a sly, terrible burglar.‖217     
 
The hostile invasion of the house is in itself an act of horrific violence, a rupture of one‘s 
―second skin‖ that in such fictions is often followed by the destruction of the inhabitant‘s 
body.
218
 Horror fiction further exploits the connection between the victim and her home 
through depictions of corrupted household space after the killing. When the surviving 
characters discover the victim‘s body, the surrounding area is similarly mangled and tainted 
by her blood; in some horror films the director uses similar camera angles to juxtapose 
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images of a once mundane domestic space with its later state of bloody disorder.
219
 Episodes 
of horrific violence can corrupt the house permanently. Tales of haunted houses almost 
always involve what Stephen King calls ―a supernatural provenance,‖ some previous horrific 
event that has converted the house into a Bad Place.
220
 This genre of horror fiction inverts 
traditional attitudes toward the home: we normally project fond memories of comfort and 
familiarity onto our houses, but the haunted house is marked by bad memories and the 
inability to recover from a past disruption.
221
    
The motif of the unsafe and corrupted house seems similar to Euripides‘ treatment of 
the hero‘s home in the Heracles. As I have argued above, the play contains an unsettling 
contradiction between the victims‘ assumption that the house is a closed, secure space and 
Lyssa‘s surreptitious entrance through the roof, an unexpected avenue. The abruptness of this 
shift from safe to unsafe domestic space is characteristic of modern horror fiction.
222
 But 
Euripides seems more willing to manipulate his audience‘s emotions and expectations than 
modern writers of horror. His depiction of the house is marked by two significant reversals: 
the first involves the family‘s recovery of control over the house following Heracles‘ arrival; 
the second involves their loss of control as the hero begins his deranged killing. The first 
reversal deceptively reinforces the initial assumptions of the play‘s characters. The displaced 
family had assumed that access to the home guaranteed safety, and Heracles saves the family 
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by taking them within the house and killing Lycus there. The audience had thus been focused 
on the house from the beginning of the play, and the second reversal represented a severe 
contradiction not only of their own associations with the house as a safe space
223
 but also the 
play‘s continued emphasis on the house as a supposed site of security.  
Heracles‘ destruction of the house is in some ways even more horrific than the 
invasion of the killer in modern horror films. It is not an alien intruder that gains control over 
the family‘s home but a man they love and trust. The victims in the horror film at the very 
least know that their house has been invaded and their security has been compromised. 
Heracles‘ family cannot so easily distinguish the familiar patriarch from the deranged killer 
that pursues them. The father and his family also view the house itself in vastly different 
ways: for the mad Heracles it is an epic obstacle, a Cyclopean palace that he must raze to the 
ground; for the family it is a much more mundane dwelling, marked by ordinary architectural 
features that cannot protect them against the fury of an insane warrior.     
Euripides also establishes a symbolic connection between family and home, though it 
is a different type of connection from the one found in modern horror. The tragedian does not 
concentrate on sentimental or idiosyncratic details; there is no indication that this home is 
designed to reflect the particular personalities of its inhabitants.
224
 Instead he draws on a 
more general and fundamental connection between the Greek house and its occupants. As 
Lacey observes, the term οἶκος had two levels of meaning for Athenians: on the material level 
it denoted the house itself and the surrounding property where the family lived, but on the 
social level it established their membership in the community, and it was of the utmost 
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priority to retain this property in order to ensure the survival of their γένος.225 In the Heracles 
the family strongly identifies with their home. Even when they have lost control of the 
building, they do not doubt that it essentially belongs to them. Megara remarks: ―Others 
control [the property] but the name is still ours (ἄλλοι κρατοῦσι, τὸ δ’ ὄνομ’ ἔσθ’ ἡμ῵ν ἔτι, 
338). They similarly treat the house as an essential part of the family. The returning Heracles 
first addresses it before reuniting with his wife and children (523-524); Amphitryon instructs 
his son to ―allow your paternal home to see your face‖ (δὸς πατρώιοις δώμασιν σὸν ὄμμ’ ἰδεῖν, 
600).  
The destruction of the house during the massacre marks an irreparable loss of identity 
for Heracles. Not only has he slaughtered his children, whom he imagined would inherit his 
estate and his heroic reputation (460-475), he has destroyed the foundation of his γένος. The 
play presents the massacre as a kind of κατασκαφή, a razing of the house.226 Heracles earlier 
vowed to raze Lycus‘ house to the ground (κατασκάψω δόμους, 566); in his delusions he now 
similarly threatens to dismantle the palace of Eurystheus (943-946), though he ultimately 
dismantles (σκάπτει, 999) the inside of his own home.227 The practice of κατασκαφή was 
considered one of the most severe punishments in the Greek world, reserved for acts of 
heinous murder and treason.
228
 It targeted not just the offender but his entire γένος: it was 
often accompanied by the denial of burial for the criminal and the disinterment of his 
previously-buried kin.  It therefore represented ―the extirpation of the individual and his 
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immediate kin from the society.‖229 Following the massacre the shattered house reflects the 
hero‘s broken identity. He appears for most of the play beside a broken column, a symbolic 
representation of a broken home.
230
 He also uses architectural metaphors to explain the 
disaster: in describing Amphitryon‘s pollution he remarks that it is natural for offspring to 
suffer ―whenever the foundation of the race is not rightly established‖ (ὅταν δὲ κρηπὶς μὴ 
καταβληθῇ γένους / ὀρθ῵ς, 1261-1262); he compares himself to a building that Hera has 
overturned by its very foundations (αὐτοῖσιν βάθροις / ἄνω κάτω στρέψασα, 1306).231  
Euripides uses the subversion and destruction of the home to amplify the horror of 
Heracles‘ madness. He contradicts traditional conceptions of the house as a closed and secure 
space in much the same way that producers of modern horror fiction do. The invasion of the 
home in the Heracles, however, is more sinister. The gods in the play transgress not only the 
boundaries of the house but also the boundaries of the human body. Lyssa vows to enter 
Heracles‘ chest as well as his home, and blurs the distinction between herself and the hero in 
killing the children. 
οἷ’ ἐγὼ στάδια δραμοῦμαι στέρνον εἰς Ἡρακλέους· 
    καὶ καταρρήξω μέλαθρα καὶ δόμους ἐπεμβαλ῵, 
   τέκν’ ἀποκτείνασα πρ῵τον· ὁ δὲ κανὼν οὐκ εἴσεται 
παῖδας οὓς ἔτικτεν ἐναρών, πρὶν ἂν ἐμὰς λύσσας ἀφῇ. 
Such terrible races I shall run into the chest of Heracles. And I will shatter his 
house and enter his home, after first killing his children. And he, the killer, 
will not recognize that he is killing the children whom he sired until he casts 
off my madness.  
 
She acknowledges that the hero will eventually be rid of her influence, but the play makes 
clear that neither Heracles nor his home can be fully restored. In modern horror fiction acts 
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of horrific violence convert a home into a Bad Place, a permanently tainted location where 
the carnage is often repeated. The house of Heracles is similarly tainted by the gods and the 
deranged patriarch, but there is no threat of future violence. Instead the implications of the 
massacre involve a destruction of agency and identity; a hostile force has invaded the house 
and its owner, and both the family and their home have been annihilated. The play ends with 
a separation of father and son in disturbing variations of their original predicaments: Heracles 
pursues his final labor without any hope of benefiting his family; Amphitryon alone tends to 
his son‘s now devastated house and looks after his now dead wife and children. The horrific 
violence within the play then is fundamentally disaffirmative and disruptive. In the Hecuba 
Euripides illustrates how humans defy and manipulate social conventions in horrific ways, 
but in the Heracles he reveals how even the most virtuous and brave people are helpless in 
the face of irrational cosmic forces.
  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The most effective horror fiction presents its audience with a frightening disruption of 
the familiar. Stephen King compares this practice to that of a martial artist paralyzing her 
opponent: both are engaged in ―the business of finding vulnerable points and then applying 
pressure there.‖1 In the Hecuba and Heracles Euripides probed some of the most fundamental 
assumptions of his fifth-century audience and demonstrated their instability. The violence 
within these plays defies traditional distinctions between the masculine and feminine, friend 
and enemy, and domestic and outside space. The dramas achieve a similar emotional effect 
despite significant differences in plot, character, and setting. The Hecuba concentrates on a 
deliberate act of vengeance enacted by one non-Greek against another. Its protagonist is 
moreover an aged former queen whose ability to commit violence is in itself shocking, and 
the action occurs in a savage foreign land where the gods are noticeably absent. The Heracles 
focuses on deranged and spontaneous violence caused by inexplicable divine anger, its 
protagonist is one of the most renowned heroes of Greek myth, and the slaughter unfolds 
inside domestic space familiar to the play‘s audience. In both dramas, however, there is a 
similar pattern involving the evocation of familiar cultural distinctions followed by a 
hideously violent disruption. Euripides possessed great skill in manipulating his audience‘s 
emotions: in constructing these familiar categories he introduced subtle contradictions within 
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them, cracks in the foundations, before he demolished the categories entirely through 
manifestly horrific disorder.
2
        
 If we acknowledge some similarity between these plays and modern horror fiction, 
this allows us to appreciate the tragedian‘s skill in plays that have been condemned for their 
lack of unity.
3
 These plays of ―multiple action‖ deviate radically from Aristotle‘s ideal 
single-plot tragedy,
4
 and they do not conform to the standards of plausible and logical action 
espoused in the Poetics. But it is through the violation of plausibility and logic that an author 
can most effectively generate horror. Modern horror fiction concentrates on fantastic 
monsters and situations that raise doubt even among the characters and that defy normative 
cultural categories often without a clear logical purpose. The audience feels horror when the 
plausible order of human life is suddenly destroyed. Euripides achieves a similar effect in the 
Heracles and Hecuba: the former play features the sudden intrusion of inscrutable gods who 
corrupt the most intimate areas of human life; in the latter Hecuba‘s desire for vengeance is 
itself logical, but the shocking nature of this vengeance and her defiance of political and 
gender-based categories are horrific. The many apparent inconsistencies found in these plays 
are not examples of poor composition. Rather through these disturbing contradictions and 
shocking revelations Euripides offered his audience a provocative emotional experience.
5
  
 Investigations of horrific moments can aid our understanding of other Euripidean 
plays, as well. Violent contradictions of cultural categories can be found in almost every one 
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of his dramas, though these contradictions do not always serve the same purpose. The 
Orestes and Andromache, for example, resemble the plays discussed above in their 
apparently bipartite plot structure and in the sudden violence that erupts during the second 
half of each. Euripides dwells on contradictory details in each description of slaughter. 
References to the Trojan War pervade the Phrygian‘s account of the gruesome attack (Or. 
1453-1536), but these allusions reveal the peversion of heroic motifs: Hector and Ajax are 
conflated into one figure, Pylades (1478-1480), Helen;,the original prize of war, is now a 
target of violence (1500-1502), and Greek military might is now tested against women and 
eunuchs (1483-1488, 1527-1528). In Andromache, the messenger‘s report of the death of 
Neoptolemus highlights the contradiction between the holy site of Delphi and the merciless 
violence enacted by its citizens and the god Apollo (1085-1165). The end of his speech 
contains a disturbing juxtaposition between Neoptolemus‘ mutilated corpse and the incense-
bearing shrine from which it is ejected (1152-1157).  
These horrific details are not merely signs of moral condemnation against the killers.
6
 
Rather we see in these descriptions the distortion of social and cosmic order: the three 
conspirators of the Orestes, like Odysseus in the Hecuba, honor bonds of φιλία through 
outrageous violence;
7
 in the Andromache the ―wise‖ (σοφός) Apollo, like the gods of the 
Heracles, seems so intent on vengeance (1162-1165) that he encourages violence against a 
suppliant within his precinct.
8
 The severe narrative disjunctions and contradictions of cultural 
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assumptions in these plays may have been intended to achieve the same disruptive effect 
discussed in earlier chapters: Euripides challenges his audience‘s preconceptions and 
horrifies them by portraying a world in disorder.  
 Euripides was not the only tragedian to generate horror by contradicting familiar 
cultural distinctions, but he seems to have been the most eager to bring these contradictions 
to extreme levels of dissonance. Aeschylus‘ Clytemnestra defies traditional conceptions of 
feminine weakness and submissiveness: she is from the outset of the Agamemnon defined as 
woman with masculine will (γυναικὸς ἀνδρόβουλον κέαρ, 11), and this tension in her character 
culminates in the surprising revelation of her personal agency in Agamemnon‘s slaughter.9 
But the horrific contradictions within her character are never depicted as starkly as those 
found in Euripides‘ female killers. The Medea and Hecuba each present a horrific act of 
female vengeance as the final blow in a prolonged and explicit battle of the sexes. Moreover, 
while Clytemnestra represents a monstrous disruption of social order, Orestes‘ revenge, 
purification, and absolution in the court of the Areopagus suggests that the monster can be 
contained. There is no such hope in the Euripidean dramas: after slaying her children Medea 
is beyond the reach of her husband, and there is no indication that civil institutions within 
Athens will mollify the destructive figure headed in the city‘s direction at the play‘s end; 
Hecuba‘s gruesome revenge is ratified by judicial proceedings, but her sole focus on revenge 
renders this judgment futile – after executing her plot no fate can upset her, neither slavery 
nor bestial metamorphosis.
10
 Both women seem to find satisfaction in revenge itself despite 
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their otherwise miserable circumstances.
11
 Hecuba is unmoved by the disgrace of slavery, 
and Medea sees the painful loss of her children as a reasonable price for victory against her 
husband. Euripides presses the horrific potential of the contradictory nature of these 
characters to its limit and shows how such deviations can lead to sheer mayhem. 
 It is difficult to determine why Euripides concentrated on moments of extreme horror. 
There is, as Carroll notes, a paradoxical quality to horror fiction: the genre is most pleasing 
when it arouses an emotion normally considered unpleasant.
12
 Carroll attempts to resolve this 
paradox by claiming that the same contradictions that arouse horror also cause fascination, 
and in seeking fascination the audience must suffer horror as a side-effect. Carroll‘s theory 
does not, however, sufficiently explain the horror found in Euripidean drama: there is no 
shortage of fascinating and sensational material in these plays, but if the tragedian sought 
only to present intriguing marvels he could have resolved the unsettling contradictions that 
persist throughout these dramas. It is more likely that he specifically aimed to arouse feelings 
of fear and repulsion through the sudden and unexpected disruption of the familiar. It is 
through such horrific disruption that Euripides could explore the complex and unstable 
cultural institutions that his audience took for granted. He did not attempt to reassure them by 
portraying these institutions as a sufficient source of protection against violence. Instead he 
revealed how those who relied on them were vulnerable to attacks from manipulative people 
and irrational supernatural forces. While these plays are grim and often pessimistic, they 
nonetheless present complex and engaging conflicts relevant to their audiences; Athenians 
took pride in their ability to make quick judgments concerning complicated matters (Th. 
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1.70, 1.140, 2.40.3, 2.41). The horrific violence in Euripidean drama presented them with 
severe contradictions involving familiar sources of tension in their world (e.g. political vs. 
personal interest, religious ritual practice vs. apparent divine irrationality). The suggestion 
that these tensions could not be satisfactorily resolved was likely unsettling, but the audience 
may have appreciated the honest reflection of a world that was frequently in disorder. 
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